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Abstract
This thesis examines the international politics of post-conflict reconstruction in 
Guatemala. To do so, it articulates an analytical framework based on the political 
philosophy of Antonio Gramsci. The framework emphasises the nature of power, 
coercion and consent, and the problematic of political subjectivity, augmenting 
Gramsci's understanding of the latter with insights from Michel Foucault’s notion of 
neoliberal govemmentality. Based on this theoretical framework, the thesis examines 
the historical-material development of the Guatemalan ensemble of social relations 
into one of counterinsurgent disarticulation. It argues that counterinsurgency reflects 
the impulse to secure the ‘remainder’ of disarticulation -  the exploited, marginalised, 
‘traditional’ element of society constructed around semi-proletarian labour -  a sector 
of society that is both (re)produced through disarticulation and denied by its ‘modem’ 
element. A crisis of counterinsurgent disarticulation leads to the Guatemalan peace 
process, which involves negotiations stmctured around certain understandings of 
democratic p articipation t hat p rotect e lite p rivilege, p articularly e lectoral d emocracy 
and consultation with ‘civil society’. The divisions within Guatemala’s elites are not 
entirely resolved through the peace process: the accords reflect an unstable ‘caesarist’ 
resolution (a  form o f ‘passive’ hegemony) that relies on a coalition o f  modernising 
elites, the international community and the guerrilla. This coalition agrees a set of 
peace accords that would reconstmct the post-conflict Guatemalan state along 
neoliberal lines, at the level of both society and individual subjectivity. Although the 
agreements are not fully implemented, the pattern of implementation itself reflects 
particular neoliberal priorities, while the normative project of peace validates the 
ethico-political claims of neoliberalism and (re)defines progressive politics in 
Guatemala in terms of the implementation of the neoliberal accords. The thesis thus 
argues that peace processes may function as technologies for the (re)construction of 
neoliberalism.
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Introduction
The p eace p rocess i n G uatemala h as t he p otential to b ecome one o f  the 
standard-setting achievements of the second half of the twentieth century, 
in the same class as the Camp David Agreement between Egypt and Israel, 
the peace settlement in Namibia, the Paris Accords on Cambodia, and the 
peaceful transitions that took place in Czechoslovakia, Germany, Hungary, 
and Poland after the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union. It is an 
ambitious attempt, by visionary Guatemalans and the international 
community as a whole, to end an ostensibly internal conflict that has tom a 
country apart for almost two generations.
Sir Marrack Goulding, Former UN Under-Secretary General*
The Guatemalan peace process has been widely considered a success in academic and 
policy-making circles.^ It involved polarised groups in dialogue, which seemed 
impossible during several decades of war. It provided a development programme to 
modernise the economy and national infi'astmcture that had the support of international 
organisations and both sides of the negotiating table. The peace process appeared to 
involve widespread popular participation, and by extension reflect a significantly 
democratic process. In this reading, the peace process involved disenfranchised 
communities in national level politics, in principle enhancing both the quality of their 
representation and their capacity for participation.
Perhaps the greatest sense of success is associated with the perception that the peace 
agreements were able to address effectively the roots of the armed conflict, or the 
social bases of conflict (Pasara, 2001: 12); (Byrne, 1997: 3); (Goulding, 2000: xv). In 
its strongest formulation, this position argues that the provisions for the post-conflict
* Sir Marrack Goulding, 'Preface', in Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala's Peace 
Process, ed. Susanne Jonas (Oxford: Westview Press, 2000), xiii.
 ^By this is meant the negotiations of the accords, not necessarily their implementation, 
which has been arguably less successful (discussed further in the conclusions).
State in the agreements provide the sort of development necessary for a broadly 
redistributive project in a country with abysmal social indicators -  levels of poverty, 
access to health care and education, etc. -  in both absolute terms and relative to the 
size of the economy (Burgerman, 2000: 81). This view particularly sees the Socio- 
Economic Accord as striking a balance between social and macroeconomic or 
structural adjustment concerns.
Another element of the sense of success regarding the Guatemalan peace process 
relates to the achievement of a robust statement of indigenous rights. Beyond 
representing an enormous accomplishment in the Guatemalan context, the far-reaching 
scope of indigenous rights in the agreements is seen as a model for such statements 
internationally. Christopher Chase-Dunn argues, for example, that ‘Guatemala’s 
accord on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples ... is a conceptual breakthrough 
that many other countries should emulate’ (Chase-Dunn, 2000: 109).
The peace process was similarly considered a success in terms of its effect on 
liberalising domestic politics in Guatemala. This view, related to the successes of the 
Indigenous Rights Accord, suggests that the negotiations themselves promoted an 
opening for broader civic participation in national politics, particularly among centre- 
left organisations and for the promotion of human rights (Armon, et al., 1997: 5-6). 
Suzanne Jonas uses the metaphor of springtime ‘because new spaces were opening up 
within an exclusionary system for broader participation in politics, and indigenous and 
women’s organizations were blossoming’ (Jonas, 2000: 5). Indeed, the process is 
credited with cultivating a civil society ‘capable of playing a leadership role in 
monitoring and advising the civilian government’ (Burgerman, 2000: 64).
As Sir Marrack Goulding suggests in the quote at the outset, the accomplishments of 
the Guatemalan peace process are not seen to be limited to the domestic sphere alone: 
they are considered a success of the ‘international community’ as well. The 
Guatemalan peace process is seen as a success for the United Nations (UN) on several 
issues. Perhaps most significantly, the UN mission for the verification of human rights 
in Guatemala, MINUGUA, is widely accepted as having reduced human rights abuses 
and created an atmosphere that allowed wider participation in the peace process than 
would have otherwise occurred. The UN’s role as mediator was seen as both highly 
successful and an important development in the role of the Secretary General in the 
promotion of peace internationally. Susan Burgerman describes the case of Guatemala 
as one of the ‘most illuminating examples’ of ‘direct intervention in the settlement of 
civil conflict by the United Nations (UN) Secretary General’ in part because the UN 
mediator’s conduct ‘extended beyond the role of “good offices” to initiating 
independent proposals, including recommendations for disarmament procedures, 
military restructuring, and j udicial and constitutional reform measures’ (Burgerman, 
2000: 63). Finally, the international community is seen as having succeeded in 
Guatemala in  terms o f its coordination on financial questions and its willingness to 
consider ‘peace conditionality’ in policies vis-à-vis Guatemala. Guatemala provided an 
opportunity for the UN and the international financial institutions (IFIs) to address the 
criticism o fw  orking at c ross-purposes, which h ad b een p articularly 1 evelled against 
the S alvadoran peace process (de Soto and del C astillo, 1994). The achievement o f  
communication and coordination between the multilateral institutions constitutes part 
of the understanding of the peace process as a success of the international community.
To borrow a metaphor that Finn Stepputat uses for the post-conflict Guatemalan state, 
in many ways the peace process itself served as a laboratory for the UN and the IFIs to
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refine their understandings of peace negotiations and post-conflict reconstruction 
(Stepputat, 1999: 54). These ‘trials’ were considered positively conclusive: Jeremy 
Armon, echoing the sentiments of many, has argued that the lesson of Guatemala is 
that ‘there is clearly a facilitatory role for the international community in bringing civil 
wars to an end, and nurturing the conditions for increased political tolerance and 
diversity’ (Armon, et al., 1997: 7).
Critical perspectives on the ‘success’ narrative
This story nonetheless raises a number of questions regarding the grounds on which 
this ‘success’ was achieved. What fundamental p olitical understandings o f  the post­
conflict state and society are implied by the peace accords? Are these understandings 
problematic if one moves away fi*om technical considerations of reaching consensus 
within the peace negotiations themselves? These questions inspire a more critical 
reading of the Guatemalan peace process, which implies a series of counter­
considerations to the success claims outlined above. Such a posture seeks to explore, 
for example, how celebrating the establishment of the notion that root causes should be 
addressed, may depoliticise the nature of post-conflict reconstruction, and thus asks by 
what criteria the social bases of conflict are to be addressed. Similarly, the emphasis 
on achieving indigenous rights may obscure the grounds on which such rights are 
constructed. This critical perspective is 1 ikewise concerned with the parameters and 
structure of domestic political liberalisation and with what principles the IFIs and the 
UN improve their coordination. The distinction between critical and problem-solving 
theories can illuminate this project of focusing attention on what is obscured by the 
‘success’ reading of the peace process.
Problem solving theories ‘take the world as they see it’ and aim to make ‘relationships 
and institutions work smoothly by dealing effectively with particular sources of 
trouble’ (Cox, 1981: 129). Thus, problem-solving knowledge tends to result in a 
reproduction of the status quo (Patomaki, 2001: 727). Problem solving theory engages 
with a ‘continuing present’ in the form of ‘the permanence of the institutions and 
power relations which constitute its parameters’ (Cox, 1981: 129). As Robert Cox 
observes, problem-solving theory’s ahistoricity ‘is not merely a convenience of 
method, but also an ideological bias’, problem solving theory may be 
‘methodologically value-free insofar as it treats the variables it considers as objects (as 
the chemist treats molecules or the physicist forces and motion); but it is value-bound 
by virtue of the fact that it implicitly accepts the prevailing order as its own 
framework’ (Cox, 1981: 129-30).
Critical theories, b y contrast, s tand ‘ apart for the p revailing o rder o f  the world and 
[ask] how that order came about’ (Cox, 1981: 129). As captured in Robert Cox’s 
famous dictum, ‘theory is always for someone and for some purpose’, the purpose of a 
critical theoretical perspective is to uncover the interests behind dominant 
understandings of the status quo (Cox, 1981: 128). ‘[Critical theory] is directed 
towards an appraisal of the very framework for action, or problematic, which problem­
solving accepts as its parameters’ (Cox, 1981: 129). In their attention to social 
transformation, critical theories engage with an historical account that actively 
incorporates both a description of the past and a description of historical change. 
Where problem-solving theories take social and political institutions as ‘given’, critical 
theories seek to analyse them in terms of their histories, interrelationships and 
processes of transformation. A critical perspective thus implies understanding how 
power is constructed historically and how power relationships become naturalised or
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obscured. Where problem-solving theory establishes narrow parameters on its 
analytical remit, critical theory seeks to establish a holistic understanding: ‘the critical 
approach leads towards the construction of a larger picture of the whole of which the 
initially contemplated part is just one component, and seeks to understand the 
processes of change in which both parts and whole are involved’ (Cox, 1981: 129). 
Finally, as the above would imply, critical theory differs from problem-solving theory 
in its posture towards epistemology. Given its understanding of the necessity of a 
normative position in every theory, critical theory rejects the fact-value distinction 
associated with problem-solving theory’s generally positivist methods.
A Gramscian reading of the Guatemalan peace process
Given the issues at stake in the Guatemalan peace process, a critical reading should be 
equipped to engage with an account of the social bases of conflict in full historical and 
international dimension, of the ethico-political status of cultural difference, the nature 
of popular political participation, and the nature of the relationship between the 
international community and ‘domestic’ peace processes, in other words, an account of 
world order. The political theory of early twentieth century socialist, Antonio Gramsci, 
explored further in Chapter 2, provides tools for such an analysis. The point of 
departure for Gramsci’s analysis is historical materialism, from which he develops 
several conceptual tools for the critical analysis of politics and society: innovative 
understandings of the ‘state’, political power, and political subjectivity.
The success story emphasises the social bases of conflict within problem-solving 
parameters that locate conflict in the dysfunctional state and obscure the historical and 
international dimensions of conflict as well as the construction of the state itself.
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Gramsci understood the state in broad terms of the operation of political power: the 
‘integral state’ involves both civil society and political society, the narrow, 
conventional understanding of the state. For Gramsci, governance transcends the 
institutional and is understood in broad political-socio-economic terms: the emphasis 
is on understanding the ‘ensemble of social relations’. Central to Gramscian analysis, 
then, is a rejection of the assumption that civil society exists necessarily in opposition 
to political society; rather, these spheres are intricately related in the operation of 
power within the ensemble of social relations.
The targeting of civil society as a sphere for foreign policy intervention thus is quite 
significant to a Gramscian analysis. William I. Robinson suggests that US policy­
makers appreciate the political power of civil society, making it the site for the ‘new 
interventionism’ (Robinson, 1996: 28-29). Multilateral organisations have also 
engaged in ‘targeting’ civil society. These interventions often serve neoliberal political 
economic goals (Biekart, 1999: 175, 211).
The integral state and the ensemble of social relations are helpful for conceptualising 
the nature of the state and governance in the ‘periphery’, because they allow for an 
appreciation of the complex political, economic and social relationships implied by 
global hierarchies in ‘development’. The structures of ‘peripheral’ economies, 
particularly those dependent on exports from agriculture or mining, involve complex 
relationships in civil and political society both ‘domestically’ and ‘internationally’ that 
construct the possibilities for politics. In such cases of disarticulation (see below), 
political decision-making is highly contingent on conditions and agents outside of the 
narrow, institutional state. Indeed, the very conceptions of modernisation and 
development that condition the peripheral state’s raison d'etat, internal and external
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relationships are constructed through a dynamic informed by ‘domestic’ realties and 
considerations of a larger political-economic-cultural order. Perspectives on conflict in 
the periphery, furthermore, to a large extent involve an assessment of the problematic 
of modernisation and development. (As is discussed further in Chapter 3, 
counterinsurgency warfare results from tensions of a particular understanding of 
modernisation in disarticulated conditions.)
Gramsci’s most notable contribution to understanding politics was his concept of 
hegemony, a sophisticated account of the operation of power through a combination of 
force and suasion. Hegemony describes a situation of successful ‘intellectual and 
moral leadership’ such that dominant groups that hold the coercive power in society 
need not use it to exercise their dominance but may rely on the consent of subaltern 
groups. Whether or not conditions of hegemony actually obtain, its constituent 
elements are illuminating for the understanding of political power. In his analysis of 
the nature of consent, Gramsci drew attention to questions of political consciousness 
and subjectivity, key factors in the operation of political power.
Gramsci’s understanding of politics -  located both in political and civil society, 
associated with questions of suasion and consciousness -  is intricately related to 
questions of culture. This, along with his critique of positivism and teleology, provide 
a lens with which to see both the historically and materially constructed dimensions of 
racial and cultural difference as well as the ethico-political grounds on which such 
difference might be approached. The holistic perspective sought by critical theory is 
captured in Gramsci’s notion of the historical bloc, the mutually reinforcing 
institutionalisation of the political and cultural dimensions of a particular socio­
economic order.
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The Gramscian reading of the Guatemalan peace process offered in the chapters that 
follow emphasises the historical and international dimensions of the ‘social bases of 
conflict’ and their relationships to peripheral conditions of disarticulation. It sees the 
definition of democracy and liberalisation in domestic politics as the result of evolving 
circumstances that established particular parameters that would limit the possibilities 
for social transformation. In this reading, the negotiations themselves construct 
parameters around fundamental questions such as the nature of cultural rights and their 
relationship to socio-economic questions. The nature of the post-conflict state implied 
by the texts of the agreements involves the reconstruction of society as subordinate to 
the market at the institutional and subjective levels.
This alternative, critical reading understands conflict in terms of the tensions and 
contradictions within the disarticulated ensemble of social relations (see Chapter 3). 
Disarticulated economies are export-oriented and rely on coercive labour relations 
(within the ostensive rubric of free labour); disarticulation reflects both the ‘objective’ 
economic conditions o f  this exploitation, as well as the ‘ subjective’ social relations 
that emerge, including class, race, and cultural (e.g., ‘modem’/‘traditionar) 
hierarchies. Historically dominant theories of modernisation have sought to 
industrialise disarticulated societies through the maintenance of such social 
hierarchies. They conceptualise resistance to such modernisation in terms of the 
destabilising effects of social transformation on ‘traditional’ social patterns rather than 
a rejection of the underlying social hierarchies and the rationales through which they 
are defended. Thus dominant theories of modernisation are associated with 
conceptions of how to secure society during times of transformation, embodied in 
theories of counterinsurgency.
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The counterinsurgent state in Guatemala, established by domestic elites and the US as 
a reaction against attempts to challenge the disarticulated social order, would 
ultimately suffer a crisis of its own contradictions (discussed further in Chapter 4). 
This crisis would be addressed through the related phenomena of a domestic 
démocratisation process and a regional peace processes. The latter would reconstruct 
involvement in the region, giving parameters to what could be called the ‘international 
community’: bilateral involvement of the US and European states, multilateral 
involvement of the EU, the IFIs and the UN. The domestic return to civilian rule 
reflected a pact to reassert economic elites’ interests while preserving key elements of 
military power. The regional peace process established an anaemic understanding of 
democracy constructed to discipline the revolutionary movement in Nicaragua. These 
processes would result in Guatemala’s domestic peace process, which would be 
limited by prior understandings of questions such as the nature of democratic 
participation and the need to rebuild the political centre.
The peace process can be understood in two dimensions: the negotiations of the 
agreements (which occur in several phases) and the vision of the post-conflict state as 
constructed through the texts of the accords. The negotiations reflect the operation of 
political p ower to p  reserve e lite i nterests, as a Gramscian analysis h elps i lluminate. 
They involved the strategic use of civil society to cultivate consent for the peace 
process, within parameters that established the need for consensus around the political 
centre: opportunities for participation consistently led to the attenuation of popular 
demands. The negotiations also consistently deferred socio-economic considerations in 
their engagement with political questions, constructing an understanding of rights as 
an exclusively political problematic.
15
The negotiations reflect the elite management of a moment of social transformation, 
but one of competing perspectives that leaves the peace process itself on unstable, 
contested terrain. Thus the texts of the accords articulate a view of the post-conflict 
state that reflects a coalition of interests constructed around a particular resolution of 
the contradictions of counterinsurgency: a resolution based on the conception of 
neoliberal modernisation shared by certain economic elites and international actors. In 
this reading, social investment per se cannot be considered a compromise between 
neoliberalism and addressing ‘the root cases of conflict’: the nature of what is being 
(re)constructed through such investment must be observed. The texts of the 
Guatemalan accords reflect the reconstruction o f  the Guatemalan state in  neoliberal 
terms. It emphasises market mechanisms for the resolution of distributional questions 
particularly vis-à-vis land, a key question in the conflict. However, in its social 
investment patterns as well, the provision of spending is predicated on the 
‘reorganisation of the rural population for production’, that is the construction of 
neoliberal subjectivity as a requirement for participation in the post-conflict state.
The accords therefore reflect a very thin resolution of disarticulated counterinsurgency. 
They address the objective conditions of disarticulated agricultural production only at 
the margin, in the rural population beyond the finca, while they engage with the 
‘subjective’ dimension of counterinsurgency through the incorporation of ‘dangerous’ 
groups (the indigenous and the guerrilla) though a regime of rights and reintegration. 
However, this solution is one that in fact further erodes the autonomous bases for 
indigenous society and subjects it -  as with Guatemalan society as a whole -  to market 
rationality, such that the grounds for the preservation of indigenous culture is its 
commodification.
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Although this resolution does to a degree reflect the ‘genuine’ construction of consent 
between economic elites and the guerrilla based largely on achievements understood in 
terms of the success claims outlined above, it is unstable as the result of the very logic 
that preserved elite influence in the peace process. This logic -  which among other 
strategies relied upon an unreformed electoral system to endorse the resolution of 
‘essential’ economic and military issues -  maintained not only the position of 
modernising economic elites but of other powerful groups that would challenge this 
resolution of disarticulation as well.
Peace processes and the (re)construction of world order
In the reading offered here, ultimately the Guatemalan peace process reflects the 
(re)construction of the post-conflict state in neoliberal terms through a coalition of 
international actors, Guatemalan economic elites and the guerrilla. Neoliberal p eace 
processes reflect a certain ‘reflexive’ process of the (re)construction of neoliberalism: 
the ‘international community’ assists in the reconstruction of the state in neoliberal 
terms, while the neoliberal state in turn contributes to the (re)construction of a 
neoliberal world order.
The issue of neoliberalism’s impulse to reconstruct the state is not entirely new for 
Gramscian analyses of world politics. Robert W. Cox’s classic analysis of the 
relationship between states and world orders examined the dynamics between internal 
and external pressures on states to maintain their compatibility with global economic 
conditions. Stephen Gill’s work on disciplinary neohberalism and William I.
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Robinson’s work on authoritarian-democratic transitions also provide analyses to some 
extent animated by this concern.
Robert Cox has used Gramscian analysis to examine the relationship between the state 
and world order. In his schema, the state is the product both of internal forces (‘the 
configuration of social classes within a historic bloc’, discussed further in Chapter 2) 
and external forces (‘the permissiveness of the world order’, which ‘tends to limit 
forms of state to those that are compatible with the prevailing social structure of 
accumulation’) (Cox, 1987: 147-8, 209-10). For Cox, because the state is a reflection 
of social classes, raison d ’etat is an expression of the organisation of production: 
transformations in production relations are related to changes in the form of state and 
the raison d ’etat (Cox, 1987: 106).
In Stephen Gill’s account of neoliberalism, the economic project of liberalisation is 
accompanied by a political project of restructuring the state and international 
organisations. This political project, the ‘new constitutionalism’, operates through 
conditionality, ‘ quasi-institutional regional arrangements’ and multilateral regulatory 
frameworks such as the WTO (Gill, 1995: 412). Central to this is ‘the imposition of 
discipline on public institutions, partly to prevent national interference with the 
property rights and entry and exit options of holders of mobile capital with regard to 
particular political jurisdictions’ (Gill, 1995: 413).^ The political project of the new
 ^Among other privileges for capital. Gill suggests that the new constitutionalism has 
involved the restructuring of taxation in the OECD and elsewhere, in ways that reduce 
the relative taxation of capital while attempting to broaden the individual tax base, ‘in 
order to create a more “activist tax state” with increasingly regressive taxes’. Stephen 
Gill, Power and Resistance in the New World Order (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2003), 136-7. Taxation is a long-standing question in Guatemala and 
central to the question of peace conditionality, as discussed further in the Conclusion.
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constitutionalism is necessary because, ‘whereas capital tends toward universality, it 
cannot operate outside or beyond the political context, and involves planning, 
legitimation and the use of coercive capacities of the state’ (Gill, 2003: 141).
Gill argues that ‘neo-liberal forms of discipline are not necessarily universal nor 
consistent, but they are bureaucratized and institutionalized, and operate with different 
degrees of intensity across a range of “public” and “private” spheres, in various state 
and civil society complexes. Discipline in this sense is both a transnational and a local 
dimension of power’ (Gill, 2003: 130-1). This is underwritten by certain values and 
orientations -  ‘new constitutionalist proposals are often implicit rather than explicit’ -  
such as market efficiency, discipline, confidence, economic policy consistency, 
limitations on democratic decision-making processes (Gill, 1995: 412). Indeed, for 
Gill, the cultural component of disciplinary neoliberalism reflects Marx’s commodity- 
fetishism in that capitalist commercialization conditions outlooks, identities, time- 
horizons and conceptions of social space (Gill, 2003: 120).
William I. Robinson has argued that world-wide transitions fi*om authoritarianism to 
democracy in the 1980s and 1990s, and the shift in US support for the former to the 
latter, reflects the changing needs for social control required by transnational capital. 
Fundamentally, authoritarian regimes became seen as inefficient for providing political 
stability in the face of démocratisation movements generated by changing social and 
economic roles associated with globalisation (Robinson, 1996: 38). The US policy­
making elite, acting on behalf of the interests of a transnational elite, responded to 
such movements with the promotion of a particular, narrow understanding of 
democracy, where political contestation is limited to elections involving a selection of 
elite-determined choices (‘polyarchy’), as well as an emphasis on political intervention
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into civil society to reconstruct it as an arena to buttress elite political projects 
(Robinson, 1996: 28-29)/
The reading of the Guatemalan peace process offered here draws on and is animated 
by many of the same concerns as the works of Cox, Gill and Robinson, however it 
differs in scope, most significantly vis-à-vis the issue of political subjectivity. Peace 
processes, particularly those that emphasise addressing the social bases of conflict, 
offer a uniquely profound opportunity to reconstruct the state. As the analysis of the 
texts of the accords in Chapter 4 illustrates, this possibihty can be seen to operate at 
the most fundamental level of political subjectivity. In the Guatemalan peace process, 
the ‘reorganisation of the rural population for development’ extends the ‘capillary 
power’ of capitalism that Gill describes to the level of constructing political 
subjectivity.
The analysis presented here largely accepts Cox’s arguments about the relationship 
between the stae and the interstate system. This reading also resonates with Gill’s 
observations about the cultural dimension and values animating neoliberalism, while 
the specific technologies of consent found in the negotiations shares much with 
Robinson’s analysis of the promotion of polyarchy. However, it combines questions of 
the cultural status of neoliberalism and its values -  more profoundly its subjectivity 
and rationality -  and the question of its construction within North-South relations and 
the development problematic. To do so it relies on an appreciation of the subjective 
dimension of political-economy at the macro-economic level through Alain de
As discussed in Chapter 2, although sympathetic to Robinson’s project in many 
respects, his attempt to integrate world systems theory with a Gramscian analysis 
conflicts with the analytical fi*amework offered here.
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Janvry’s understanding of the disarticulated developing economy and at the level of 
individual rationality through neoliberal conceptions of homo economicus.
Questions of culture and subjectivity have been central elements of the ‘development 
problematic’, both in its formulation as an object of academic study as well as the 
longer-standing historical questions of the encounter between the ‘modem’ and the 
‘traditional’ (the European and the indigenous) in Latin America and globally/ These 
divisions are of enormous significance for the stmcture of the ensemble of social 
relations and the ontology and nature of political violence in Guatemala. Appreciating 
the subjective dimension of the post-conflict state (and by extension global order) is 
central to understanding the efficacy of the constmction of neoliberalism in the 
periphery and, firom a Gramscian perspective, how to resist it.
In what follows, a Gramscian fi’amework for understanding contemporary peace 
processes is developed in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 examines the historical-material 
development of the Guatemalan ensemble of social relations into one of 
counterinsurgent disarticulation. Chapter 4 then describes how the crisis of 
counterinsurgent disarticulation and regional peace processes converge to constmct the 
Guatemalan p eace p rocess, the n egotiations o f t h ep  eace p rocess and then eoliberal 
accords it produces. Finally, the Conclusion considers the implementation of the 
accords and implications that has on understanding the international politics of post- 
conflict reconstmction.
 ^For an overview of the intellectual history of development studies, see: Tariq Banuri, 
'Development and the Politics of Knowledge: A Critical Interpretation of the Social 
Role of Modernization Theories in the Development of the Third World', in 
Dominating Knowledge: Development, Culture and Resistance, ed. Federique Apffel 
Marglin and Stephen A. Marglin (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
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Gramscian Politics and the Study of Peace Processes
This chapter provides a reading of the work of the Italian political theorist Antonio 
Gramsci to construct a framework for examining the international politics of post- 
conflict reconstruction in Guatemala/ Gramsci’s Prison Notebooks -  his greatest 
contribution to political theory, written while incarcertated under fascist government, 
1926-1937 -  might he characterised as exploring the nature of politics and power in 
terms of three interrelated dimensions: the institutional, the subjective and the 
historical. Gramsci prohlematises conventional understandings of the institutional 
dimension of politics through an expanded notion of state and an appreciation of the 
sociological and cultural dimensions of politics. He understands power to be 
historically, materially, and subjectively (re)constructed, a dynamic that constitutes the 
terrain of politics and possibilities for social transformation.
 ^ The following relies heavily on Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith’s 
selections from and translations of the Prison Notebooks. Antonio Gramsci, Selections 
from the Prison Notebooks o f Antonio Gramsci^ ed. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey 
Nowell Smith, trans. Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith (London: Lawrence 
and Wishart, 1991). This translation, originally published in  1 971 and reprinted six 
times, is widely respected as one of the most thorough English-language collections of 
these works. E.J. Hohsbawm, 'The Great Gramsci', The New York Review o f Books, 
April 4 1974, 39. Hoare and Nowell Smith have also translated selections from 
Gramsci’s political writings 1910-20 and 1921-26 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from 
the Political Writings 1910-1920, ed. Quintin Hoare, trans. John Mathews (London: 
Lawrence and Wishart, 1977); Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Political Writings 
1921-1926, ed. Quintin Hoare, trans. Quintin Hoare (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 
1978). A collection of Gramsci’s cultural writings is found in Pedro Cavalcati and Paul 
Piccone, eds.. History, Philosophy and Culture in the Young Gramsci (St. Louis: Telos 
Press, 1975). David Forgacs provides a collection of shorter excerpts of Gramsci’s 
original works in, David Forgacs, ed., A Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916- 
1935 (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1988). The most comprehensive collection of 
commentaries on Gramsci’s political theory can he found in Martin James’ four 
volume series. Martin James, ed., Antonio Gramsci: Critical Assessments o f Leading 
Political Philosophers, 4 vols. (London: Routledge, 2002). Joan Nordquist, ed., 
Antonio Gramsci: A Bibliography, Social Theory: A Bibliographic Series (Santa Cruz, 
CA: Reference Research Services, 1987), while a bit dated, includes works by and 
about Gramsci as well as references to reviews of such works. Giuseppe Fiori’s 
biography is considered the definitive description of Gramsci’s life available in
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The following provides a reading of Gramsci*s understanding of politics, above all his 
understanding of hegemony and its constituitive elements, coercion and consent, 
intellectual and moral leadership, political subjectivity, Gramsci’s understanding of 
power and the relationship between politics and culture. How these relate to questions 
of the state and world order is then considered, with particular attention to the world 
order and raisons d ’etat implicated in the Guatemalan case. The reading of Gramsci 
offered here incorporates features of this thought that have conventionally be 
disaggregated in different academic disciplines (e.g., cultural studies, anthropology, 
international political economy). As a theorist of political economy, culture, and 
political subjectivity, Gramsci provides a framework highly suited to examining 
developing countries in general and Guatemala in particular, where the ‘ensemble of 
socialrdations’ ishistorically rooted inpattems o f  economicproduction associated 
with cultural and racial hierarchies. Such conditions, furthermore, are understood to be 
related to the ‘social bases of conflict’, and are central to understanding the peace 
process and reconstruction plans for the post-conflict state.
English, Guiseppe Fiori, Antonio Gramsci: Life o f a Revolutionary^ trans. Tom Narin 
(New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1971). A simpler introduction to Gramsci’s life and 
work is found in Anne Showstack Sassoon, ed.. Approaches to Gramsci (London: 
Writers and Readers, 1982), while a brief introduction to his politics can be found in 
Roger Simon, Gramsci's Political Thought (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1991). 
Walter L. Adamson, Carl Boggs and Alastair Davidson all have written book-length 
treatments of Gramsci’s life and politics: Walter L. Adamson, Hegemony and 
Revolution: A Study o f  Antonio G rams cVs P olitical and Cultural Theory (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1980); Carl Boggs, The Two Revolutions: Antonio 
Gramsci and the Dilemmas o f Western Marxism (Boston: South End Press, 1984); 
Alastair Davidson, Antonio Gramsci: Towards an Intellectual Biography (London: 
Merlin Press, 1977); while Anne Showstack Sassoon, Gramsci's Politics (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1987) focuses more exclusively on his politics.
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Hegemony and Gramscian politics
Gramsci’s most noted contribution to political theory is his conception of hegemony/ 
Gramscian hegemony reflects a particular strategy of governance that rules 
predominantly through consent, yet with the ever-present possibility of coercion to 
protect the dominant order. Hegemony thus reflects the importance of the cultural- 
ideological or ‘superstructural’ element of governance. However, at the same time, the 
possibilities for rule are historically and materially constructed, thus always linked to 
an economic order that informs the nature of power in such a system. To appreciate the 
complexity of hegemony it is helpful to recognize three elements of its operation: the 
relationship between coercion and consent, Gramsci’s notion of intellectual and moral 
leadership, and political subjectivity.
Coercion and consent
A key feature of hegemony is the relationship between coercion and consent. Coercion 
reflects the direct power a ruling group wields in society, while consent reflects the 
ideological power o f  intellectual, moral and cultural understandings that favour that 
group.
 ^For discussions of the history and genealogy of hegemony with reference to Gramsci 
see, in addition to the survey works cited above: Ernesto Laclau and Chantai Mouffe, 
Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics^ 2nd ed. 
(London: Verso, 2001); Peter Ghosh, 'Gramscian Hegemony: An Absolutely 
Historicist Approach', History o f European Ideas 27, no. 1 (2001); Chantai Mouffe, 
ed., Gramsci and Marxist Theory {LonàQm Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1979); 
Joseph A. Woolcock, 'Politics, Ideology and Hegemony in Gramsci's Theory', Social 
and Economic Studies 34, no. 3 (1985); Thomas R. Bates, 'Gramsci and the Theory of 
Hegemony', Journal o f the History o f Ideas 36, no. 2 (1975); Joseph Femia, 
'Hegemony and Consciousness in the Thought of Antonio Gramsci', Political Studies 
23, no. 1 (1975); James, ed., Antonio Gramsci: Critical Assessments o f Leading 
Political Philosophers, volume 2, part 8.
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Hegemony manifests itself as ‘spontaneous consent’ for ‘the general direction imposed 
on social life by the dominant fundamental group’. State coercion exists to guarantee 
this ‘natural’ social condition: ‘The apparatus of state coercive power ... “legally” 
enforces discipline on those groups who do not “consent” either actively or passively. 
This apparatus is, however, constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of 
moments o f  crisis o f  command and direction when spontaneous consent has failed’ 
(Gramsci, 1991: 12). Thus, the legitimacy of coercion is constructed around a specific 
social order. Force, ‘domination’, is a resource held by the ruling groups but its 
legitimate use is a shared construction of dominant and subordinate groups.
Hegemony requires that a potentially dominant group express its narrow corporate 
interests in universal terms that appeal to the larger socio-political unit, which unifies 
different groups’ social and political aims under an ideology that ultimately privileges 
the hegemonic group (Gramsci, 1991: 181-2). The political purchase of hegemonic 
concepts comes from their ability to seem universal, in the interest of all. Thus, ‘the 
development and expansion of the particular group are conceived of, and presented as 
being the motor force of a universal expansion, of a development of all the “national” 
energies’ (Gramsci, 1991: 181-2). An example from international relations might be 
Britain 1845-65, as its conception of international economic order was effectively 
expressed in universal terms -  ‘comparative advantage, free trade and the gold 
standard’ -  and underwritten by Britain’s position in Europe and her navy further 
afield (Cox, 1993: 60). This hegemony involved ‘the capacity to claim with credibility 
that the expansion of the United Kingdom served not just its national interest but a 
“universal interest” as well’ (Arrighi, 1993: 174). Hegemony expresses the shared 
political understandings of dominant and subordinate groups. The dominant group 
controls the apparatuses of force in society, however, the social order is accepted and
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equally reproduced by subordinate groups. Hegemony is ‘ethico-political’ in that 
cultural factors are as important as economic and political ones in its justification. Yet 
Gramsci qualifies this Crocean e lement by reiterating that ‘the philosophy o f  praxis 
[Marxism] thus judges the reduction of history to ethico-political history alone as 
improper and arbitrary, but does not exclude the latter’ (Forgacs, 1988: 195).*
The universalisation stage is the most ‘purely political phase’ of hegemony, and the 
universal expression of the hegemon’s interests may involve specific concessions to 
subaltern groups (Gramsci, 1991: 181). The hegemonic group may need to modify 
implicitly its goals to accommodate those of other groups. Such compromises are of an 
‘economic-corporate’ kind, they do not ‘touch the essential’, i.e., the economic order at 
the root of a society. ‘[TJhough hegemony is ethico-political, it must also be economic, 
must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the leading group in 
the decisive nucleus of economic activity’ (Gramsci, 1991: 161). The concessions 
inherent in the notion of consent in hegemony are made precisely to preserve the social 
order, not to empower marginalized groups. Though dynamic in its expression, 
ultimately hegemony protects a particular economic order.
Hegemony is a condition of power that does not require the direct exercise of force,
although it does require the continuous leadership of a dominant group:
A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise ‘leadership’ before 
winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principal conditions 
for the winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it
This is Forgacs’ own translation of one of the Prison Notebooks (Quademo 10, I§12), 
and does not refer to a particular work by Croce; Croce did nonetheless write a volume 
specifically on ethics and politics: B enedetto Croce, Etica epolitica ( Bari: Laterza, 
1931), in English, Benedetto Croce, Politics and Morals, trans. Salvatore J. 
Castiglione (New York: Philosophical Library, 1945).
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exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue 
to ‘lead’ as well (Gramsci, 1991: 57-58).
Hegemony must be continually renewed through the exercise of intellectual and moral
leadership, and such leadership requires understanding and appealing to the interests of
subordinate groups. The coercive threat underpinning the hegemonic group’s
dominance only appears when the system breaks down. Thus, as Robert Cox puts it,
‘coercion is always latent but is only applied in marginal, deviant cases. Hegemony is
enough to ensure conformity of behaviour in most people most of the time’ (Cox,
1993: 52).
Intellectual and moral leadership
The leadership implied by Gramsci’s understanding of hegemony moves beyond 
conventional Marxist notions o f  class alliances. Here 1 eadership is  an undetermined 
intellectual process that actively engages subaltern groups in articulating a worldview 
that responds to their ‘common sense’. In so doing, it challenges notions of a pre-given 
political subject as well as economistic understandings of Marxism.
There is little in the Prison Notebooks on the specifics of ‘intellectual and moral 
leadership’ (Gramsci, 1991: 57). It is conceivable that this is because different groups 
will employ different techniques based on the class interests that they reflect. 
Nonetheless, the meaning and parameters of intellectual and moral leadership may be 
inferred from the extensive discussions of philosophy, ideology and common sense.
Gramsci argues that ‘All men are intellectuals ... but not all men have in society the 
function of intellectuals’ (Gramsci, 1991: 9). Those that ‘function’ as intellectuals 
reflect historically formed social groups that make up a social order (Gramsci, 1991:
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10). Intellectuals are socially situated: each group may produce its own ‘organic’ 
intellectuals. However, intellectual activity is a complex exchange between the 
‘common sense’ of one’s lived experience and ‘ideological superstructures’ that shape 
society. The intellectual process is complex and ‘“mediated” by the whole fabric of 
society and by the complex of superstructures’ (Gramsci, 1991: 12). Thus there is a 
dialectic between an intellectual’s background and the attraction of intellectual 
activities of other groups. The more important social groups are able to promote ‘more 
extensive and more complex elaboration’ of their positions (Gramsci, 1991: 10). This 
power of attraction can end up ‘subjugating the intellectuals of other social groups 
.. .thereby creat[ing] a system of solidarity between all the intellectuals, with bonds of 
apsychological nature (vanity, etc.) and often o f  caste character (technico-juridical, 
corporate, etc.)’ (Gramsci, 1991: 60).
Knowledge is infused with the social categories of society and the power relationships 
that they imply. As Stephen Gill notes, based on Robert Cox’s famous observation, ‘by 
linking a theory of knowledge to a theory of identity and interests, Gramsci was able to 
show how ... theory is always for someone and for some purpose’ (Gill, 1993: 25). 
Intellectuals, although potentially counter-hegemonic, more often serve as ‘“deputies” 
exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political government’ for 
the dominant group, generating ‘spontaneous’ consent and justifying state coercion 
(Gramsci, 1991: 12). Indeed, Gramsci uses the term intellectual to mean anyone who 
actively articulates rationales for the political-social order, whose ranks have greatly 
expanded in the modem era. ‘The democratic-bureaucratic system has given rise to a 
great mass of functions which are not all justified by the social necessities of 
production, though they are justified by the political necessity of the dominant 
fundamental group’ (Gramsci, 1991: 13).
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For intellectual activity to have any leadership potential it must be compatible with the 
‘common sense’ of the groups to be influenced. Common sense captures ‘the 
conception of the world which is uncritically absorbed by the various social and 
cultural environments in which the moral individuality of the average man is 
developed’ (Gramsci, 1991: 419). This phenomenon reflects the accumulation of 
conventional wisdom over time: it is a reflection of dominant cultural and historical 
legacies in a society (Gramsci, 1991: 325-6). Only philosophies that engage with 
common sense can become historically effective. As Stuart Hall puts it: ‘formal 
coherence cannot guarantee [an ideology’s] organic historical effectivity. That can 
only be found when and where philosophical currents enter into, modify and transform 
the practical, everyday consciousness or popular thought of the masses’ (Hall, 1996: 
431).
Intellectual leadership involves the articulation of the (actually or potentially) 
dominant group’s political project in terms that resonate with the common sense of 
other groups. This articulation may come from a number of sources, including 
subordinated members of hegemonic institutions. For example, Gramsci observes that 
subaltern groups in the military demonstrate the most conspicuous allegiances to the 
hegemonic project (Gramsci, 1991: 13fri).’
 ^ ‘Here again military organisation offers a model of complex gradations between 
subaltern officers, senior officers and general staff, not to mention the NCO’s, whose 
importance is greater than is generally admitted. It is worth observing that all these 
parts feel a solidarity and indeed that it is the lower strata that display the most 
conspicuous esprit de corps, from which they derive a certain “conceit” which is apt to 
lay them open to jokes and witticisms’. Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks 
o f Antonio Grams ci, 13fh.
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Political subjectivity
Gramsci understands ideas as material forces that create political consciousness and 
political subjects (Gramsci, 1991: 365); (Mouffe, 1979: 185). Therefore, ‘social 
classes that exist at the economic level, are not duplicated at the political level; instead, 
different “inter class” subjects are created’ (Mouffe, 1979: 189). Political subjects are 
constructed through ideology and culture, they are not ontologically given. An 
individual may have competing political identities, but consciousness is also a 
collective phenomenon, ‘a consequence of the relationship between “the self’ and the 
ideological discourses which compose the cultural terrain of society’ (Hall, 1996: 433).
Gramsci conceives of consciousness as grounded both in the actual, material 
circumstances of real life, as well as in one’s socialisation, which he describes as ‘two 
theoretical consciousnesses’ (Gramsci, 1991: 333).*° This latter element, one’s 
received understandings of the world, may be as powerful and meaningful as the 
former. This received conception of one’s self creates collective identities and 
conditions one’s propensity for political action (in potentially debilitating ways: ‘often 
powerfully enough to produce a state in which the contradictory state of consciousness 
does not permit any action ... and produces a condition of moral and political 
passivity’ (Gramsci, 1991: 333)). Gramsci does see transformative potential in the 
critical understanding of oneself, which ‘takes place through a struggle of political 
“hegemonies’”, but the outcome of this struggle may not be guaranteed (Gramsci, 
1991:333).
James Scott’s critique of hegemony (which does not engage directly with Gramsci’s 
texts) is in fact based on an argument akin to Gramsci’s two consciousnesses. Much of 
what he attributes to ‘hegemony’ in his critique would be understood as domination in 
the reading of Gramsci offered here. James C. Scott, Weapons o f the Weak: Everyday 
Forms o f Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
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Gramsci provides a nonessentialised account of collective identities. Collective 
identities exist, but not in a static, ahistorical, ontologically-given way as per the ‘clash 
of civilisations’ thesis and related understandings of culture and ethnicity in IR 
(Huntington, 1993). Nor do identities simply exist as a reflection of economic 
production, as much classical Marxism assumes. The production of knowledge and 
culture that sustains identities is a dynamic, collective, social phenomenon. Identities 
are always tied to the socio-economic conditions that give rise to them, yet class is 
only one element of identity and, as with all elements, heterogeneous and fluid, 
contingent on the ensemble of social relations in an historical moment. Nonetheless, as 
‘common sense’ involves the residues of historical understandings, we must appreciate 
that this ‘fluidity’ may in fact be quite viscous.
In sum, we cannot expect political identification on the basis of any purely ‘rational’ 
category, such as class or an ‘obvious’ condition of exploitation such as in Che 
Guevara’s foco theory." As Stuart Hall argues, ‘This complex, fragmentary and 
contradictory conception of consciousness is a considerable advance over the 
explanation by way of “false consciousness” more traditional to marxist theorizing but 
which is an explanation that depends on self-deception and which he rightly treats as 
inadequate’ (Hall, 1996: 433). Political identification occurs in terms that are salient to 
a specific collective sense of history and society, whose transformation -  as it is 
constructed by both dominant and subaltern groups -  is psycho-socially complex.
For discussions of foco theory, see: ‘Guerrilla Warfare’ in Rolando E. Bonachea and 
Nelson P. Valdes, eds., Che: Selected Works o f Ernesto Guevara (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1969), Michael Lowy, The Marxism o f Che Guevara: Philosophy, Economics 
and Revolutionary Warfare, trans. Brian Pearce (New York: Monthly Review Press, 
1973), particularly part III, 75-113, Léo Sauvage, Che Guevara: The Failure o f a 
Revolutionary, trans. Raoul Frémont (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 
170-80.
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Gramsci’s political thought allows us to see how e conomic systems produce varied
political identities that may not conform to traditional notions of class. Central among
these facets of complex political identities is the notion of race. Gramscian analysis
can be fruitfully employed to engage with race and class as related social constructs, as
has been shown by above all Stuart Hall. He argues.
The e thnic and r acial s tructuration o f  the 1 abour force, 1 ike i ts gendered 
composition, may provide an inhibition to the rationalistically conceived 
‘global’ tendencies of capitalist development. And yet, these distinctions 
have been maintained, and indeed developed and refined, in the global 
expansion of the capitalist mode (Hall, 1996: 436).
With this perspective in mind, ‘backwards’, marginalized sectors in a social formation
becomes sites for critical analysis. Hall reflects on practices of incorporating
‘backwards’ sectors -  e.g. peasant economies in industrialising Latin American
societies, Gramsci’s Sardinia, or apartheid era ‘Bantustans’ -  into more ‘advanced’
economic structures: ‘Theoretically what needs to be noticed is the persistent way in
which these specific, differentiated forms of “incorporation” have consistently been
associated with the appearance of racist, ethnically segmentary and other similar social
features’ (Hall, 1996: 437, emphasis original).
A Gramscian approach can appreciate the material import of racism as an ideological 
structure that conditions subjects (both as beneficiaries and victims of race hierarchies) 
into a cultural understanding of race that obscures its economic functions. It illustrates 
the operation of power through knowledge and identity.
Economism, positivism, teieoiogy
Gramsci’s complex understanding of politics, with its dimensions of consent,
intellectual and moral leadership, and subjectivity, clearly conflicts with
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understandings of history as exclusively economically determined. The Prison 
Notebooks contain an explicit critique of ‘economism’ grounded in his readings of the 
early writings of Marx and Engels. The dynamic between economics and ideology 
‘must be accurately posed if the forces which are active in the history of a particular 
period are to be correctly analysed and the relations between them determined* 
(Gramsci, 1991: 177). In Gramsci’s view, the Second International misinterpreted 
Marx to understand that capitalism’s contradictions would lead inevitably to 
revolution, based on a positivist epistemology that saw the validity of Marxism in 
terms of the empirical efficacy of his analysis (Mouffe, 1979: 173).
Gramsci’s critique of economism is related to that of positivism. It is a mistake, he 
argued, to abstract patterns that may be observed in society from the context of their 
‘ensemble’ of relations. He reiterated this in at least three examples: vis-à-vis 
economics, politics, and the concept of the individual as homo oeconomicus. In the 
case of economic ‘laws’, for example, “‘[djetermined market” is therefore equivalent 
to “determined relation of social forces in a determined structure of the productive 
apparatus”, this relationship being guaranteed (that is, rendered permanent) by a 
determined political, moral and juridical superstructure’ (Gramsci, 1991: 410). Thus, 
economic ‘truths’ are highly contingent on the social structures in which they are 
embedded.
The reduction of the understanding of politics to a technocratic, parliamentary politics, 
and its separation from society (sociology), reflects a similar mistake. Gramsci argues 
that it is erroneous to believe in the ‘[cjonviction that the constitutions and parliaments 
had initiated an epoch of “natural” “evolution”, that society had discovered its 
definitive, because rational, foundations, etc. And lo and behold, society can now be
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studied with the methods of the natural sciences!’ (Gramsci, 1991: 244). Gramsci
engages in a parallel critique of the ‘situatedness’ of classical economics’
understanding of economic man.
Homo oeconomicus is the abstraction of the needs and of the economic 
operations of a particular form of society, just as the ensemble of 
hypotheses put forward by economists in their scientific work is nothing 
other t han the e nsemble o fp  remisses t hat are at the b ase o f  a p articular 
form of society (Gramsci, 1991: 400 fii 39).
‘Rational, economic man’ can only be so in the social and cultural environment that
constructs that rationality.'^ He turns positivism on itself, arguing that the real question
is not the observable ‘permanent’ forces in society, but rather, how these seemingly
immutable patterns are sustained in society.
It is not a question of ‘discovering’ a metaphysical law of ‘determinism’, 
or even establishing a ‘general’ law of causality. It is a question of 
bringing out how in historical evolution relatively permanent forces are 
constituted which operate with a certain regularity and automatism 
(Gramsci, 1991: 412).
Gramsci’s critique of economism and discussions of the ‘determined’ market,
technocratic politics and homo oeconomicus reflect a post-positivist commitment to
understanding the ensemble of social relations -  manifest structurally, institutionally,
and subjectively -  as socially constructed.
As with his rejection of determinism, in contrast to ‘teleological Marxism’, Gramsci’s 
thought does not provide a blueprint for the ideal society. Nonetheless, it provides
Marx also describes the socially ‘situatedness’ of ‘individuals producing in society’, 
c.f. variations through the Grundisse (the outline for A Critique of Political Economy), 
the original introduction to A Critique of Political Economy (generally included as an 
appendix), and the Preface to A Critique of Political Economy Karl Marx, A 
Contribution to the Critique o f Political Economy (Marxists.org, 1859 [cited 17 June 
2003]); available from http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol- 
economy/index.htm. Yet his discussion centres on the historical trajectory that allows 
for the (mistaken) abstraction of the individual from society rather than the socio­
cultural emphasis that Gramsci gives it, which allows for a comparison of political 
communities, discussed below.
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what Gill calls, ‘a rather negative definition, concerning minimum conditions, of the 
“good society”’, which he argues ‘offers no promises nor prescriptions for the form 
that such a society might take’ (Gill, 1993: 25). Leonardo Paggi offers a similar 
assessment: ‘By concretely articulating the notion of the ethico-political, Gramsci is 
able to identify, not the content of this new culture, but features of the social and 
political process which will be its support and form of realisation’ (Paggi, 1979: 144). 
This contingency is reflected in the Prison Notebooks^ discussion of the myth of 
Machiavelli’s Prince, which Gramsci critiques as oriented to restoring the past rather 
than inventing a new future. It assumes a pre-existing (albeit dispersed) collective will, 
rather than the necessity of forging a new collective will, ‘to be directed towards goals 
which are concrete and rational, but whose concreteness and rationality have not yet 
been put to the critical test by a real and universally known historical experience’ 
(Gramsci, 1991: 130). A progressive social myth will have goals, but goals that are 
seen as tentative and conditional rather than concrete. Robert Cox describes it this 
way:
[the social myth] presupposes a psychic force, a compelling movement 
combined with a rejection of the prevailing norms (e.g. as hypocritical, 
demystified). It is a normative force but not a normative plan or set of 
normative criteria. It can generate movement but not predict outcome.
Thus the normative element is crucial but not as teleology (Gill, 1993: 25 
quoting a letter from Cox).
Gramsci’s critique of economism, positivism, and telos, along with his understanding 
of p olitical subjectivity, provide the tools with which to  conceptualise a Gramscian 
perspective on indigenous politics.
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Political subjectivity and indigenous culture
Gramsci’s attention to culture provides the means for thinking about social change in a 
multicultural context. In Guatemala, where racial-cultural hierarchies of ‘ traditional- 
indigenous’ / ‘modem-ladino’ form the basis of disarticulated production in the 
economy (discussed further in Chapter 3), the relationship between the guerrilla and 
the indigenous was an issue of ongoing practical and theoretical exploration (Smith, 
1990). How should indigenous politics and autonomy be approached, then, particularly 
if it is acknowledged that indigenous culture in Guatemala has been constructed 
through a legacy of discriminatory practices over time? From a classical Marxist 
perspective, the problematic might be the following: if an indigenous culture persists 
over time because it represents a strategic source of labour, why (on what grounds) 
should it be protected from assimilation into a more modem, equitable society?
Gramsci’s appreciation of the historically and socially contingent nature of knowledge 
allows him to see rationality, particularly economic rationality, as socially embedded. 
His rejection of a specific teleology does not require that a progressive society assume 
a particular form. This open-ended notion of telos and Gramsci’s emphasis on the 
ethico-political character of a social ensemble mean that a particular social 
arrangement based on a Western understanding of technology need not be seen as 
inevitable. Nonetheless, there are grounds for cultural assessment and comparison: 
they are located in the ethos of participatory democracy in all spheres of the ensemble 
of social relations.
A Gramscian perspective raises the tension of, on one hand, understanding how 
cultural difference may be constmcted (or better: continually reconstructed) within the 
ensemble of social relations and on the other, recognising the significance of cultural
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difference i n t erms o fp  olitical s ubjectivity and the e thics o fp  olitical a lliances. H is 
discussions of the ‘Southern question’ in Italy (the uneven development of the South in 
relation to the North) illustrated a normative perspective on cultural difference, 
including the need for an autonomous voice for the ‘subaltern’ in its engagement with 
more powerful groups (Gramsci, 1978: 451).*  ^ A Gramscian position approaches 
cultural integrity in a way that recognises the relationship between historical material 
conditions and the construction of identity, yet it also allows for the valuation of 
subaltern subjectivities beyond class.
Power
In Gramsci’s conception, power is embedded in social practices and reinforced by the 
material (including ideological) structures of society. His analysis allows us to move 
beyond overly simplistic notions of power as force to comprehending power as a 
dynamic embedded in the ensemble of social relations, reinforced by social and 
cultural practices and understandings of the world. Gramsci moves the notion of power
Gramsci’s essay ‘Some Aspects of the Southern Question’ underscored the necessity 
of an alliance between Northern workers and Southern peasants for a communist 
society. He argued that the Southern peasants had been oppressed and exploited ‘in yet 
more odious and bestial ways’ than the Northern workers Gramsci, Selections from the 
Political Writings 1921-1926, 445. Obstacles to a mutual alliance existed on both sides 
and were the result of bourgeois intellectuals. Northern workers internalized Northern 
bourgeois attitudes that viewed the South as an impediment to the North and 
Southerners as biologically inferior Gramsci, Selections from the Political Writings 
1921-1926, 444. However, Southern peasants were likewise ill-served by Southern 
intellectuals (such as Benedetto Croce), whose affiliations lay with national and 
European society Gramsci, Selections from the Political Writings 1921-1926, 460. The 
political challenge becomes helping Southern peasants to see their true affiliation 
should be with Northern workers rather than with the Southern gentry Gramsci, 
Selections from the Political Writings 1921-1926, 446. Significantly, Gramsci 
appreciates the need for an autonomous peasant politics and subjectivity: the Turin 
workers’ should not ask for ‘guarantees of any kind: neither to the party, nor to a 
programme, nor to the discipline of the Socialist parliamentary group’ but that their 
Southern collaborators remain answerable to their own constituencies Gramsci, 
Selections from the Political Writings 1921-1926, 451.
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from institutions such as the state, the conventional ‘vessel’ of power in Marxist 
analysis, to ideologies and practices.
To take Steven Lukes discussion of power as a guide, Gramsci’s most approximates a 
three dimensional view of power (Lukes, 1974). In Lukes’ schema, a one dimensional 
view sees only power a s expressed through overt conflict. A two dimensional view 
sees power expressed through both conflict and the ability to set the public (or other 
relevant) agenda: ‘it allows for consideration of the ways in which decisions are 
prevented from being taken on potential issues over which there is an observable 
conflict of (subjective) interests..,' (Lukes, 1974: 20, emphasis original). The third 
view of power goes further to look at how power might act to create peoples’ 
understanding of their own interests, and thus might operate beyond the realm of 
observable conflicts of interest.’* Barry Hindess has rightly critiqued Lukes’ 
conception for failing to include the social context of power in his emphasis on 
maintaining an empirical focus (Hindess, 1976). As Gramsci’s conception of power is 
quite explicitly embedded in the ‘ensemble of social relations’, it moves beyond 
Lukes’ third dimension.’*
Robert Cox observes that, ‘The Machiavellian connection frees the concept of power 
(and of hegemony as one form of power) from a tie to historically specific social 
classes and gives it a wider applicability to relations of dominance and subordination 
. . .’. Robert W . Cox, ' Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: AnEssay in  
Method', in Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations, ed. Stephen 
Gill (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 52.
Lukes indeed examines Gramsci in his discussion of the difficulties of working with 
a three dimensional view of power. Steven Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: 
Macmillan, 1974), 47-48.
Nonetheless, Lukes’ schema is more useful for drawing out the key dimensions of 
how Gramsci’s conception differs from the mainstream (i.e., in the realm of 
consciousness), than, for example, Paul Hirst’s critique of IR, drawn from Hindess’s 
later work, which does not get to questions of ideology and political subjectivity. Paul 
Hirst, 'The Eighty Years' Crisis, 1919-1999 — Power', Review o f International Studies 
24, no. 5 (1998): 134-5.
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Gramsci’s account of power is more vigorous and satisfying than definitions of power 
in mainstream International Relations (IR). As Paul Hirst observes, the dominant 
understanding of power in International Relations involves a ‘capacity-outcome’ 
model, where power is a ‘simple quantitative capacity’ exercised in a zero-sum game, 
so ‘an actor’s capacities can be judged essentially by outcomes -  who “has” power is 
who prevails’ (Hirst, 1998: 133-34). He argues that this is not only true of realists, but 
of their critics as well, who fail in their critiques to offer coherent alternatives (Hirst, 
1998: 134).'"
In examining the role of US power in international relations, Stephen Gill has 
observed that, like realists, world systems analysts understand power as ‘power over’; 
he calls the two collectively, ‘the conventional wisdom on the American case’ (Gill, 
2003: 74). The combination of world systems theory and Gramscian analysis, as has 
been attempted, for example, by William I. Robinson, thus implies significant tensions 
with the reading of Gramsci offered here. Robinson does not explicitly reconcile the 
relationship between these two conceptions of power, apparently drawing on world 
systems theory as a way of redressing what he perceives to be an over-emphasis on 
intra-core analysis and to the exclusion of core-periphery relations in the ‘Italian 
school’ of IR (Robinson, 1996: 30) (Robinson, 1996: 629).'® Yet his alternative is to
Hirst charges Robert Keohane with incoherence, and argues that Susan Strange, 
rather than ending in incoherence, ultimately adopts a conventional definition anyway. 
Hirst, The Eighty Years' Crisis, 1919-1999 — Power': 134 n6.
Robinson refers to this second article, William I. Robinson, 'Globalization, the 
World System, and "Democracy Promotion" in U. S. Foreign Policy', Theory and 
Society 25, no. 5 (1996), in William I. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, 
US Intervention, and Hegemony, vol. 48, Cambridge Studies in International Relations 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), as a source for the summary of his 
article, thus both are drawn on for this discussion. His ciritque of the ‘Italian School’ is
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examine c ore-periphery relations e xclusively t hrough t he 1 ens o f  US f  oreign p olicy, 
which acts as on behalf of ‘an emergent transnational elite’ in a ‘power-over’ frame.'® 
The complexity of interactions associated with the ways in which power is exercised 
and mediated implied by Gramscian analysis thus does not appear in the analysis, in 
which changes in US foreign policy reflect shifts in the world system rather than 
elements of agency which might contribute to the construction such an order 
(Robinson, 1996: 617). Robinson’s analysis does provide a helpful reading of the 
nature of democracy promotion in US foreign policy, including documenting some of 
the specific strategies used to marginalise popular elements in authoritarian-democratic 
transitions (which appear to occur in the Guatemalan peace process as well, see 
Chapter 4). Yet his contribution, rather than being seen as compelling or coherent 
alternative to the ‘Italian school’, would best fit under the rubric of an elaboration of 
‘intellectual and moral leadership’ in the reading of Gramsci offered here.
only partially fair, particularly given the limitations of his analysis outlined here: while 
there is more work for ‘Italian School’ in theorising the relationships between 
developing countries and industrialised countries, Robinson makes no mention in 
Promoting Polyarchy of Robert W. Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social 
Forces in the Making o f History, 4 vols., vol. 1, Power and Production (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1987), which describes several ‘peripheral’ raisons d ’etat 
as well as the changing nature of ‘core’ and ‘perhiphery’ under the internationalisation 
of production and the state. (The latter, incidentally, is likewise uncited in, but very 
similar to, Robinson’s discussion of globalisation Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: 
Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony, 31-41.)
This over-emphasis on the US as agent and power as domination has serious 
consequences for Robinson’s empirical work, where he overstates the role, for 
example, of USAID funded research institutes in Guatemala, which, rather than 
playing a determining role were subject to a complex process of appropriation and 
manipulation by local elites William I Robinson, 'Neoliberalism, the Global Elite, and 
the Guatemalan Transition: A Critical Macrosocial Analysis', Journal o f Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs 42, no. 2 (2000). (For a critique of the empirical limitations 
of Promoting Polyarchy, see: William LeoGrande, 'Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan 
Doctrine and American Foreign Policy; Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US 
Intervention, and Hegemony', The Journal o f Politics 60, no. 1 (1998).) Given 
Robinson’s project is to theorise global Gramscian politics from the perspective of 
developing countries, it is ironic that his framework marginalises the specific 
experiences of the (class hierarchies within the) South in constructing such an order.
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Gramscian politics and social change
Although Gramsci’s understanding of power and hegemony appear to operate in a 
‘totalising’ manner, ‘a social form “always” has marginal possibilities for further 
development and organizational improvement’ (Gramsci, 1991: 222). Gramsci 
theorised the nature of social change under such circumstances: of particular 
significance is the notion of the war of position, the construction of alternative 
potential hegemonies to challenge a hegemonic order. Nevertheless, Gramsci remained 
concerned with how dominant groups reassert themselves during moments of social 
change, his concepts of passive revolution, trasformismo and caesarism illustrate the 
technologies of power for maintaining control.
As hegemony is exercised through continuous leadership, it may also be challenged 
and replaced through a war of position. A war of position is the strategy of creating the 
intellectual and moral leadership component of hegemony before holding the state’s 
coercive power: it is the creation of a viable alternative hegemony in civil society 
before controlling the institutional ‘state’. The war of position reflects the ideological- 
cultural battle to be waged, in contrast to the war of manoeuvre, the physical, military 
battle to control the state of conventional revolutionary politics. Gramsci understood 
that in the modem political environment the war of position would increasingly 
replace the war of manoeuvre (Gramsci, 1991: 206-75); (Hall, 1996: 427).
The term ‘passive revolution’ often appears near the war of position in the Prison
Notebooks. It reflects Gramsci’s analysis of the failure of progressive forces to
overcome conservative interests during Italian unification. Progressives failed for two
reasons: an atmosphere of intimidation limited their programme and their leadership
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(Garibaldi) was not sufficiently independent of the intellectual leadership presented by 
the moderates (Gramsci, 1991: 61)/° Passive revolution reflects one response to an 
organic crisis where significant changes to the economic structure are made from 
above, ‘through the agency o f  state apparatuses’, without the active participation of 
society more broadly (Simon, 1991: 50). The case for social change is co-opted by the 
dominant group. In the end, a degree of social change is achieved, but on terms 
favourable to the dominant group and without the participation of the majority. 
(Gramsci considered fascism in Italy to be an example of a passive revolution, unlike 
many Marxists of the day, who considered it the ‘last gasp of capitalism’.) This co­
optation may manifest itself in various strategies, such as the intellectual leadership 
inherent in successful hegemony, or the notion of direct co-optation that Gramsci 
terms trasformismo.
Trasformismo originally described the convergence of left and right parties in Italy 
after unification, ‘until there ceased to be any substantive difference between them’ 
(Gramsci, 1991: 58 fii 6). This reflected a period of bourgeois hegemony in which 
there was no real opposition or contestation of power (Forgacs, 1988: 430). Gramsci 
uses the term to describe a process of co-opting potential resistance into the hegemonic 
regime. He observed two stages of such cooptation in Italian history: first at the 
individual ‘molecular’ level, where individual leaders of the opposition join the
Gramsci’s perspective provides a radical interpretation of the term passive 
revolution, taken from Vincenzo Cuoco who used the phrase to describe the 
Neapolitan revolution of 1799 wherein an enlightened bourgeoisie introduced 
moderate reforms (without popular participation) to pre-empt genuine revolution. 
Forgacs, ed., A Gramsci Reader: Selected Writings 1916-1935, 413 note 4. Cuoco’s 
conception is echoed in the contemporary democratic transition literature of Guillermo 
O’Donnell et al., critiqued by Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US 
Intervention, and Hegemony.
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dominant bloc, and then at the group level, i.e., the formation of a centre/right 
nationalist party from ex-anarchists and syndicalists (Gramsci, 1991: 58 fii 6).
When there is a stalemate between forces in society such that ‘they balance each other 
in such a way that a continuation of the conflict can only terminate in their reciprocal 
destruction’, the only solution is for a third force to step in and subjugate the other two 
(Gramsci, 1991: 219). Gramsci described the solution where ‘a great personality’ 
serves as an arbiter of this historico-political situation as Caesarism (Gramsci, 1991: 
219). Caesarism may be pregressive or regressive. What is interesting is Gramsci’s 
critique of caesarism’s modem form as a police system: ‘It is necessary for the 
dominant social form to preserve [the] weakness [of the rival progressive force]: this is 
why it has been asserted that modem Caesarism is more a police than a military 
system’ (Gramsci, 1991: 222).
In his exploration of strategies of promoting or limiting social change, Gramsci 
articulates different strategies of power and resistance. His discussions elucidate the 
‘modem form’ such strategies take: the increasing significance of the war of position 
and the emergence of the police over the military.
Historical biocs, the integral state and world orders
Gramscian politics operate through subjectivity and knowledge, but are guaranteed by 
coercion. The relationship between these elements is historically and materially 
constmcted and mediated by the ‘ensemble of social relations’. Gramsci’s conceptions 
of the integral state and the historical bloc illuminate the institutionalisation of such
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ensembles, and provide a point of departure for understanding the relationship between 
political communities at the level of the ‘domestic’ and the ‘international’.
The integral state
Gramsci’s understanding of politics as informed by power operating through 
historically and materially constructed knowledge and subjectivity is reflected in a 
broad conception of the state. In his view, the ‘state = political society + civil society’ 
(Gramsci, 1991: 262-3).^‘ This amplification of the notion of state reflects Gramsci’s 
observation that at the time of the Russian revolution ‘advanced’ liberal states were 
very resilient to revolutionary social change. He argues that in these cases powerful 
interests did not need to control the state itself to exercise power over society: they 
could do so through the arena of civil society. Civil society reflects an ‘organisational 
reserve’ of the ruling classes. As a result, ‘[t]he state apparatus is far more resistant 
than is often possible to believe, and it succeeds, in moments of crisis, in organizing 
greater forces loyal to the regime than the depth of the crisis might lead one to 
suppose’ (Gramsci, 1978: 409).
For Gramsci, the idea of state includes the social structures of civil society that affect 
political consciousness: religious institutions, the education system, the press, etc. The 
state is seen not merely as the monopoly of ‘legitimate’ force but as an active agent in
For a thorough discussion of potentially competing interpretations of Gramsci’s 
understanding of the state, see Perry Anderson, The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci', 
New Left Review, no. 100 (1976-7). Nonetheless, Peter Ghosh argues that Gramsci 
maintained ‘a relentless insistence that the only legitimate state is seamlessly bound to, 
and arises from, society. So what looks like Gramsci’s confusion in the usage of terms, 
his “failure” to find “a single, wholly satisfactory conception of ‘civil society’ or the 
State” is really a significant misunderstanding on the part of his classical 1970s 
commentators’. He goes so far as to argue that Anderson’s ‘problems and confusions 
are all self-inflicted’ Ghosh, 'Gramscian Hegemony: An Absolutely Historicist 
Approach': 5.
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socialising the body politic. It is administrative and coercive, as well as educational 
and formative (Gramsci, 1991: 258-9). Governance occurs through the state narrowly 
conceived, as well as through the institutions of civil society where the ideological 
structures of the dominant classes can be constructed and disseminated. It incorporates 
a combination of direct coercion, socialisation, and the cultivation of consent 
embodied in the notion of hegemony.^^
Luis Razeto Migliaro and Pasquale Misuraca suggest that Gramsci’s understanding of 
the state is not ‘a fortress to be stormed, as a machine which can be operated 
differently by various political managements, or as an institutional apparatus which 
can be the property of a class’, but rather ‘the organization of relations between leaders 
and led’ (Razeto Migliaro and Misuraca, 1982: 72, 73). Thus for Gramsci, rather than 
Marx’s and Lenin’s emphasis on the ‘character’ of the state (capitalist, socialist, etc.) 
per se (Razeto Migliaro and Misuraca, 1982: 77), the emphasis is on the ‘ensemble of 
social relations’ and its implied strategies of governance.
Gramsci’s understanding of civil society has been a matter of great debate among 
commentators of his work given the number of contexts in which it appears in his 
work, especially the Prison Notebooks. What is clear is that his definition departs from 
one understood in terms of ‘the system of social relations based on the association of 
people independently of the State and the family which first emerged in Europe in the
Here one might note the difference between this reading of Gramsci and that of 
Louis A Ithusser, who rej ected the n otion o f  an i ndependent c ivil s ociety a Itogether, 
arguing that “‘churches, parties, trade unions, families, schools, newspapers, cultural 
ventures” in fact all constitute “Ideological State Apparatuses”, Louis Althusser, Lenin 
and Philosophy, and Other Essays (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1971) in 
Anderson, 'The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci': 35. Such a position destroys the 
subtlety of Gramsci’s contribution to understanding the relationship between power 
and knowledge and arbitrarily reifies the state.
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seventeenth century... characterised by “free” labour and a commodity market, a 
system of law enforcement and voluntary association’ (Marxist Internet Archive). 
Gramsci understands civil society more in terms of a mediating layer between the 
economic structure and the state (‘between the economic structure and the State with 
its legislation and its coercion stands civil society’ (Gramsci, 1991: 208)). His 
emphasis is less on an inviolable sphere protected from the state than on a cultural 
milieu that constructs the rationality and homo economicus necessary for production; 
as Hoare and Newell suggest, ‘civil society is in effect equated “the mode of economic 
behaviour’” (Gramsci, 1991: 209). This understanding thus moves away from a 
reliance on the direct replication of the European experience to achieve an identifiable 
‘civil society’, as well as from problematic assumptions about a pre-social human 
nature associated with ‘social contract’ theorisations of politics (e.g., the civil society 
of Hobbes and Rousseau (Marxist Internet Archive)). In effect, this conception allows 
consideration of the ways in which civil society -  that is to say a ‘private’ realm 
distinct from political society -  exists beyond the capitalist core, in much the same 
way that theorising capitalism itself in the periphery has challenged a broad spectrum 
of (particularly Marxian) thinkers.
The notion of ‘state power’ is thus related to the nature of the relationship between the 
dominant or ruling elements of the ‘ensemble of social relations’ and the subaltern 
elements, a question of political subjectivity and legitimacy. This is true both at the 
domestic and international levels, where power (including its sociological and cultural 
dimensions) operates both through the political society -  institutions of the state or the 
interstate system (multilateral organisations, etc.) -  and through ‘civil society’ beyond 
them. ‘International relations intertwine with these internal relations of nation-states, 
creating new, unique and historically concrete combinations. A particular ideology, for
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instance, bom in a highly developed country is disseminated in less developed 
countries, impinging on the local interplay of combinations’ (Gramsci, 1991: 182). In 
this sense, questions of ‘state power’ posed from the perspective of conventional 
understandings of the state capture only one site of many where power may operate. 
The degree to which power operates through ‘state power’ narrowly understood 
depends upon whether or not dominant forces in an ensemble of social relations 
(examined at the domestic or intemaitonal level) are hegemonic.
Historical bloc
The ‘historical bloc’ provides a means of conceptualising the institutionalisation of the
‘ensemble of social relations’ at a particular historical moment. It reflects the
combination of the Marxian categories of base/structure (the economy) and
superstructure (ideology). The historical bloc is ‘the complex, contradictory and
discordant ensemble of the superstructures is the reflection of the ensemble of the
social relations of production’ (Gramsci, 1991: 366, emphasis original). This
conception is a feature of Gramsci’s theory that is considered to distinguish him most
from orthodox Marxism (Smart, 1983: 39); (Forgacs, 1988: 424). Yet Gramsci makes
this claim precisely by appealing to Marx.
[Marx’s propositions tend] to reinforce the conception of historical bloc in 
which precisely material forces are the content and ideologies are the form, 
though this distinction between form and content has purely didactic value, 
since the material forces would be inconceivable historically without form 
and the ideologies would be individual fancies without the material forces 
(Gramsci, 1991: 377, emphasis original).
Razeto Migliaro and Misuraca suggest that the difference between Gramsci and (the
later) Marx on this matter involves their different understandings of civil society. As
Marx reduced civil society to economic relations devoid of mediating institutions of
intellectual and moral leadership, he could not distinguish concrete relations between
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base and superstructure, and as a result ‘the concrete ways in which the economy and 
society actually relate to the state escape analysis and subsequently are seen abstractly, 
by means of speculative concepts, such as determination, correspondence, reflection, 
conditioning, etc.’ (Razeto Migliaro and Misuraca, 1982: 80). Gramsci’s conception of 
civil society, by including the dimension of intellectual and moral leadership, allowed 
for more specific analysis.^ Gramsci’s notion of a bloc involves the dimension of 
political subjectivity, rather than exclusively ‘objective’ categories of some orthodox 
Marxisms (Boggs, 1984: 228-9).
The historical bloc reflects the institutionalisation of a particular ensemble of social
relations. It is a political formation of a dominant group and the alliances it forms with
subaltern and dominated classes: the degree to which these alliances organically
construct the world-view of subaltern groups determines whether or not an historical
bloc is hegemonic. Thus a historical bloc is a formation of heterogeneous and
contingent social elements:
The ‘leading elements’ in a historic bloc may be only one fraction of the 
dominant economic class -  for example, finance rather than industrial 
capital; national rather than international capital. Associated with it, within 
the ‘bloc’, will be strata of the subaltern and dominated classes, who have 
been won over by  specific concessions and compromises and who form 
part of the social constellation but in a subordinate role (Hall, 1996: 424).
An historical bloc involves the articulation of a world view to provide ‘substance and
ideological coherence to its social power’ (Rupert, 1993: 81). Yet this world view may
or may not be hegemonic: while hegemony always emerges from a historical bloc, not
all historical blocs are hegemonic (Adamson, 1980: 177-8). Hegemony reflects a
Razeto Miliaro and Misuraca argue that the root of this discrepancy lies in their two 
different readings of Hegel. Luis Razeto Migliaro and Pasquale Misuraca, 'The 
Theory of Modem Bureaucracy', in Approaches to Gramsci, ed. Anne Showstack 
Sassoon (London: Writers and Readers, 1982), 77.
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condition where a particular order has a ‘totalising’ effect on the ensemble of social 
relations, one that particularly is able to govern through consent rather than coercion. 
Historical blocs may also be ‘supremicist’, for example, if they remain in power to a 
greater extent through coercion than consent, i.e., if they are not able to universalise 
their world view credibly or organically to subaltern groups.
Stephen Gill has compared the Gramscian historical bloc to Foucault’s notion of a 
discursive formation, ‘a set of ideas and practices with particular conditions of 
existence which are more or less institutionalised, but which may be only partially 
understood by those that they encompass’ (Gill, 1995: 403). The stronger analogue in 
Foucault’s work may be the concept of a ^dispositif or apparatus: ‘the system of 
relations’ that can be established between ‘a thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble 
consisting o f  discourses, institutions, architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, 
administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic 
propositions’ (Foucault, 1980: 194).^ '* Nonetheless, a central difference between the 
historical bloc and Foucault’s concepts, as Gill notes, is that the historical bloc 
explicitly i nvolves a Mention to the p ower o f  c apital as a s ocial r elation ( Gill, 1995 : 
404).
Historical biocs, states and the state system
The historical bloc may be understood at a number of mutually constituting levels: the 
nation, the region, and the international (Cox, 1993: 259); (Cox, 1987: 6-7). As Robert
T he n otion o f  a ‘ dispositif has b een u sed to d  escribe p ost-WWn c onceptions of 
‘development’ (discussed below). On the compatibility between Gramsci and 
Foucault, see: Barry Smart, Foucault, Marxism and Critique (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1983); Anna Marie Smith, Laclau and Mouffe: The Radical Democratic 
Imaginary (London: Routledge, 1998); Michèle Barrett, The Politics o f Truth: From 
Marx to Foucault (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).
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Cox argues, world orders are constructions of and reflections of particular historical 
blocs. Such an order might be constructed through the explicit agency of a hegemon, 
as a liberal world order was constructed under British hegemony in the early to mid 
nineteenth century. Hegemonic orders limit the possibilities for state structures to 
those consistent with its social structure of accumulation: ‘The economic-productive 
structures of social formations are made compatible with the hegemonic world 
economy even though state-political structures may differ’ (Cox, 1987: 209-10). The 
liberal world order did not construct the liberal state everywhere, though it exported 
the functions of the liberal state as widely as possible; in non-European, ‘penetrated’ 
regions, new social orders were constructed not on the basis of liberalism in the 
‘periphery’, but on the basis of preserving the basis for the ‘core’s’ ‘liberal’ production 
and exchange.^^
However, as Cox describes in his assessment of the period of rival imperialisms 
following British imperialism, a particular raison d ’etat or set of such logics may 
emerge in a non-hegemonic period as well. Thus, the 1 ogic ofpow er politics under 
industrialisation generates a set of social forces (associated with the concentration of 
workers and urbanisation) that leads to a particular set of options at the state level, 
particularly centred around ‘the labour problem’ (Cox, 1987: 154-7). As with the
As he notes, ‘The liberal world order, like the liberal state, posited a separation of 
politics from economics, together with a fundamental compatibility between them. The 
free-trading world economy was understood to be the condition for the wealth of 
nations; this was the domain of industrial, mercantile, and financial operators. The 
responsibility of the state and the state system was to ensure the conditions for this 
open world economy while refraining from interfering with the operations of these 
economic agents. This was the meaning of “liberal” as attached to the terms state or 
world order. Liberalism had a circumstantial connection with political pluralism and 
parliamentary government in the British case. Regimes in other countries proved 
capable of achieving the same balance between economy and politics under 
authoritarian auspices. Both were “liberal” in the sense discussed here.’ Cox, 
Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in the Making o f History^ 127.
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hegemonic, liberal international historical bloc, the non-hegemonic logic of the period 
of rival imperialisms (1880s -  1919) constructed different kinds of states that 
nonetheless responded to the imperatives of competitive militarism/^
World orders involve the complex interplay between the chaging distribution of 
military power between states and the potential that productive forces have to change 
power relations both between and within states (Cox, 1987: 209). The logic of 
production and the distribution of power in the international system, along with more 
‘locally’ significant social formations influence the structure of both the state (the 
‘national’ ensemble of social relations) and the interstate system (the ‘transnational’ 
ensemble of social relations).
World order and the post-WWII historical bloc: development and 
disarticulation
There are three periods of interest as world order historical blocs to the study of the 
Guatemalan peace process: the period from the end of WWII through the economic 
transformations associated with the early 1970s, from the early 1970s through the end 
of the Cold War, and the period after the end of the Cold War. Within these, the 
evolving factors of military power and economic order must be analysed, as well as 
how developments in these spheres interact with prior social relations. In particular.
Cox argues that this era included three phases: the 1870s -  1890s, when national 
ambitions challenged liberal hegemony and ‘in forsaking world order, state leaders 
focused on bridging the chasm of class antagonism to consolidate loyalties to the 
national order’; the period from then through WWI, when ‘the state succeeded through 
wartime mobilization in reconciling the new [popular] pressures w ith national unity 
behind state goals’; and finally, ‘from 1919 to 1945 came a phase o f  building new 
historic blocs as the foundations for quite different developmental trajectories with 
tripartism, state corporatism, and central planning as their principal modes of social 
relations of production’. Cox, Production, Power and World Order: Social Forces in 
the Making o f History, 164.
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the position of developing countries in these historical blocs and in relations to military 
and economic issues must be theorised and understood.
The historical bloc to emerge from the end of World War II may be described in terms 
of an ‘embedded liberalism’ of the Cold War. ‘Embedded liberalism’ refers both to 
the domestic -  where macro-economic intervention along Keynsian lines was 
permitted -  and to the international order, which was multilateral in organisation under 
the auspices of US leadership (Ruggie, 1982: 393). As Stephen Gill puts it, ‘This post 
war settlement among the major interests in the capitalist world corresponded to an 
internationalization of the basic ideas of the New Deal: it was a negotiated 
compromise between the various factions of capital and labour in a range of capitalist 
states’ (Gill, 2003: 87). This order applied to industrialised states; countries outside of 
the economic core were subject to a different logic, as with the liberal order of the 19th 
century. The US was a leading element in this ensemble as the dominant military and 
economy of the post-war period and central architect of the Bretton Woods institutions 
(Ruggie, 1982). It also played a significant role in terms of constructing the 
‘intellectual and moral leadership’ surrounding the nature of post-colonial international 
capitalist development, i.e., how the project of ‘development’ in the Third World 
should be understood, a problematic embued with the politics of Cold War 
confrontation.
Cox argues that in the post-WWll era, both production and the state were 
internationalised (Cox, 1987: 244-65). Production was transnationalised as companies 
in the industrialised countries established dependent relationships with firms in the less 
industrialised countries for the provision of raw materials and labour at lower costs
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than in the ‘core’ (Cox, 1987: 246-7)/^ The state was internationalised through ‘a 
process of interstate consensus formation regarding the needs or requirements of [an 
open] world economy that takes place within a common ideological framework’, along 
with which states themselves are restructured ‘so that each can best transform the 
global consensus into national policy and practice’ (Cox, 1987: 254). Such policies are 
coordinated within a global hierarchy: among the advanced capitalist countries 
between their own governments (foreign offices, treasuries, central banks) and through 
multilateral institutions (the IMF, World Bank, OECD) (Cox, 1987: 259).
This order was underwritten vis-à-vis developing countries by power operating on a 
spectrum from the explicit coercive apparatuses of the Cold War through the less 
explicit mechanisms of finance and debt through the subtle discipline of normalisation 
associated with the ‘development dispositif. Direct coercion was exercised 
predominantly through US military power under the rationale of countering a 
‘communist threat’, though as much scholarship has illustrated and the Guatemalan 
case supports, this ‘threat’ was so widely interpreted that in practice interventions were 
associated with any number of challenges to the social order, including many 
‘nationalist-capitalist’ projects (discussed further in Chapter 3).^ * US intellectual and 
moral leadership constructed an understanding of ‘development’ -  modernisation 
theory -  that privileged order and the preservation of particular social relations during
Here core and periphery are general huristic divices and do not refer, for example, to 
strict categories as in world systems theory. As Cox puts it: ‘Althou^ the 
geographical and industrial-sector connotations of core and periphery have become 
increasingly confused, the analytical validity of the differentiation between core and 
periphery has been strengthened by the economic crisis since the mid-1970s. The basis 
for the distinction, however, needs to be redefined so as to avoid tying it too closely to 
these factors of geography and industrial sector. Cox, Production, Power and World 
Order: Social Forces in the Making o f History, 321.
cf: Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony, 
15.
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periods of industrialisation over other principles, leading to understandings of the 
military as an agent of development and challenges to social relations as security 
threats (see also Chapter 3)}^
International financial institutions provided another, symbiotic form of disciphne in 
mediating access to finance and, particularly after the 1970s, structuring and defining 
development. Nortoiously, the IFIs understood finance as a matter of national 
sovereignty, lending without discrimination to authoritarian regimes. Further discipline 
of the internationalised economic order was imposed on developing countries through 
finance and debt: in exchange for access to finance, developing countries must pursue 
development that is complementary to the internationalisation of production and 
‘conducive to accumulation on the world scale’ (Cox, 1987: 264). Cox argues: 
‘international finance is the pre-eminent agency of conformity to [world order] and the 
principal regulator of the political and productive organization of a ... world economy’ 
(Cox, 1987: 267).
Multilateral institutions also played an important role in ‘defining the ideological basis 
of consensus, the principles and goals within which policies are firamed, and the norms 
of “correct” behavior’ (Cox, 1987: 259). The regulatory function of the multilateral 
agencies has been described in terms of a process of ‘normalisation’, a practice of 
establishing rules by which subjects (here Third World states and individuals) must 
abide; it assesses them vis-à-vis the criteria associated with this rule, creating
cf: David L. Blaney and Naeem Inayatullah, "Neo-Modernization? IR and the Inner 
Life of Modernization Theory', European Journal o f International Relations 8, no. 1 
(2002); Irene L. Gendzier, Managing Political Change: Social Scientists and the Third 
World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985).
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hierarchies, and then establishes the degree of conformity to the rule that must be 
observed (Brigg, 2002: 427).^ ®
The i ntemational economy and the C old War t  ogether o perated to c onstruct c ertain 
raisons d ’etat in the ‘periphery’. Cox describes two kinds of peripheral states to 
emerge from this period that reflect different levels of incorporation in the world 
economy: the larger, late-developing neomercantilist developmentalist form of state 
aims to reproduce the industrialised welfare state in developing conditions. The more 
marginalised ‘protostate’ may hold power, but lacks ‘either a firm social basis of 
consent or the administrative capacity to formulate and apply effective economic 
policies’ (Cox, 1987: 218). What needs to be observed and problematised, however, is 
not just how the international economic order within the hegemonic sphere of the Pax 
Americana (in Cox’s terms) structures states but the ways in which the military 
dimension of the Cold War mediated such conditions, particularly at the margins of 
such order, as well. As Robinson has put it, ‘behind East-West relations ... North- 
South relations were always intrinsic and central to the whole Cold War Era’ 
(Robinson, 1996: 15).
Under US political and military leadership, the existential threat of ‘communism’ was 
used to justify the preservation of certain social relations in the periphery in the face of 
social transformation. The Cold War security problematic was infused with rivalry 
around development, classically encapsulated in Nikita Khrushchev’s speech of 6
Brigg discusses these practices within a Foucauldian conception of a post-World 
War II ‘development dispositif’. He argues ‘the focus on the normalisation of the 
nation-state does not preclude but in fact relies upon the operation of normalisation at 
a range of other levels and sites, including that of individual subjects’. Morgan Brigg, 
'Post-Development, Foucault and the Colonisation Metaphor', Third World Quarterly 
23, no. 3 (2002): 427.
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January 1961 on wars of national liberation, in which he claimed the communist 
movement would ‘bury’ the West. At stake for ‘embedded liberalism’ materially was a 
particular set of social relations that allowed access to the raw materials and 
inexpensive labour of the hierarchical world order (Robinson, 1996: 15). Ideologically 
what was at stake was a ‘war of position’, waged through the promotion of liberal 
modernisation theory, towards constructing such an order as hegemonic.
The convergence of these material and ideological forces with particular forms of 
peripheral economies led to the counterinsurgent state. As discussed further in Chapter 
3, conditions of ‘disarticulation’, where export production is structured around an 
exploitative hierarchy understood in terms of social divisions of ‘traditional’ and 
‘modem’, generate social pressures that present particular challenges to liberal 
modernisation theory. The reassertion of elite mle under such circumstances has taken 
the form of counterinsurgency, under US intervention and/or military training and 
support. The counterinsurgent state is particularly suited to Gramscian analysis, as its 
repressive apparatus is continually moving across ‘public’ and ‘ private’ boundaries: 
‘state’ repression and paramilitary death squads operate to the same political ends (also 
discussed further in Chapter 3).
World order and the financial crises of the 1970s: neoliberalism
The economic crisis of the advanced industrialised states in the 1970s would transform
the post-WWn world order in several ways. The resolution of the crisis would result in 
a new set of social relations in the North, underwritten through a transnationally 
constmcted project of intellectual and moral leadership. Changes in the structural remit 
of the IMF in international finance, the consequences of the debt crisis and the
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purchase of this new intellectual and moral leadership in the IFIs would redefine the 
understanding of development in this new order.
Inflationary tendencies resulted in a fiscal crisis of the industrialised state and the 
exchange crisis of the industrialising state (Cox, 1987: 282). As the former’s 
obligations grew, groups within the social compact became divided over the tax 
burden (Cox, 1987: 281). The resolution of this crisis would have the effect of 
increasing the power of capital vis-à-vis organised labour in the core countries. 
However, this crisis was not only ‘material’ in nature, it also relied upon a project of 
intellectual and moral leadership that legitimated the challenge to the ‘embedded 
liberal’ (at the national level in the core, Keynesian) order, through the elaboration of 
what may be called neoliberalism. Cox describes this as ‘a collective effort of 
ideological revision undertaken through various unofficial agencies -  the Trilateral 
Commission, the Bilderberg conferences, the Club of Rome, and other less prestigious 
forums -  and then endorsed through more official consensus-making agencies like the 
OECD’ (Cox, 1987: 282). Neoliberalism involves a globalised economy based on the 
competitive deregulation of capital markets underwritten by certain values and 
orientations, particularly those of market efficiency and discipline, and established 
through conditionality, ‘quasi-institutional regional arrangements’ and multilateral 
regulatory frameworks such as the WTO (Gill and Law, 1993); (Gill, 1995: 412).
With the move off of the gold standard in the 1970s, multilateral financial institutions 
changed focus from Europe to the Third World: the IMF became focused on stabilising 
developing economies with balance of payment problems and the World Bank became 
the multilateral agency for aid and development. This transition process was not purely 
‘institutional’ in nature, but a ‘political’ choice to promote the Bretton Woods
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institutions over analogous institutions proposed for the UN system in the context of 
Southern calls for a ‘New International Economic Order’ (Bello, 2002: 4)/^ 
Furthermore, the remits of the IMF and World Bank would increasingly converge 
around the logic of structural adjustment programmes: programmes designed to 
reconstruct debtor countries’ ability to repay through liberalisation of exchange rates, 
trade, export promotion, the elimination of subsidies, balanced budgets and 
privatisation of public enterprise (Feinberg, 1988). The term ‘Washington Consensus’ 
emerged as a way of describing this neoliberal understanding shared by the Bretton 
Woods institutions, the US government, and other networks of ‘intellectual and moral 
leadership’ centred in Washington, DC.^ ^
The transformation of world order in response to this crisis results in new raisons 
d ’etat, centred on the acceptance of the world market as ‘the ultimate determinant of 
development’ (Cox, 1987; 290). Cox has described the rise of the logic of ‘state- 
capitalism’, where the state intervenes to enhance the competitiveness of national 
industries (Cox, 1987: 290). This rationality governs both industrialised and 
industrialising nations, and can be found, for example, in works such as Michael 
Porter’s The Competitive Advantage o f Nations (Porter, 1990). Competitive advantage
The institutional manifestation of this tension was ‘resolved’ through the 
‘compromise’ of creating a soft-loan capacity at the World Bank in the form of the 
International Development Association (IDA), and establishing the UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) for smaller amounts of primarily technical assistance. Walden 
Bello, 'Prospects for Good Global Governance: A View from the South', (Focus on the 
Global South, 2002), 4.
The term Washington Consensus was coined by John Williamson. Paul Krugman 
has observed: ‘By “Washington” Williamson meant not only the U.S. government, but 
all those institutions and networks of opinion leaders centred in the world's de facto 
capital—the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, think tanks, politically 
sophisticated investment bankers, and worldly finance ministers, all those who meet 
each other in Washington and collectively define the conventional wisdom of the 
moment’. Paul Krugman, 'Dutch Tulips and Emerging Markets: Another Bubble 
Bursts', Foreign Affairs 74 (1995): 28.
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replaces the comparative advantage of classical trade theory under international 
economic conditions of ‘total competition’; the theory posits that the state is not 
naturally endowed with given factors of production but constructs them, while 
maintaining the logic of market mechanisms to govern the economy. The discipline of 
the intemaitonal economy in effect is harnessed as a subsidy for capital to create its 
competitive advantage. (Porter’s influence in Guatemala is discussed further in 
Chapter 4).
Neoliberalism implies a new conception of the state, social relations and political 
subjectivity. The neoliberal state finds its legitimacy in terms of the promotion of 
economic growth, redefining the social as a form of the economic. ‘[T]he economy 
embraces the entirety of human action to the extent that this is characterized by the 
allocation of scant resources for competing goals’ (Lemke, 2001: 197).” The market 
becomes the organising principle for both state and society (Lemke, 2001: 200). 
Government action is both justified and limited by the economy. Its role is to create 
the conditions assumed by liberalism, i.e., a universal economic rationality, but that 
neoliberalism recognises to be a social construct: ‘government itself becomes a sort of 
enterprise whose task it is to universalize competition and invent market-shaped 
systems of action for individuals, groups and institutions’ (Lemke, 2001:197).
Thomas Lemke, "The Birth of Bio-Politics': Michel Foucault's Lecture at the Collège 
de France on Neo-Liberal Govemmentality', Economy and Society 30, no. 2 (2001), 
represents a reconstruction from audio tape of Michel Foucault’s exploration of 
neoliberal govemmentality in his 1979 lectures at the Collège de France, which are not 
available in text form. Discussions of how govemmentality relates to Foucault’s other 
work can be found in Colin Gordon, 'Introduction', in Power: Essential Works o f 
Foucault 1954-1984, ed. James D. Faubion (New York: The New Press, 2000) and 
Arpad Szakolczai, 'From Govemmentality to the Genealogy of Subjectivity: On 
Foucault's Path in the 1980s', (Florence: European Univeristy Institute, 1993).
59
As Michel Foucault argued, neoliberalism, unlike liberalism, no longer sees economic 
rationality as a natural characteristic, but one that can rightly be cultivated by the state. 
‘Whereas in the classical liberal conception, homo economicus forms an external limit 
and the inviolable core of government action, in the neo-liberal thought of the Chicago 
School he becomes a behaviouristically manipulable being...’ (Lemke, 2001: 200). 
The individual is subject to the disciplinary features of the universalisation of 
economic rationality. The person becomes a self-entrepreneur, subject to the 
responsibility of individual investment decisions involving areas of social services 
previously under the government’s remit: illness, unemployment, poverty, move from 
being social problems to being individual problems of ‘self-care’ (Lemke, 2001: 201- 
2).
Neoliberalism, then, explicitly engages the state in constructing the conditions for the 
market, including the political subjectivity of market rationality. Andrew Barry et al. 
note of Foucault’s description, echoing the central Gramscian problematic: ‘The 
supposed separation of State and civil society is the consequence of a particular 
problematization of government, not of a withdrawal of government as such’ (Barry, et 
al., 1996: 9). This understanding of neoliberalism differs from those assessments that 
assume neoliberalism’s appeal to the market to arbitrate all social, economic and 
political questions represents the disappearance of the state. Likewise, it challenges the 
assumption that neoliberalism lacks any ethico-political rationale beyond privileging 
capital over labour: in fact, it claims to relocate the social contract away from a 
coporatist compact among capital and organised labour to the individual.
The move towards neoliberalism creates tensions in the counterinsurgent state. 
Counterinsurgency poses certain obstacles to the generalisation of neoliberal
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rationality, with its emphasis on efficiency and competitiveness, in the state’s 
economy. The counterinsurgent state’s control over the population (discussed further 
in Chapter 3) represents a considerable expense that economic elites in an economy 
diversifying away from the traditional sectors of the disarticulated economy may not 
want to incur. Politically unstable areas that undermine guarantees for capital (the rule 
of law in economic matters), either through cumbersome traditional legal mechanisms 
or the graft associated with powerful militaries, inhibit foreign investment and 
finance.^ '* In addition, counterinsurgency’s violent rupture of the ‘traditional’ social 
order to secure the threat it poses to ‘modernisation’ generates conditions that are more 
favourable to the logics of neoliberalism, particularly the atomisation of collective 
societies and economies. Thus, the emergence of a neoliberal historical bloc creates 
conditions that render certain counterinsurgent conflicts ‘ripe’ for resolution.^^
Peace processes as technologies of neoliberalism
Peace processes reflect profound opportunities for restructuring the state. Indeed, this
is implied in both academic and multilateral organisations’ moves towards an 
emphasis on addressing the ‘root cases of conflict’.^*^ To ask how a peace process
Robinson has argued that authoritarian regimes ‘are unable to manage the expansive 
social intercourse associated with the global economy’ Robinson, Promoting 
Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony, 38.
There is no requirement for the neoliberal world order that every economy becomes 
neoliberal internally, but two factors pressure in that direction: first, the logic of ‘total 
competition’ internationally requires a certain number of economies prepared to 
compete in such vein, through the reduction of labour costs, etc.; second, the 
intellectual and moral leadership associated with multilateral institutions and the 
ethico-political premises of neoliberal theory reflect a ‘univeralising’ impulse.
Cf: Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peace-keeping', (New York: United Nations, 1992); for a review of 
the multilateral activities in conflict management and resolution see: Renata Dwan, 
'Armed Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution', in SIPRI Yearbook 
(London: Oxford University Press, 2001), Renata Dwan, 'Armed Conflict Prevention,
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affects the ensemble of social relations implies two related areas of concern. The first 
regards the negotiations of the peace process. In principle, negotiations represent the 
moment of generating consent for a post-conflict order (at least among armed factions, 
although ideally when emphasising resolving the roots of conflict, in the broader 
society).^’ Yet a Gramscian analysis treats such arrangements cautiously, with 
particular attention to how power operates in such circumstances. Here, of course, 
power includes several elements: intellectual and moral leadership of powerful groups, 
the purchase it has in a particular historical bloc, the role of civil society and the 
political subjectivities emerging fi*om conflict. The second concern relates to the 
content of the agreements reached through such negotiations. The texts of such 
agreements reflect blueprints for the post-conflict state and illuminate the ethico- 
political basis for the emergent ensemble of social relations. To the extent that they 
construct the logic of the dominant world order historical bloc, they work at a very 
elemental level to realign states and societies.
In the chapters that follow, Gramscian analysis is applied to the Guatemalan peace 
process. The conflict and its effects on the ensemble of social and economic relations
Management and Resolution', in SIPRI Yearbook (London: Oxford University Press, 
2002).
One approach to solving ‘root causes’ that has been gaining currency since the 
1970s is the subfield of conflict resolution, which aims through a neutral third party 
negotiator to have parties to a conflict identify the psycho-social needs at the root of 
the conflict and rearticulate them in terms that can be mutually accommodated. Paul 
Rogers and Oliver Ramsbotham, 'Then and Now: Peace Research — Past and Future', 
Political Studies 47 (1999). Yet as Fetherstone and Parkin have observed: ‘These 
approaches attempt to bracket power in practice by assuming improved 
communication and a re-analysis of the conflict will bring parties together on an equal 
basis. By not recognising the silent operation of the often huge structural, cultural, 
social power differences between groups involved in violent conflict ... the coercion 
has only been hidden’. A. B. Fetherston and A. C. Parkin, 'Transforming Violent 
Conflict: Contributions firom Social Theory', Issues in Peace Research 1997-98 
(1997): 25.
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in Guatemala are considered, with attention to the changing features of society during 
the war. The peace process itself is then examined, with attention to the role of 
international actors in ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ and the evolution and 
techniques of the negotiations themselves. Finally, the construction of the post-conflict 
state, society and subjectivity in the text of the agreements is explored. The text, which 
in many circles is broadly considered to be a balance between the IFIs’ neoliberal 
structural adjustment ideal and more progressive Keynesian post-conflict economic 
theory, is reassessed in terms of a fuller appreciation of the rationalities of 
neoliberalism.
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The Ensemble of Social Relations In Guatemala
This chapter examines the ensemble of social relations in Guatemala in the historical 
context of the civil war and the transition to the peace process. As per the Gramscian 
analytical framework outlined in Chapter 2, the ensemble of social relations describes 
the subjective elements of society (groups and identities) and the historically and 
materially constructed cultural and political arrangements within which they are 
contained. The ensemble of social relations captures the specific orders and 
understandings within which power operates in a particular context, given its coercive 
and consensual (intellectual and subjective) dimensions. Ensembles of social relations 
are constructed around regimes of production and related to world orders in which they 
are positioned.
The Guatemalan ensemble of social relations is understood in terms of 
‘disarticulation’, where a number of factors converge to structure society in a highly 
hierarchical way: production is structured around exploitative labour practices and 
relies virtually entirely on international markets, which mitigates against the need to 
engage in ‘Fordist’ practices associated with role of internal demand in an economy. 
Exploitative conditions are underwritten by social hierarchies that are historically 
constructed but continue operate through a historical transition to ‘free wage labour’ 
by relegating the costs of social reproduction in non-wage, ‘traditional’ cultural 
spheres.
Understanding the nature of disarticulation helps explain the nature and origins of the
conflict in Guatemala. The US, as the dominant element in the post-WWII era global
order, assumed conditions of disarticulation in its ‘liberal modernisation’ theories of
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post-war development. It was thus disposed to intervene to support elites in developing 
countries where disarticulation was under threat, articulating such threats as 
‘communist’ whether or not their internal politics could be rightly characterised as 
such. Counterinsrugent disarticulation thus reflects a particular raison d’etat 
constructed in peripheral, export-oriented economies in the post-WWII era of 
‘embedded liberalism’, under what Cox has described as the Pax Americana of US 
hegemony.
However, disarticulation under liberal modernisation suffers from an internal 
contradiction: pronounced social hierarchies with no internal markets continually re­
construct a ‘traditional’ sector of society to sustain social reproduction contra the 
fundamental basis for modernisation’s ethos, the elimination of such a sector in favour 
of the socially modem. This tension creates the conditions for counterinsurgency: a 
form of military policing of society that manoeuvres to control the marginalised 
elements of society as the ensemble of social relations is opened up through elite-led, 
neoliberal modernisation. Counterinsurgency attempts to reconstmct social identities 
in a more ‘secure’ fashion, forging new political subjectivities in the violent excesses 
of its perception of a generalised the threat to social order.
The contradictions of counterinsurgency, embedded in its own modernising ethos, are 
also manifest and amplified through military excesses both in coercion and in the 
economic sphere. Particularly under the logic of neoliberalism, the counterinsurgent 
state becomes too costly for modernising elites as coercive military excesses 
compromise participation in the international sphere and economic excesses challenge 
the possibilities for modernised sectors of the economy. The impunity of an
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uncontrolled military compromises safeguards to capital (the rule of law in economic 
matters) as well as the position of non-military elites in the national economy.
In what follows, this chapter explores Alain de Janvry’s conception of disarticulation 
and outlines the relationship between disarticulation and counterinsurgency. It then 
examines the origins of the Guatemalan conflict in the challenge to disarticulation and 
the US-assisted backlash to that challenge. The construction of the counterinsurgent 
state under such circumstances is described, as is the transformation of powerful 
economic interests from the 1970s. The ensemble of social relations entering the peace 
process reflect these conditions emerging from the contradictions of counterinsurgent 
disarticulation, a crisis that both implies the opportunity for social change within the 
peace process and constructs the interests of powerful groups in managing such 
change.
Disarticulation, counterinsurgency and the ontology of conflict
Disarticulation describes a condition of peripheral capitalism where a system of 
functional dualism between the ‘modem’ and ‘traditional’ sectors allows wages to be 
kept below the minimum otherwise required to maintain and reproduce the labour 
force by having the subsistence economy provide part of people’s sustenance.^* Social 
disarticulation relies on a condition of ‘semiproletarianisation’ in the economy to
Although first expounded by Samir Amin, the discussion here relies on Alain de 
Janvry’s use of the term, which is more oriented to a neo-Marxian approach than 
Amin’s ‘development-of-underdevelopment’ perspective and therefore, among other 
virtues, is more compatible with a Gramscian analysis. Samir Amin, Unequal 
Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976), Alain de Janvry, The 
Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1981), 7-23.
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maintain wages below market valne/^ As Alain de Janvry explains: ‘From the 
standpoint of the employer, labor is “free” and fully proletarianized; labor is only 
semiproletarianized since part of the laborers’ subsistence needs are derived from 
production for home consumption’ (de Janvry, 1981: 37). Wages are kept below 
market value because subsistence agricultural production or the informal urban sector 
subsidise the ‘modem capitalist’ sector (de Janvry, 1981: 84).'*° This is possible in 
disarticulated economies in part because there is no assumption that there will be a 
home market for the goods produced: maintaining low labor costs in a disarticulated 
(periphery) economy does not detract from the possibilities for production they way it 
would in an articulated (centre) economy (de Janvry, 1981: 36).
In Latin America, disarticulation is the result of the historical trajectory of labour 
relations from slavery, to servitude on plantations, to ‘free semiproletarians’ outside 
the plantation. As labour becomes more plentiful at each stage, landowners can un- 
encumber themselves of the costs of labour’s reproduction. Landowners must pay the 
full costs of slaves’ subsistence, even during periods of sickness, etc.^‘ Servitude on 
plantations allows landowners to incur only the (fixed) price of the subsistence plot
Disarticulation occurs in two broad types of economies: export-enclave and import 
substitution, de Janvry, The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America, 32.
Although it originates in export-oriented agricultural production, and thus describes 
the condition of peasant labour, disarticulation may survive processes of urbanization: 
‘functional dualism is re-created in other forms in the course of its ultimate 
elimination. Thus, as the population of Latin America becomes increasingly urban, 
while employment in the modem sector remains a relatively fixed share of the total 
labor force, the informal urban sector becomes a new source of subsidy for the 
maintenance and reproduction of labor power’, de Janvry, The Agrarian Question and 
Reformism in Latin America, 39-40.
Keeping in mind that ‘Only when the supply of slaves is highly elastic and their 
price is low is overexploitation possible, and it results in early exhaustion through 
death or incapacitation. But this condition never evolved in Latin America, where 
slavery consequently assumed relatively paternalistic forms’, de Janvry, The Agrarian 
Question and Reformism in Latin America, 82.
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and costs of the work performed, while ‘free semiproletarians’ on land outside of the 
plantation are less expensive still, involving payment only for work (de Janvry, 1981: 
83). Thus, while on the surface or in an ‘economic’ sense labour relations have 
become increasingly free, social disarticulation reflects the ‘objective’ conditions 
behind the ‘subjective forces’ that justify repressive labour practices (de Janvry, 1981: 
34-5).
The ‘semiproletariat’ labour market can only exist in certain conditions: when there is 
surplus labour and when the state controls labour on behalf of private landlords (de 
Janvry, 1981: 83).“^  Thus the surplus value generated in disarticulated economies must 
service multiple claims including the costs of repression to sustain the system: the 
amount of surplus value that can be generated within a disarticulated economy is 
dictated by the capacity for social control (de Janvry, 1981: 36-37). Disarticulated 
economies are thus structured to rely on coercion to maintain export-oriented 
plantation agriculture. Force is a long-standing feature of labour relations in such 
settings, yet one that is maintained in the transition to the capitalist labour ‘market’ in 
the periphery, recalling Stuart Hall’s attention to the differential incorporation of 
‘actually existing capitalism’.S u c h  practices are underwritten with the ‘subjective’ 
understandings of different social groups associated with different roles, ‘traditional’ 
and ‘modem’.
Peasants may nonetheless participate to a certain extent ‘freely’ in the disarticulated 
economy because they opt to maintain some control of their economic lives: ‘Whereas 
the fully proletarianized worker loses both control of the production process and 
ownership of the means of production, the semiproletarianized worker maintains these 
two forms of control. Because semiproletarians seek to protect this control, they 
compete fiercely on the labor market and accept wages below the price of subsistence’, 
de Janvry, The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America, 84.
As per the discussion in Chapter 2, Stuart Hall, 'Gramsci's Relevance for the Study 
of Race and Ethnicity*, in Stuart Hall: Critical Dialogues in Cultural Studies, ed. 
David Morley and Kuan-Hsing Chen (London: Routledge, 1996), 437.
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Furthermore, disarticulated economies inherently depend on external relationships for 
financing and markets (de Janvry, 1981: 40), and although not explicitly discussed in 
de Janvry’s work, for smaller economies, military assistance as well. The reproduction 
of the ensemble of social relations implies a dynamic between domestic and 
international involving material and subjective elements.
Disarticulation and counterinsurgency
Disarticulation r eflects the m utual c onstruction of the t raditional and the m odem i n 
peripheral capitalism: a dynamic that reconstructs the peasantry as economically and 
socially subordinate through state coercion acting for private interests with the 
assumption of free labour. This system generates certain tensions and contradictions: 
between the labour ‘market’ and the objective bases for repression, between the 
assumption of the modem and the (re)production of the traditional and, indeed, related 
assumptions of the universality of (a particular) modem subjectivity and the 
constmction of the subordinated other. When such tensions appear to destabilise the 
ensemble of relations in a disarticulated society, one response historically has been 
counterinsurgency.
Counterinsurgency: from colonisation to modernisation
Military historian Ian F. W. Beckett defines counterinsurgency in terms of the
awareness of the need for political action to complement military action in combating
irregular armies (Beckett, 2001: chapter 2). Thus, aIthough insurgencies date to the
fifteenth century BC, the notion of counterinsurgency only enters French military
doctrine around 1850 with its experiences in West and Central Afiica and British
military doctrine circa 1896, with the War Office’s publication of Small Wars: Their
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Principles and Practice, ‘based on a wealth of colonial experience over the past 
century’ (Beckett, 2001: 32). Theorists often attempt to understand counterinsurgency 
thinly, as an apolitical set of military strategies and techniques,'^ yet given the overtly 
political element of counterinsurgency as well as the specific circumstances with 
which it is consistently related, to do so commits the same errors discussed in 
Gramsci’s critique of positivism (see Chapter 2).
The principle sources for the development of counterinsurgency theories are the 
French colonial experience, the British colonial experience, and the US experience 
with counterinsurgency in the 20th century (Beckett, 2001: chapter 2), all cases 
distinguished by the ‘subjective’ social hierarchies associated with disarticulation. 
These examples are characterised by pronounced social hierarchies associated with 
significant dislocation for the sake of modernisation. Such a pattern is familiar to 
students of colonisation; the US has supported elite-led governments in the Third 
World, understanding that they were better suited to the difficult task of modernisation 
(‘the masses were “naturally indifferent to political matters” (Shafer, 1988: 84), 
quoting US National Security Council Document 51). Indeed, US counterinsurgency 
theorists have understood colonisation as part of the modernisation process they seek 
to promote.
The US understanding of counterinsurgency is intimately related to the dominant 
understanding of modernisation in the 1950s and 1960s, exemplified by Walt W.
Cf: Douglas S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: US Doctrine and 
Performanmce, 1950 to the Present (New York: The Free Press, 1977); John J. 
McCuen, The Art o f Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy o f Counter-Insurgency 
(Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1966). Indeed, to an extent Beckett is guilty of this 
as well, despite his own definition, as he understands politics, like military strategy, to 
be a technical realm.
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Rostow’s The Stages o f Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Rostow,
who was Kennedy’s deputy national security advisor and an architect of its
counterinsurgency policies, understood colonisation as a necessary (and seemingly
benign) precursor to modernisation:
Colonies were often established initially not to execute a major objective 
of national policy, nor even to exclude a rival economic power, but to fill a 
vacuum; that is, to organize a traditional society incapable of self­
organization (or unwilling to organize itself) for modem import and export 
activity (Rostow, 1990: 109).
This understanding of economic modernisation was paired with the theorisation of
political development to justify the necessity elite-led rule (Shafer, 1988: chapter 3).
In t heir characterisation o f  the e lite / mass d i vision p arallel to t  hat o f  them odem / 
traditional, in effect theories of counterinsurgency assume a kind of social 
disarticulation, which they must protect from insurgency. These assumptions about the 
nature of society are obscured by counterinsurgency’s claim to being an apolitical 
military technology, whose applicability is, if not universal, dictated by logistical, 
military considerations (Blaufarb, 1977: 289-91). From a Gramscian perspective, the 
counterinsurgent project amounts to a highly militarised ‘passive’ revolution infused 
with colonial anxieties of race and development.
Counterinsurgency’s threat: the anxieties of disarticulation
Counterinsurgency’s remit involves securing a particular social order under threat
(Shafer, 1988: 63, 155-6);(Castro and Ettenger, 1994: 67), it must therefore navigate
the contradictions that give rise to conflict while maintaining to some extent the
premises of that order. The question of the maintenance of social order within the
hierarchical ensemble of social relations means that control of the population and its
identity, rather than the conventional military question of territory, becomes central to
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the counterinsurgency project. The maintenance of social order becomes rooted in the 
control of the population (Blaufarb, 1977: 288); (McCuen, 1966: 98); (Stepputat, 
1999: 57). Initially this may be understood as an extensive policing operation (Stubbs, 
1989: 247), however, when it escalates, the emphasis on controlling the population 
leads to imperative that there is no neutral position and that identity itself must be 
secured (Stepputat, 1999: 66); (McClintock, 1985: 258).
To maintain the validity o f  hierarchical social order, counterinsurgency understands 
the n ature o f  the t hreat to s tability i n t erms t hat r econfirm the s ubordination o f  the 
identities to be secured, the peasantry, the ‘natives’ or the indigenous. It attributes 
instability not to objective conditions of exploitation, but to the vulnerability of 
engaging in ‘modernisation’ and outside agents who manipulate the marginalised. 
Thus, the peasantry is constructed as passive and apolitical (Shafer, 1988: 106), 
Indians are understood as ‘very susceptible ... easy to ply, just like clay’ (Stepputat, 
1999: 71), native peoples are seen as easily indoctrinated (McCuen, 1966: 98). 
Instability arises when external agents of subversion -  communists or nationalists -  
manipulate the naïve subalterns of the disarticulated ensemble of social relations, a 
scenario that becomes more likely under the inherently destabilising (yet inevitable) 
process of modernisation (Shafer, 1988: 106, 50). US counterinsurgency theories link 
the threat of insurgency to a global ensemble of social relations characterised by Cold 
War rivalry, in which communism represents a s inister perversion of modernisation 
that exploits the fragility of countries in the process of development.'** Furthermore, as
This perception was in large part fuelled by Nikita Khrushchev’s speech on wars of 
national liberation of 6 January 1961, in which he claimed the communist movement 
would ‘bury’ the West. Charles Macehling Jr., 'Counterinsurgency: The First Ordeal 
by Fire', in Low-Intensity Warfare: Counterinsurgency, Proinsurgency and
Antiterrorism in the Eighties, ed. Michael Klare and Peter Kombluh (New York:
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Gerald Home has illustrated, the US emphasis on anticommunism was often an 
extension of notions of white racial supremacy that were acceptable at the beginning of 
the 20th century (Home, 1999)/^
The contradictions of securing and subordinating the subaltem’s identity are expressed 
‘tactically’ through a movement between the polls of consent and coercion, which in 
the disarticulated context are pathologically expressed in terms of ‘hearts and minds’ 
campaigns, on the one hand, and the absolute identification of the subaltem with the 
threat on the other (genocide in its extreme manifestation, as occurred in Guatemala). 
‘Hearts and minds’ campaigns represent the military ideal for the simple resolution of 
the political dimension of counterinsurgency. Yet they always reiterate their primary 
objective of social control through tactics such as reorganising the mral population 
into strategic hamlets, designed ostensibly to provide some social services but 
primarily to isolate the peasantry fi-om the guerrilla (Stubbs, 1989: 250) (Sharckman,
Pantheon Books, 1988), 22; Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: US Doctrine and 
Performanmce, 1950 to the Present, 18. Yet even relatively ‘moderate’ positions in 
such circles drew similar conclusions fi-om Mao Tse-tung’s success in China. Douglas 
S. Blaufarb, formerly affiliated with the CIA and the RAND corporation, a major think 
tank of counterinsurgency theory, reflects that communist successes in ‘backwards’ 
regions: ‘suggested that something surreptitious was afoot, a worldwide campaign to 
make major changes in the power balance masquerading as something else. Further 
study confirmed that, indeed, a sophisticated method was being employed, and fi-om 
that fact it was not a large step to conclude that the world was witnessing a concerted 
and clever effort to revise the balance among the major powers by stealth and 
deception’. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: USDoctrine andPerformanmce, 
1950 to the Present, 2,
For a discussion on the ‘norm against noticing’ race in the discipline of International 
Relations, see: Robert Vitalis, 'The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture: Making 
Racism Invisible in American International Relations', Millennium 29, no. 2 (2000). 
See also: R. J. Vincent, 'Race in International Relations', International Affairs 58, no. 4 
(1982); Roxanne Lynn Doty, 'The Bounds of 'Race' in International Relations', 
Millennium: Journal o f International Studies 22, no. 3 (1993).
73
1974: 198); (Shafer, 1988: 116-7)/’ If the guerrilla cannot be exorcised from the 
peasantry through such ‘consensual’ arrangements as winning their hearts and minds, 
the entire peasantry becomes suspect, ‘infected’ with subversion and thus inherently 
the enemy to be eliminated (McClintock, 1985: 258).
As with the obscured but necessary relationship between state coercion and private
production in disarticulated economies, counterinsurgency also operates by shifting the
boundary between public and private. This reflects the tensions between the role of the
state in defending elite privilege and the necessity of defending the legitimacy of such
order through appeals to society more broadly understood. Thus,
On the one hand, the private sphere becomes vulnerable to sudden, brutal 
and arbitrary intrusions on the part of authorities. On the other hand, the 
authorities cease to operate in a true public fashion. Punishment becomes 
secretive, unavowed, in what amounts to the privatization of state coercion 
(Yashar, 1997: 242)."^
The military becomes the paramilitary and warfare becomes covert and extra-legal
(McClintock, 1985: 272). Death squads occupy the boundary between public and
private, for example, in the use of off-duty military and police personnel in privately
organised activities. This blurring of the distinction allows for the maintenance of the
dominant group’s understanding of social order without requiring that it be exposed to
broader scrutiny. The division of competencies such that the military becomes an
Indeed, the case for the necessity of this political dimension and winning ‘hearts and 
minds’ is often put forward contra the ‘conventional’ military position that such 
strategies as too ambitious or even potentially counterproductive if insurgents take 
such aid for their own cause. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: US Doctrine and 
Performanmce, 1950 to the Present, 289; D. Michael Shafer, Deadly Paradigms: The 
Failure o f US Counterinsurgency Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 
118-23. To reiterate, however, this understanding of the political is hierarchical and 
disarticulated.
While largely sympathetic to this observation, it is important to note that in the 
argument being made here, state coercion already works for private interests; 
counterinsurgency represents a particular amplification of that logic.
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autonomous institution of government allows for violence to be reified as a purely 
military operation with its own logic divorced from the ensemble of social relations, 
while in fact it precisely operates as the guarantor of a particular, elite-defined order.
Counterinsurgency’s aim is to secure a disarticulated ensemble of social relations 
during moments of social change, which, although gone awry, at their root are 
understood to reflect the constructive process of modernisation. On one level, this 
implies the construction of new subjectivities to mitigate the ‘traditional’ subaltern’s 
lack of identification with such a process. However, the nature of counterinsurgent 
violence, tied so intimately to understandings of identity, also traumatises in ways that 
have macro-subjective effects.
In what follows, the historical construction of disarticulation in the Guatemalan 
ensemble of social relations is explored. This is a social hierarchy based significantly 
on race, in  which racial categories are reconstructed through the disarticulation and 
coercion associated with plantation agriculture. The contradictions generated in this 
process lead to a popular reaction and a decade of reform, whose project of smaller 
scale capitalist agriculture could not overcome the power institutionalised in the 
disarticulated ensemble of social relations. Securing the process of modernizing and 
reconstructing the ensemble in the post-reform era inaugurates the counterinsurgent 
state.
Disarticulation in Guatemala: race, force, and economy
The relationship between race, force and the economic mode of production in 
Guatemala reflect ‘common sense’ understandings of racial hierarchies and their
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relationship to economic production and the (legitimate) use o f  force that are long­
standing features of colonial and independent state/^ These relationships are 
continuously reconstructed, particularly with the generalisation of coffee cultivation. 
Yet the expansion of commercial agriculture is also to an extent constrained by the 
strength of indigenous resistance to ladino oppression, a dynamic related to elite 
political debates. This historical dynamic illuminates significant tensions within 
(‘actually existing’) liberalism, where conditions of such ‘exceptionalness’ justify the 
resort to violence and anticipate the counterinsurgent state.^“
The racial hierarchy in Guatemala precedes the independent state. A racial hierarchy 
was established through the conquest and was reflected in intellectual debates, for 
example, about whether Indians possessed souls. Such theological questions, however, 
were intimately related to the political-economic arrangements of the plantation 
system; indigenous ‘idleness’ was both an economic and an ethical question: forced 
labour was considered a moral necessity (MacLachlan, 1988: 48). The indigenous 
view of land and labour as a single unit was likewise considered problematic and force 
was philosophically and theologically defended an acceptable measure to 
institutionalise the concept of private property (MacLachlan, 1988: 48).
For histories of Guatemala, see: James Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus: A Political 
History o f Modern Central America (London: Verso, 1988); Jim Handy, Gift o f the 
Devil: A History o f Guatemala (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1984); Paul J. Dosai, 
Power in Transition: The Rise o f Guatemala's Industrial Oligarchy, 1871-1994 
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1995); Carol A. Smith, ed., Guatemalan Indians and the State, 
1540 to 1988 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990); Charles D. Brockett, Land, 
Power and Poverty: Agrarian Transformation and Political Conflict in Central 
America, ed. Gilbert W. Merkx, Thematic Studies in Latin America (Boston: Unwin 
Hyman, 1988). For political-economic histories, see: Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The 
Political Economy o f Central America since 1920 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1987); Edelberto Torres-Rivas, History and Society in Central America, trans. 
Douglass Sullivan-Gonzalez (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1993); David 
McCreery, Rural Guatemala 1760-1940 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994).
For a brief timeline of Guatemala’s political history, see Appendix 1.
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Elite political debates in Central America at independence (1821) were polarised 
between Liberals and Conservatives/' Liberals favoured free-trade, the expansion of 
commercial agriculture, and sought to constrain the power of the Catholic Church; 
Conservatives sought ‘a return to the past’, supporting the Church and the ‘customs of 
colonial society’ rather than the further commercialisation of agriculture and increased 
trade, which invited greater foreign influence in Guatemala (Cambranes, 1985: 3 4). 
The first Liberal regime (1831-37) sought to modernise the state and eliminate both 
indigenous and Hispanic traditions. This involved abolishing the privileges of the 
church, establishing independent education and a new legal code (Woodward Jr., 
1990: 60). The Liberal programme also involved attempts to privatise and systematise 
land tenure, which threatened indigenous communal property (Weaver, 1999: 136).®^  A 
peasant revolt in 1837, which brought a conservative government to power, reflected 
the indigenous objection to the erosion of traditional land tenure in the countryside. 
The fear of such backlashes in Guatemala (where the indigenous population was much 
stronger and more numerous than in other parts of the Isthmus) would condition the 
relationship between criollo (white creoles), ladinos and indigenous in the future.” A
These debates were initially embedded in the larger question of whether the Central 
America would remain a single republic or be divided into smaller countries. 
Guatemala came into fully independent statehood in 1839, after the break up of the 
United Provinces of Central America. See: Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus: A 
Political History of Modern Central America, 5-20 and Robert G. Williams, States and 
Social Evolution: Coffee and the Rise o f National Governments in Central America 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994), Chapter 6.
See also: Wayne M. Clegem, Origins o f Liberal Dictatorship in Central America: 
Guatemala, 1865-1873 (Niwot, CO: University Press of Colorado, 1994).
Dunkerley notes that the indigenous element of the rebellion, ‘took the shape of an 
aggressive social mobilization that cowed even its clerical and Conservative sponsors’. 
But he argues, ‘This should not be viewed solely as a response to provocative Liberal 
measures that lacked social backing or even to the coincidental outbreak of cholera in 
1837, which ravaged the population of the highlands and compounded superstitions ... 
Priests certainly played on this anguish and laid responsibility for the calamities upon
77
second Liberal regime, particularly associated with the expansion of coffee cultivation, 
came to power in 1871. The infrastructural requirements for coffee exceeded those for 
previous agricultural commodities, and thus demanded the active involvement the state 
to assist in the promotion of exports, a remit that the Conservatives failed to address 
but that the Liberals were willing to take on (McCreery, 1994: 13); (Williams, 1994: 
207-8).
Non-subsistence production in Guatemala has been based on agricultural products 
grown in plantation conditions for export: first concineal, followed by indigo, then 
coffee and sugar cane, to which were added bananas, cotton, and cardamom in the 20th 
century. Coffee, however, was the first product that could be cultivated throughout 
the country, and is thus associated with the expansion of the plantation economy from 
the 1860s (Smith, 1990). Coffee cultivation only required large numbers of workers 
for 4-6 months of the year; this and the experience the peasant revolt in 1837, 
promoted the protection of indigenous communities as ‘labour reserves’ for seasonal 
agriculture (McCreery, 1986: 104). Indigenous communities ‘could be allowed and 
even encouraged to survive ... to reproduce and train an agricultural workforce and 
sustain these individuals in the off-season or when they became too ill or old for 
productive use in the export sector. Resources were manipulated so that villages had
the sin of Liberalism, yet their agency was but one figure in the resistance of 
communities that had to some appreciable degree recovered from both the initial 
demographic collapse of the Conquest and the disruptive, centrifugal dynamics of 
labour on indigo plantations, which had been in decline in Guatemala itself for several 
decades’. Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus: A Political History o f Modern Central 
America, 13.
A  comprehensive description can be found in Julio Castellanos Cambranes, Coffee 
and Peasants: The Origins o f the Modern Plantation Economy in Guatemala, 1853- 
1897 (Stockholm: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1985), chapter 1. Concineal 
was a natural dye made from the concineal insect, replaced by synthetic alternatives in 
European markets by the 1860s.
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the minimum land necessary, “depending on the size of the community”’ (McCreery, 
1986: 104).
Both conservatives and liberals supported various coercive labour practices against the
indigenous. F orced labour antedated the independent state, but became m ediated by
the agricultural fortunes and political debates in the post-independence state.^ ® Given
the sense of labour shortages associated with the expansion of coffee, the liberal
government reintroduced the colonial forced labour requirement, the mandamiento, in
1876 (McCreery, 1986: 103-5). That such measures clearly conflicted with liberal
principles of free labour went largely unacknowledged.
The government was rarely willing even to acknowledge the existence of 
mandamientos and insisted instead that the indigenous population enjoyed 
the “precious guarantees of the constitution”, which included freedom of 
contract. Indians, however, found themselves sent repeatedly against their 
will to the coast. Such hypocrisy initially confused even a few local 
officials: “It seems that Item 3 of your recent note calls for issuing 
mandamientos**. They quickly cau^t on, however, and each year 
dispatched thousand of mazes from the highland coffee estates (McCreery,
1986: 107).'"
Mandamiento was constructed by the state for the benefit of the private sector. One 
way of being exempted from the mandamiento was to already be in debt peonage to a
The following relies heavily on the work of David McCreery, perhaps the 
preeminent scholar of Guatemalan labour history, as do many of the more general 
studies noted in this chapter. See, inter alia: David McCreery, 'Coffee and Class: the 
Structure of Development in Liberal Guatemala', Hispanic American Historical 
Review 56, no. 3 (1976); David McCreery, "An Odious Feudalism': Mandamiento 
Labor and Commercial Agriculture in Guatemala, 1858-1920', Latin American 
Perspectives 13, no. 1 (1986); McCreery, Rural Guatemala 1760-1940 ; David 
McCreery, 'Wage Labor, Free Labor, and Vagrancy Laws: The Transition to 
Capitalism in Guatemala, 1920-1945', in Coffee, Society, and Power in Latin America, 
ed. William Roseberry, Lowell Gudmundson, and Mario Samper Kutschbach 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
The paragraph concludes by noting: ‘Not surprisingly, the Indians protested these 
abuses: “Under Liberal laws which guarantee our rights, we believe that no one may 
be forced to work against his will and that all coercion of this sort is illegal”. Such 
complaints met with little response’. McCreery, "An Odious Feudalism': Mandamiento 
Labor and Commercial Agriculture in Guatemala, 1858-1920': 108.
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private finca. Nonetheless, the forced labour system drove wages down for debt peons 
and ‘free’ labour and accelerated class differences in traditional communities 
(McCreery, 1986: 111-2). The move to coffee decreased the productivity in traditional 
highland communities as well (McCreery, 1986: 112).
Debt peonage gave way to vagrancy laws that essentially paralleled the coercive 
structure of the debt arrangements: they were constructed to compel the poor to work. 
Thus, in additional to ‘conventional’ definitions, the Guatemalan law defined vagrancy 
in terms of how much land one possessed and cultivated (McCreery, 1995: 220); 
(Cambranes, 1985: Chapter 8); (Dunkerley, 1988: 25-42). Like debt peonage, the 
vagrancy laws accelerated the socio-economic-differentiational effects in traditional 
communities (McCreery, 1995: 220-3). These similarities resulted from the persistent 
question from the elite perspective: how to generate the pressure to compel Indians to 
participate in an economy they rejected, particularly under (at least perceived) 
conditions of renewed resistance from the 1920s (McCreery, 1995: 213).^’ Thus ‘free 
labour’ nonetheless required coercion because ‘the Indian lacked the “civilized needs” 
that would drive him into the wage labor market’ (McCreery, 1995: 211-2). The 
inapplicability of liberal assumptions about market forces to the Indian population 
(which ‘responded to the opportunity to make higher wages but not to that of simply 
making more money’), led to two conclusions: either the reduction of its prominence 
in Guatemalan society through its elimination or dilution (via ‘the immigration of 
“healthy elements’”) or its rehabilitation towards ‘economic rationality’ (McCreery, 
1995: 212).
57 See also: McCreery, Rural Guatemala 1760-1940, chapter 10.
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Carol Smith relates the evolution of race in Guatemala to the generalisation of coffee 
cultivation. According to Smith, the term ladino -  which today refers to the non- 
Indian/Latin population -  originally referred to Indians who had lost their cultural ties 
to the indigenous lifestyle.^* The introduction of coffee as a cash crop created (what is 
today) the racial distinction: ladinos became managerial agents for the white elite and 
transformed culturally and econonücally to be more ‘modem’. As a result, they were 
perceived to be less indigenous. Smith argues that race was more compelling than 
class difference because those of the same class (smallholding peasants) but of 
different ‘ethnicities’ were spatially separated.^^ ‘ Ladinos (who at this point in time 
were presumed to have some white blood) filled the newly created class positions 
because, as “partial” whites, they did not challenge traditional ideology of race 
hierarchy in taking the mediating role as agents between plantation owners and 
workers’ (Smith, 1990: 85). The exploitative power behind the racial hierarchy meant 
that 'ladinos’ participated in this arrangement, ‘not only because some of them 
benefited from the exploitation of Indians but because all of them benefited from being 
treated as non-Indians’ (Smith, 1990: 90).
Race hierarchy and the modernisation project of the liberals were explicitly connected:
Progressive Guatemalans, wanting to both “enlighten” and “whiten” their 
nation, attempted a vast overhaul of national institutions in imitation of 
Western models. They also attempted to encourage European migration in 
order to improve the local racial stock. While Guatemalan progressives 
blamed S panish colonialism for Guatemala’s b ackwardness, they had no 
program for development other than a dependent, imitative one. As they
Smith reminds us that the signifiers that distinguish Indians from non-Indians today 
(religion, dress, political forms) ‘are not surviving pre-Hispanic forms but a fusion of 
native and Spanish traditions’. Carol A. Smith, 'Origins of the National Question in 
Guatemala: A Hypothesis', in Guatemalan Indians and the State, 1540 to 1988, ed. 
Carol A. Smith (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 74.
Maps of Guatemalan economic regions, insurgent regions and political departments 
can be found in Appendix 2.
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saw it, development required all of Guatemala to become as Europeanized 
(and, they hoped, as white) as the Creole elite (Smith, 1990: 76).
The period of liberalism associated with this move to coffee cultivation is marked both
by the ‘racialisation’ of class divisions along cultural lines and by the involvement of
foreign investment in the economy. Coffee production particularly attracted foreign
immigration in the 1880s and 1890s; such farmers ‘got away with a highhanded
manner in part because Liberal ideology presumed the inherent superiority of
immigrants from the more developed countries’ (McCreery, 1994: 233). Germans
were the largest and most prominent group of expatriate farmers, however, the
presence of foreign investment in the economy was more widely spread, involving
French and US ownership of transport facilities and British and German control of
marketing channels (Smith, 1990: 83-84). By the 1930s, foreign interests owned all six
of the largest coffee companies in Guatemala (McCreery, 1994: 234). McCreery
provides data on the composition of the sector by 1938-39:
Guatemalan Coffee Exports by Nationality of Exporter, 1938-39
Nationality Exports (quintales) Value (quetzals)
German 497,549 Q4,974,719
Dutch 218,975 2,214,590
U.S. 210,921 2,083,194
Guatemalan 67,474 696,924
Spanish 12,025 115,122
English 9,100 86,718
Total 1,016,044 Q10,171,267
Source: (McCreery, 1994: 234) 
The racialised categories associated with the expansion of coffee in Guatemala were 
reinforced by international capital which, through its knowledge of civil engineering 
and access to the European markets, was able to reiterate the ‘superiority’ of 
Europeans and whites.
Liberalism in this context took a particular form in as much as it attempted to replicate
formally, culturally, and racially, the industrialised countries taken as models. This
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required a particular intervention by the government that Frederick Stirton Weaver has
aptly observed is quite similar to the tenets of modernisation theory. He notes,
Such vigorous, interventionist state policies might seem inconsistent with 
the discourse of nineteenth-century liberalism, but Guatemala Liberals 
recognized the logic of the analysis: the scale of needed change was so 
great that it required an agent independent of current social forces ... This 
meant that a technocratic and authoritarian state, supposedly neutral and 
above politics, was necessary and appropriate to produce a more open, 
free, and prosperous Guatemala (Weaver, 1999: 136).
The resolution of development and liberalism as understood in Guatemala and later the
United States thus invokes the use of ‘neutral, technocratic and authoritarian’
techniques of government, which require mihtary guarantees. ‘The congruence with
North American modernization theory -  with Huntington (1968) as the classic
statement -  is once again impressive’ (Weaver, 1999: 136).
As significant as foreign investment in coffee was the foreign investment in bananas, 
which was controlled by the US-based United Fruit Company (UFCO).®° The most 
controversial aspect o f  the UFCO’s operations in Guatemala involves the degree to 
which its expansion was associated with the construction of the commercial 
transportation infrastructure and thus the control it was able to exert over the economy 
more broadly, earning it the moniker ^El Pulpo' (the Octopus). The company 
controlled the railways, ports and telegraph system in Guatemala and dominated most 
of the shipping that its agricultural exports relied upon.
For a pithy description of the banana sector as a vertical (and externally-oriented) 
enclave, see Torres-Rivas, History and Society in Central America, 30-41. For a more 
detailed discussions of its expansion via control of transport, see Charles David 
Kepner, The Banana Empire: A Case Study o f Economic Imperialism (New York: 
Russell and Russell, 1967); Paul J. Dosai, Doing Business with the Dictators: A 
Political History o f United Fruit in Guatemala 1899-1944 (Wilmington, DE: 
Scholarly Resources, 1993).
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The UFCO’s expansion occurred under the dictatorship of President General Jorge 
Ubico Castenada (1931-1944) and the economic crisis of the 1930s. Paul Dosai has 
argued that the establishment and expansion of the UFCO in Guatemala could only 
take place during dictatorial regimes (Cabrera, then Ubico), because other elites would 
have vetoed the concessions the company received had they been subject to 
parliamentary approval (Dosai, 1993: 38). Others have suggested that such strong 
tactics were required by the potentially explosive economic conditions of the day 
(Cullather, 1999: 9), and the difficulties of attracting capital to Central America in 
such conditions created the economic imperative to provide generous investment terms 
(Grieb, 1979: 186).^‘
There are indeed apparent tensions and contradictions of Ubico’s tenure. He allowed 
for the UFCO to establish its stranglehold on key sectors of the Guatemalan economy, 
though he also established an advisory council for modernising elites to create a 
national industrial policy.^ He was a member of the oligarchy, albeit a modernising 
one, as well as the military, to which he gave control of the labour supply with the 
transition from debt peonage to vagrancy laws.^  ^His oppressive measures alienated the
Ubico came to office when Guatemala had accrued a US$5 million debt, the interest 
on which threatened to consume nearly all government income. Handy, Gift o f the 
Devil: A History o f Guatemala, 94.
See: Kenneth J. Grieb, Guatemalan Caudillo, The Regime o f Jorge Ubico: 
Guatemala, 1931-1944 (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1979), chapter 12; Dosai, 
Power in Transition: The Rise o f Guatemala's Industrial Oligarchy, 1871-1994, 
chapter 4. ‘ The formal advisory council foreshadows the origins o f  C ACIF: To the 
industrialists, development policy should fall within the exclusive domain of the 
fuerzas vivas (a favorite self-description of the private sector in the 1980s), the 
planters, merchants, bankers, and industrialists who own productive enterprises and 
create jobs’. Dosai, Power in Transition: The Rise o f Guatemala's Industrial 
Oligarchy, 1871-1994, 72.
Dosai, Power in Transition: The Rise o f Guatemala's Industrial Oligarchy, 1871- 
1994, chapter 4, examines Ubico’s oligarchic and military background. Grieb,
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nascent urban middle class, which had only come into being under his administration 
(Dosai, 1995: 78).
The theme unifying these tensions is Ubico’s conception of modernisation, which
required international capital and the iron hand of the military to overcome
Guatemala’s developmental limitations. His regime was marked by such statements as:
‘Public order is the cornerstone on which the tranquillity and well-being of peoples is
based’ and ‘Peace and Order are the only conditions essential for human development’
(Grieb, 1979: 32-33). Ubico’s biographer, Kenneth Grieb, argues such declarations
were ‘designed to provide auspicious conditions for investment, both foreign and
domestic’ (Grieb, 1979: 33). Indeed, Grieb suggests that despite the monopolistic
practices qf UFCO, ‘many Guatemalans, among them Ubico, exhibited a decided
preference for investment from the United States and placed a high priority on the
attraction of North American firms to the republic’ (Grieb, 1979: 182). He explains:
The Caudillo considered the Yankees shrewd businessmen, and felt that 
establishing ties with the hemisphere’s great power and world financial 
center would prove beneficial to his nation, particularly since the relative 
proximity to the Northern Colossus offered the trading advantages that 
would serve to stimulate the development of the Guatemalan export sector 
(Grieb, 1979: 182).
The nexus between modernisation and militarization would be manifest in Ubico’s 
‘reform’ of the labour laws wherein vagrancy laws replaced debt peonage, expanding 
the militarised state into labour policy.®'* The labour required under such laws
Guatemalan Caudillo, The Regime o f Jorge Ubico: Guatemala, 1931-1944, 
particularly chapter 2, provides a more personal description of Ubico.
See Cindy Forster, The Time o f Freedom: Campesino Workers in Guatemala's 
October Revolution (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001), 29-30, for a 
discussion of the ‘official myths’ constructed to promote the idea that Ubico was
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amounted to nearly half the year for many indigenous men (Handy, 1984: 98); 
(Forster, 2001: 33). Racism predictably underlay such policies. Ubico felt Indians were 
unsuited to politics (which should be left to the urban elite), and that the best way to 
incorporate them into national life was through military conscription: the indigenous 
“‘come [to the military] rude, brutish, and with primitive origin, but they return 
learned, polished, with good manners and in condition to face life”’ (Handy, 1984: 99). 
This view of the indigenous was widespread, and echoed by a US attaché who argued 
that as most Indians were illiterate, they had no idea what they were doing at the polls 
and should be disenfranchised (Handy, 1984: 91).
The UFCO was imbued with assumptions about race and engaged in coercive labour 
practices as well. Beyond the harassment of smaller landowners to sell their property 
and ‘company store’ practices that made labourers virtually indentured servants of the 
company (Handy, 1984: 82-83, 89), the race hierarchy of the UFCO was pronounced. 
Cindy Forster notes that ‘lynch law reigned with perfect impunity in the banana zone 
to silence workers’ collective actions as well as individual outbursts of rage against 
white managers’ (Forster, 2001: 16).®^  Indeed, according to Stephen Schlesinger and 
Stephen Kinzer, the extent of the racism displayed by UFCO alarmed its own public 
relations advisor, whose memo on the subject earned him ‘company-wide silent 
treatment’ (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1983: 82).
popular among the peasantry, part of the ‘historical record’ that has been adopted by 
many scholars.
‘In the end. United Fruit was compelled to hire Ladinos alongside the descendants of 
West Indians, even though the company’s “scientific” racism led it to believe workers 
of Afiican descent were best suited to banana production’. Forster, The Time o f 
Freedom: Campesino Workers in Guatemala's October Revolution, 16.
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Under Ubico’s tenure, the nature of disarticulation in Guatemala changes: the 
influence of international capital, modernizing elites, and the military increase vis-à- 
vis traditional agricultural elites. The military becomes more directly implicated in 
rural labour relations and as a result the race hierarchy becomes more ‘institutionally’ 
militarized. This reading of the 1930s allows for an appreciation of the often 
seemingly contradictory events and coalitions that follow in the democratic opening of 
1944-54 and the conservative backlash that followed. Thus the democratic opening 
reflects a heterogeneous coalition, some elements of which reflect a superficial 
reaction to recent changes in the nature of disarticulation while others aim to overcome 
disarticulation at a much more profound level. The conservative backlash the reform 
precipitates in turn reflects a coalition in favour of preserving disarticulation for 
‘traditional’ and ‘modernising’ reasons.
Challenging disarticulation: reforms and reaction
Ubico lost support of the oligarchy and resigned. The military attempted to have the 
legislature install its preferred successor, a move that precipitated a revolt among 
young military officers, who had the integrity to allow for elections.^ Juan José 
Arevalo, a university professor with a doctorate in Education fi-om Argentina, won 85 
percent of the vote (the enfranchised population then including only literate men 
(Gleijeses, 1991: 36))."'
The officers were joined by civilian leaders as well. The transitional junta included 
Captain Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, who would succeed Arevalo, Major Francisco Arana, 
who would lead a coup against Arevalo, and Jorge Toriello, a civilian.
As Dunkerley observed in 1988, the lack of scholarly treatment of this period given 
its later importance is somewhat surprising. Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus: A 
Political History o f Modern Central America, 134. Since then a few volumes have 
been published: Forster, The Time o f Freedom: Campesino Workers in Guatemala’s 
October Revolution ; Jim Handy, Revolution in the Countryside: Rural Conflict and
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Arévalo’s reform program involved two significant elements: a labour code and a 
social security scheme. The labour code of May 1947 affirmed the right to unionise, 
guaranteed the right to strike and protected workers from unfair dismissals, although 
agricultural unions were limited to farms employing over 500 workers and the right to 
strike was subject to a conciliation mechanism (Dunkerley, 1988: 139-40, Gleijeses, 
1991: 41, Handy, 1984: 107-8). The Guatemalan Institute of Social Security (IGSS) 
was created in January of 1948 and was soon considered one of the most incorrupt and 
effective elements of the Guatemalan government (Gleijeses, 1991: 42). Arevalo's 
policies were accompanied by greater political freedoms to the urban population and 
less repression and a commitment to rural education to the countryside (Gleijeses, 
1991: 43, 161). Yet the reforms of his administration were limited in their scope, 
explicitly stopping short of any land reform.®*
Nonetheless, such social changes met with resistance from elites, who ‘soon branded 
these freedoms as intolerable excesses and began to reminisce about the times of 
Ubico, when “social peace” had reigned supreme’ (Gleijeses, 1991: 43).®’ Indeed, 
‘“The conservative elements,” the U.S. military attaché reported, “attribute labor 
unrest to communism, look with horror on social reforms and reflect that it was easier
Agrarian Reform in Guatemala, 1944-1954 (Chapel Hill: Univeristy of North Carolina 
Press, 1994); Piero Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the 
United States, 1944-1954 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). Gleijeses 
provides the most thorough and well documented political account, and is thus most 
relied upon here.
In an April 1945 speech, Arevalo claimed ‘In Guatemala there is no agrarian 
problem ... The problem is that the peasants have lost their desire to till the soil 
because of the attitudes and politics of the past. My government will motivate them, 
but without resorting to any measures that hurt other classes’. Gleijeses, Shattered 
Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954,47.
See also Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus: A Political History o f Modern Central 
America, 40.
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to do business, easier to make money, and easier and safer to lived during the dictator 
era” (Gleijeses, 1991: 48). Although the US seemed content to allow Arevalo to 
remain in office, confident of the strength and unwavering anti-communism of the 
military as well as the prospect of a more conservative successor (Gleijeses, 1991: 
123-7), Guatemalan elites were no so patient. They encouraged Major Arana -  the 
most conservative element of the junta that allowed for Arevalo's election -  to attempt 
a coup, foiled by Arevalo but that led to three deaths, including Arana’s own.’”
Arevalo was succeeded in  1951 by Colonel Jacobo Arbenz, the minister of defence 
who had defended democracy in the Ubico transition, and who, thanks to his pubHc 
reticence and prevailing prejudices of the day, won a wide spectrum of support. 
Organised labour was drawn to his support of democracy and became convinced of his 
progressive credentials, while members of the modernising elite firom his home town 
of Quezaltenango assumed he shared their sense that limited reforms would be 
economically beneficial and sought to ‘educate the prince’ to their agenda (Gleijeses, 
1991: 73). Likewise, a US advisor’s racism and ignorance of the man himself brought 
him to the conclusion that ‘“... Arbenz is, in my opinion, essentially an opportunist 
who has strung along with the Arevalo bandwagon principally as a means of 
accumulating personal wealth and of giving ascendancy to his own political star. He 
has no admixtures of Indian blood, and is basically of an autocratic 
character’”(Gleijeses, 1991: 73 ,125).’‘
The plot and its demise are described in Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan 
Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954, chapter 3. There had been other minor 
coup attempts against Arevalo as well, however none save Arana’s was seriously 
threatening.
See also Richard H. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy o f 
Intervention (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 106. Arbenz was in fact of 
middle class origins, although quite fair given that his father was German; in 1939 he
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Once in office, Arbenz in fact introduced a significant land reform and public works 
program. His agrarian reform plan, Decree 900, approved on 17 June 1952, involved 
the redistribution of all government-owned fincas and the expropriation of 
uncultivated land on large estates in exchange for 25 year government bonds at three 
percent interest (the same arrangement as the US used in Formosa and Japan; 
(Gleijeses, 1991: 164, Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1983: 54).^  ^ The magnitude of the 
reform involved about 1.5 million acres fi*om 107 national farms and 16.3 percent of 
the country’s private arable land, which constituted only 3.9 percent of privately- 
owned land outside of the UFCO’s holdings (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1983: 55); 
(Handy, 1984: 132); (Dunkerley, 1988: 148). The number of beneficiaries has been 
assessed at ‘100,000 heads of families’, or roughly 500,000 people based on the 1950 
census (Gleijeses, 1991: 156); (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1983: 55); (Handy, 1984: 
128).
The public works program was designed to create a national transportation 
infi-astructure competitive with the US-owned network through a large road system, a 
new Caribbean port, and a hydroelectric dam.’^  The plan largely followed the
married a member of the Salvadoran upper-class, Maria Vilanova, who is credited with 
introducing him to progressive politics and literature. The charge of personal self- 
interest is particularly illogical given that Arbenz was the only officer to resign in 
protest of the military’s occupation of Congress to strong arm it into selecting General 
Ponce during deliberations for Ubico’s successor. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The 
Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954, 139-40.
Government owned fincas were lands appropriated firom German farmers during 
World War II, which the Ubico administration took under US pressure to do so; see 
Dosai, Power in Transition: The Rise o f Guatemala's Industrial Oligarchy, 1871-1994, 
79.
Schlesinger and Kinzer as well as Gleijeses emphasise that the strategy was to 
introduce competition rather than nationalization to improve Guatemalan access to 
transport services. Stephen Schlesinger and Stephen Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold
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recommendations of a 1951 World Bank report on Guatemala (Gleijeses, 1991: 165); 
(Dunkerley, 1988: 147). After the failure to balance the 1953-54 budget, Arbenz 
sought to introduce the first income tax in Guatemalan history to assist in funding the 
reforms (Gleijeses, 1991: 169); (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1983: 54).’'*
Arbenz was sympathetic to communism, joining the Guatemalan Communist Party 
(Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo, PGT) in 1957, three years after his overthrow 
(Gleijeses, 1991: 147). The communist party distinguished itself -  even in US circles 
(Lehman, 1997: 212) -  in its incorruptibility in executing land reforms (Schlesinger 
and Kinzer, 1983: 58-63) (Handy, 1984: 131). Yet the reform program of the Arbenz 
administration was firmly capitalist in orientation: he and the PGT understood 
Guatemala to be at a semifeudal level of development, which required passing through 
a capitalist stage before socialism could be considered. As a leader of the PGT put it: 
‘the PGT “enthusiastically endorsed the thesis that Guatemala must first go through a 
capitalist stage. When we state this we were not trying to hoodwink anyone. We were 
convinced of it’” (Gleijeses, 1991: 148). This meant that capitalist agriculture would 
be developed through small farmers; Arbenz made clear that this was not redistribution 
for the sake of redistribution: “‘It is not our purpose to break up all the rural property 
of the country that could be judged large or fallow and distribute the land to those who 
work it. This will be done to latifundia, but we will not do it to agricultural economic 
entities of the capitalist type’” in (Dunkerley, 1990: 226).
Story o f the American Coup in Guatemala (New York: Anchor Books, 1983), 53; 
Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944- 
1954, 165.
For a discussion of taxation in the Arevalo period, see: John H Adler, Public 
Finance and Economic Development in Guatemala (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 
1970).
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Despite their nationalist-capitalist orientation, the reforms did engender a certain
transformation in the ensemble of social relations, particularly in the countryside. As
anthropologist Richard Adams observed:
An awaking of profound import did take place for many ... but it was not 
what usually has come under the rubric of ‘ideological’. It could better be 
called a ‘sociological awakening’, for it amounted to a realization that 
certain of the previously accepted roles and statuses within the social 
system were no longer bounded by the same rules, and that new channels 
were suddenly opened for the expression of and satisfaction of needs (in 
(Gleijeses, 1991: 161).
The oligarchy likewise perceived a change. Dunkerley observes: ‘[WJhatever its
fundamental objectives, [the reform programme] was perceived by the oligarchy as an
unprecedented challenge to its economic base and a major assault upon the entire
political culture erected upon hacienda’ (Dunkerley, 1988: 148).
The backlash to Arbenz came from two quarters, the US, influenced by the UFCO, and 
the Guatemalan elites, who benefited from the ambivalence of the military and the 
urban middle classes to the reform program.^^ Both ofthese sectors objected to the 
principles of the reform program and the social changes accompanying it: domestic 
elites saw a communist scare in the transformation of social relations while the US saw 
one in Guatemala’s increasing independence from its foreign policies in the region.
Landowners, both Guatemalan and foreign, routinely underreported the value of their 
holdings on tax statements, causing a reaction to the amount of compensation offered
For discussions of US involvement in Guatemala: Walter LaFeber, Inevitable 
Revolutions: The United States in Central America, 2nd ed. (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Company, 1993); Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story o f the 
American Coup in Guatemala ; Dosai, Doing Business with the Dictators: A Political 
History o f United Fruit in Guatemala J899-1944 ;Nick Cullather, Secret Hstory: The 
CIA's Classified Account o f its Operations in Guatemala, 1952-1954 (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1999) Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan 
Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954 .
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in the land redistribution. The UFCO objected vehemently to the principle of 
reappropriation -  arguing that it required fallow land to rotate production to avoid 
disease -  and to the amount offered, which it claimed was on the order of 25 times too 
little.^ ® T he UFCO a Iso f  elt d iscriminated a gainst by the 1947 Labor C ode, w ith i ts 
limitations on rural unions to farms with more than 500 employees.^^ Guatemalan 
elites were also ‘exasperated’ by the code and ‘began to brandish charges of 
communist infiltration with even greater gusto than did UFCO’ (Gleijeses, 1991: 99).
Over the course of the reform era, the US government likewise had grown to see 
‘communism’ everywhere in Guatemala. The UFCO certainly promoted this 
perception through an elaborate and well-financed public relations campaign that 
effectively involved leading US newspapers in presenting its point of view 
(Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1983: chapter 6).^ ® Nonetheless, many observers argue that
Dunkerley suggests that 85 percent of the UFCO’s land was fallow and that 653,197 
of its 917,659 acres were subject to reappropriation, of which 15 percent were 
earmarked. Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus: A Political History o f Modern Central 
America, 149, James Dunkerley, 'Guatemala Since 1930', in Cambridge History o f 
Latin America, ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 
227. Handy puts the figure at 250,000 of 350,000 manzanas. Handy, Revolution in the 
Countryside: Rural Conflict and Agrarian Reform in Guatemala, 1944-1954, 171. The 
company claimed on the order of 25 times the compensation offered by the 
government: Q15,854,849 versus the offered Q609,572, Handy, Revolution in the 
Countryside: Rural Conflict and Agrarian Reform in Guatemala, 1944-1954, 171-2; 
or, $15.8 million, at $75 per hectare versus the government figure of $627,527 at $2.99 
per hectare, Dunkerley, 'Guatemala Since 1930', 227.
Handy argues that two other fincas fit in this category, while Gleijeses claims that 
four did. Handy, Revolution in the Countryside: Rural Conflict and Agrarian Reform 
in Guatemala, 1944-1954, 171; Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan 
Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954, 94.
Indeed, anonymous reports from one of the UFCO’s lobbyists that alleged 
Guatemala aspired to take over the Panama canal (a total fabrication, which would 
have been impossible for the limited range of the Guatemalan airforce) became part of 
State Department and CIA reports. Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold 
Story o f the American Coup in Guatemala, 107. The CIA was alleged to have 
distributed the UFCO’s public relations reports to US government officials as its own.
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there were subtler issues than mere economic imperialism at stake in defining 
communist for the US/’ Kenneth Lehman argues that in the 1950s US policy-makers 
understood reformist governments as communist (i.e., Guatemala but not Bolivia) 
when they were not amenable to US pressure, w ere vocally anti-American or when 
reform was directly addressed at US interests; Guatemala under Arbenz ‘flunked all 
three tests’ (Lehman, 1997: 195).
Initially the US engaged in a policy of harassment from a distance, denying military 
sales and economic assistance, both bilateral regional aid and a much needed World 
Bank loan.*® When the Eisenhower administration came to power in the US, the policy 
against the communist became much more interventionist, leading to a CIA-sponsored 
coup.** The operation, PBSUCCESS, involved isolating Guatemala diplomatically and
Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story o f the American Coup in 
Guatemala, 95.
It should nonetheless be observed that throughout the reform era, the US 
government held that the policies of Arevalo and Arbenz ‘victimized’ US capital. 
Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944- 
1954, 105 Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus: A Political History o f Modern Central 
America, 149.
‘As Assistant Secretary Miller later explained to Congress, the World Bank “sent a 
mission down there ... to make some recommendations for loans. We asked [them].... 
not to do that, that we ... would exercise the veto power against such loans”. Gleijeses, 
Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954, 128-9. 
Dunkerley similarly observes: that the UFCO and the US government ‘began to talk of 
the reform with the broad approval of the World Bank as ‘persecuting’ and 
‘victimizing’ private enterprise’. Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus: A Political History 
o f Modern Central America, 149.
Analyses of the Eisenhower administration decision making often note the 
prominent positions of John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, and his brother, Allan, 
head of the CIA, who had served as legal counsel to UFCO during the Ubico 
administration. Many of the concessions they negotiated for the company were undone 
by the 1952 Agrarian Reform. John Foster Dulles in particular was a forceful and 
visible member of the administration, dogmatically anti-communist. However, as 
Richard Immerman points out, ‘Rather than supporting the standard portrait of Dulles 
leading by the strings a passive president and an overawed collection of advisers, the 
papers of the Eisenhower administration reveal a foreign policy resulting from a high 
degree of multiple advocacy, with the final decisions remaining firmly within the Oval
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convincing the military that US intervention was imminent to abandon the Arbenz 
administration, while simultaneously maintaining ‘plausible deniability’ about its 
intentions.^ The campaign to isolate Guatemala diplomatically in particular involved a 
resolution in the Organisation of American States that declared the internal control of 
an American state by a communist movement a actionable threat to the security of the 
whole region (Gleijeses, 1991: chapter 12) (Schlesinger and Kinzer, 1983: 142-5). 
Such diplomatic tactics, as well as measures within Guatemala such as the 
appointment of a brash, militant new Ambassador, were designed to convince key 
players, most importantly the military, that US intervention was imminent.*  ^ On 16 
June 1954 Carlos Castillo Armas, formerly a Colonel in the Guatemalan army, began 
his US-sponsored coup against Arbenz. On 27 June, after a US-assisted bombing
Office’. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy o f Intervention, 14. 
Nonetheless, the Dulles brothers were particularly well-placed advocates for 
intervention, who allegedly even went so far as to manipulate the press (by 
discrediting a New Y ork T imes r eporter to his editor) to a fleet the c overage o f  the 
coup. Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold Story o f the American Coup in 
Guatemala, xiii.
Allan Dulles’ assistant Richard Bissell stated: ‘The figleaf was designed to deny US 
involvement... yet the success of the operation hinged on convincing the Guatemalans 
that the US was indeed involved’. Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: The Guatemalan 
Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954, 247.
In fact. Ambassador John Peurifoy was the only of the US diplomatic staff to know 
details of the operation, which was organised through the CIA. Gleijeses, Shattered 
Hope: The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954, 252. Immerman 
notes: ‘Without massive external assistance, including foreign troops, Castillo Armas 
could not possibly win an armed confi*ontation. Consequently, Allen Dulles and the 
other top CIA officials based their strategy on the assessment that both Arbenz and his 
military staff could be deceived into believing that Castillo Armas was at the head of a 
major insurrectionary force and that, if necessary, direct United States support waited 
in the wings. Perceiving such a challenge, the strategists predicted, the military would 
desert the revolution and Arbenz would resign. The actual scenario followed the CIA 
prognosis almost exactly’. Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy o f 
Intervention, 162.
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campaign and a strategic misinformation campaign about the actual numbers and 
support for the coup leaders, Arbenz resigned.®'*
In its commitment to capitalist development and limited nature of its agrarian reform 
(relying on UFCO and national lands), Arbenz challenged elements of the subjective 
but not the objective dimensions of disarticulation: his reforms did not significantly 
alter the material bases of power of elites in Guatemala. The conservative backlash to 
his policies was wider than ‘mere’ US imperialism, although Arbenz’s strong 
reputation within the military would undoubtedly have maintained his presidency 
longer had the US not gotten involved. The withdrawal of support from the military 
and the lack of strong support firom the urban middle classes allowed for conservative 
elements to reassert their control. This would require a stronger hand than before the 
reform era, which did raise expectations in the rural population: precisely the 
conditions to which emergent counterinsurgent state would address itself with US 
support.
The post-reform ensemble of social relations
Disarticulation in the Guatemalan ensemble of social relations is reconstructed in the 
post-reform era with significant involvement of the US in the military and the 
economy. The modem Guatemalan military owes a significant debt to US funding 
after the coup. Although the military was quite strong under the Ubico regime, there 
was a significant contribution by the US after 1954, through the direct transfer of 
materials and services via grant, sales and credit programmes originating in the 1950s,
Details of the coup are related in Schlesinger and Kinzer, Bitter Fruit: The Untold 
Story o f the American Coup in Guatemala, chapters 12 and 13; Immerman, The CIA in 
Guatemala: The Foreign Policy o f Intervention, chapter 7; Gleijeses, Shattered Hope: 
The Guatemalan Revolution and the United States, 1944-1954, chapter 14.
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training in the leadership of armed forces, and police assistance (Holden, 1993: 288). 
In 1962, the US established a secret base for coimterinsurgency training in the 
department of Izabal, directed by members of US special forces. Further, 2,280 
Guatemalan military personnel received US training between 1950 and 1970, both in 
the US (626 trainees) and at the US Army School of the Americas in Panama (1,654 
personnel; (Sharckman, 1974: 197). The course curriculum at the latter emphasised 
counter-guerrilla warfare and provided instruction in US military doctrine and 
ideology. The move to a counterinsurgency state involved changes in the required 
weaponry: from tanks, artillery, bombers to less expensive light weapons, mobile 
communications, and helicopters. This transition occurred in 1966-70, and served as a 
model for other US military assistance projects (Sharckman, 1974).
Police training provided by USAID also focused on anticommunist ideology and 
counterinsurgency strategies, and ‘professionalizing’ the police force. Over 30,000 
Guatemalan police personnel received such training by 1970, which included 
programmes on ‘The Threat to Latin America’, ‘The Changing Society’, and the 
‘Implementation of Modem Scientific Aid’ (Sharckman, 1974: 199). Police equipment 
grants (not including training or services) from the US to Guatemala in the period 
1957-71 amounted to $9,047,914 (SUS1990; (Holden, 1993: 305).'' Although 
Guatemala at times distanced itself from the US (notably during the Carter 
administration, because of its onerous emphasis on human rights), this was only after 
the US had established it as one of the best trained and equipped militaries in the
‘Thus, it would seem that the United States gave the Guatemalan police forces 
during the 1960s nearly all of their handguns and nearly half their shoulder 
weapons...’. Robert H. Holden, The Real Diplomacy of Violence: United States 
Military Power in Central America, 1950-1990', The International History Review 15, 
no. 2 (1993): 305-6.
97
region. Furthermore, at this point it was ahle to purchase military supplies from Israel 
and the Argentine dictatorship.*^
As the military developed institutionally, it also grew to become a significant 
economic actor. Initially the economic ambitions of the military were contained to the 
opportunistic, personal accumulation of senior officers (Dunkerley, 1988: 462). For 
example, in the 1970s a sparsely populated area called the Northern Transversal Strip, 
marked for ‘colonisation’ as a development mechanism, was ultimately so 
appropriated by military elites that it became known as the ‘Land of the Generals’. 
Later, however, this accumulation became more institutionalised, as per the military 
itself. The military established a bank and invested in such diverse activities as real 
estate construction, insurance and manufacturing; likewise it often controlled semi- 
autonomous state enterprises (Dunkerley, 1988: 462). As Regis Debray explains, with 
the creation of an Army Bank ‘military hegemony grows in time and in space with 
foreign investment... ’ (Debray, 1978: 352).
The US development strategy for post-reform Guatemala was implemented through 
the World Bank, USAID and the private US consulting firm, Klein and Saks (K&S).*’
‘At least until 1981 the Israeli connection represented a clear alternative to US 
military aid; thereafter it tended to become more of a surrogate although still providing 
the Guatemalan military with an appreciably wider margin of independence from 
Washington than was possessed by their regional counterparts. ... Argentine expertise 
in urban counter-insurgency operations gained during the ‘dirty war’ in Buenos Aires 
resulted in the effective destruction of ORPA’s (guerrilla group, discussed further 
below) network in the capital in 1981’. Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus: A Political 
History o f Modern Central America, 490. ‘Given Israel’s own dependence on US 
military hardware, and Washington’s traditional interest in shutting out potential non- 
hemispheric military suppliers, it seems likely that Israel stepped in only with the 
permission -  perhaps even encouragement -  of the United States’. Holden, The Real 
Diplomacy of Violence: United States Military Power in Central America, 1950-1990': 
304.
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These post-intervention economic policies differed from the development ethos 
adopted by many other Latin American states at the time, (as for example that of the 
UN Economic Commission for Latin America), in their emphasis on state support for 
private enterprise rather than state regulation. Prominent features of the World 
Bank/USAID/K&S plan included dismantling restrictions on foreign investment and 
attracting US investors to Guatemala (‘a campaign in which K&S played a crucial 
role’), private sector concessions and subsidies, an emphasis on export agriculture and 
the financing of infi*astructure through World Bank and US fimds (Jonas, 1974: 79). 
Such financing insulated elites fi*om taxation, a perennial problem in Guatemala, 
which has among the lowest taxes in Latin America and a highly regressive tax 
system.
The expansion of the ‘modernising’ business elite lie in the post-intervention era and 
foreign participation in the economy. From the 1950s to the 1970s, US investment in 
Guatemala increased significantly: 37 percent in the 1950s and 128.8 percent in the 
period 1959-69, bringing it to US$888 million in 1969 (Tobis, 1974: 132). The 
composition of this investment heavily favoured manufacturing over agriculture -  
previously t he d ominant s ector -  so that it g rew to a ccount for 3 6.3 p ercent o f  US 
direct investment (US$ 46.6 million) in Guatemala in 1970 (up fi*om 10.4 percent in 
1963; agriculture declined from 27.2 percent to 23.2 percent over the same period); 
(Tobis, 1974: 133). The only other sector to increase during this period was 
commercial capital: US firms operated primarily through the acquisition of local firms.
Jonas claims that the World Bank was pressured to approve an $18.2 million 
highway loan to Guatemala; the US had rejected Arbenz’ petition for the same loan. 
Here USAID is used for simplicity; during the early 1950s the agency was called the 
International Cooperation Agency. Susanne Jonas, '"Showcase" for Counterrevolution', 
in Guatemala, ed. S usanne Jonas and David Tobis (Berkeley, C A: North American 
Congress on Latin America, 1974), 77.
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This strategy created joint ventures, which further tied business elites to international 
capital. Furthermore, many firms were classified as ‘new industries’ after acquisition, 
exempting them from corporate tax for five years and granting them duty-free imports 
(Tobis, 1974: 133).
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The changes in US investment in Guatemala were accompanied by a change in the 
composition of economic elites. Thus the Comité Coodinador de Asociaciones 
Agricolas, Comericiales, Industriales y Financieras (CACIF; 1957), Asociacion 
Nacional de Café (ANACAFE; 1960) and other post-intervention business 
associations became increasingly powerful vis-à-vis their pre-intervention 
predecessors. CACIF and the American Chamber of Commerce increased in authority 
with the expansion of US capital in Guatemala in the 1960s, both in traditional 
agricultural sectors and in manufacturing and commercial sectors (Dunkerley, 1988: 
463). CACIF began as a forum ‘to allow all of private enterprise to cooperate when 
necessary’ and has since its inception promoted internationally-oriented economic 
interests (Adams, 1970: 340-1). ‘The general position of CACIF was conservative, 
however, and it did not hesitate to ridicule organizations that reflected a pre-1954 
nationalism’ (Adams, 1970: 340). The composition of business associations is
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particularly significant because, as Dunkerley notes, ‘the bourgeoisie did not greatly 
depend upon direct representation though political parties. ... [Policy-making] fell 
largely to the corporate associations of capital.. .’ (Dunkerley, 1988: 462-3).
The US reconstruction efforts in the post-reform state reinstitutes the highly privatised 
strategy of governance that extends back to before the reform decade, but under a new 
modernising ethos. This ethos more actively involves elites in the international 
economy and structures the Guatemalan state to be receptive to foreign capital. The 
result reflects a form of disarticulation structured precisely to allow for the continued 
mutual reinforcement of the dominant groups of society.
The ‘modernisation’ efforts occurred on a regional level as well, with the creation of a 
Central American Common Market (CACM) in the 1960s. The idea originated with an 
effort by the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (Comision Economica para 
America Latina, CEPAL) in 1958, which by 1960 was then largely displaced by the 
US, a move which changed the nature of the common market fi*om one based on 
regional planning to one based on a fi*ee market with the help of US$100 million in 
assistance (Jonas, 1974: 88). The notion of economies of scale was transformed into a 
definition of development based on the concept of ‘promotion’: the targeting of a 
specific sphere to attract for foreign investment, celebrated as a source of technical 
expertise. However, the incentives to attract these industries were so generous as to 
compromise any contribution they might make to the local economy (Jonas, 1974: 
96).®® The CACM strategy reflected the logic of social disarticulation: it sought to
These incentives included no restrictions on the possibility of taking over the 
locally-owned enterprise, exemptions from corporate income tax, duties on imports, 
and unrestricted profit remittances. Susanne Jonas, 'Masterminding the Mini-Market:
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establish market-widening through expanding the regional scope of the market, rather 
than through m eaningful social reform. UItimately the C ACM dissolved because o f  
tensions over its impact on other countries in the region. Smaller and poorer countries 
charged that their economic positions had worsened to the benefit of the relatively 
more industrialised states in the region, Guatemala and El Salvador.
Contradictions of disarticulation; rebellion and popular organising
Resistance to the dominant elements of the post-reform era social ensemble in
Guatemala as popular organising and rebel activity occurs in three broad periods: the 
decade 1962-72, where early attempts at guerrilla warfare are fraught with difficulty 
and effectively repressed by the state, the period between the decimation of this early 
effort and the 1976 earthquake, and the period from 1976 leading up to the genocidal 
counterinsurgency campaigns of 1980-1983.
The period 1962-72 is marked by the emergence of a guerrilla movement, led by 
disaffected army officers.®’ The CIA’s use of a Guatemalan military base without
U.S. Aid to the Central American Common Market', in Guatemala, ed. Susanne Jonas 
and David Tobias (North American Congress on Latin America, 1974), 96-97.
For a timeline of this period, see Dunkerley, Power in the Isthmus: A Political 
History o f Modem Central America, 450-2. Regis Debray’s reflections on the period 
can be found in, Régis Debray, The Revolution on Trial: A Critique o f Arms, trans. 
Rosemary Sheed, 2 vols., vol. 2 (New York: Penguin Books, 1978). For discussions of 
the Maya in this period from an anthropological perspective, see, inter alia: Beatriz 
Manz, Refugees o f a Hidden War (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988); 
Ricardo Falla, Massacres in the Jungle: Ixcan, Guatemala, 1975-1982, trans. Julia 
Howland (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994); Robert M. Carmack, ed.. Harvest o f 
Violence: the Maya Indians and the Guatemalan Crisis (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 1988); Smith, ed., Guatemalan Indians and the State, 1540 to 1988 . 
The classic biography from an indigenous perspective is Rigoberta Menchu, I, 
Rigoberta Menchu: An Indian Woman in Guatemala, trans. Ann Wright (London: 
Verson, 1984). Discussions of the controversies it raised can be found in: Arturo Arias, 
ed.. The Rigoberta Menchu Controversy (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 
2001).
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proper Army consultation provoked a nationalist coup attempt in November 1960. In 
1961 those unsuccessful rebel leaders returned to join the communist party {Partido 
Guatemalteco de Trabajo, PGT), which had committed itself to a strategy of guerrilla 
warfare. The Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR), as this effort would be later known, 
focused on the Eastern areas of Izabal province and the town of Zacapa. The 
movement suffered from two strategic problems. First, the military and political arms 
of the effort were kept separate: the guerrilla leadership was excluded from political 
decision making, which ‘engendered acute problems of coordination’ (Dunkerley, 
1988: 454). Second, the FAR and its related forces pursued a strategy of direct military 
confrontation without any organisational efforts among the population, which was later 
identified even by the FAR itself as ‘the overly adventurous and voluntarist features of 
a rigid foquismo' (after Che Guevara’s and Régis Debray’s foco theory; (Dunkerley, 
1988: 452).""
During this initial post-coup period, another form of ‘popular’ organising emerged in 
the form of Accidn Catolica, a religious developmentalist movement with the goal of 
creating small-scale farmer-entrepreneurs. This new form of development reorganised 
traditional agriculture, leading to a transition away from traditionally significant crops, 
such a com, which has spiritual significance to the Maya, towards income generating 
cash crops (Arias, 1990: 235). However, as Arturo Arias notes, ‘despite their reformist 
character, the growth of the cooperatives brought about serious conflicts with the local 
powers, thus accelerating the radicalisation o f  A cciôn Cc/d/zca’s members and their 
mentors’ (Arias, 1990: 233). The state tolerated the cooperative movement to the
Foco theory posits that under some conditions of extreme exploitation a 
revolutionary consciousness essentially already exists and thus a small group of 
guerrillas can initiate a revolution and the people will follow, without any need for 
extensive outreach or organisation.
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extent it could remain ‘apoliticar. USAID supported cooperatives in its rural 
development programme for the 1960s, but alienated participants through its attempt 
to be ‘nonpolitical’, many of whom saw USAID as working to destroy the existing 
movement (Brockett, 1988: 110). Participants became divided into those who feared 
being labelled communist -  some members of Accion Catolica and priests who argued 
that they ‘did not want to get involved in politics’ -  and those who felt disappointed 
with the failure to realise a political alternative and became radicalised through the 
experience (Arias, 1990: 234). The cooperative movement was coopted by the state, 
which became involved under the guise of the provision of technical development and 
credit. However, the movement had already established the foundations for indigenous 
organising.
After the destruction of the FAR through the assassination of its remaining leadership 
in 1972, organising entered a phase of more secret activities that involved multicultural 
alliances. A group of dissident FAR members reorganised in the predominantly 
indigenous region of El Quiche under the banner of the Guerrilla Army of the Poor 
{Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres, HOP).®* The HOP rejected foco theory and spent 
years cultivating a support base before it engaged in armed combat, initially in 1975 
but more firequently only from 1978 onwards (Dunkerley, 1988: 455-6). The 
Organizacion Revolucionaria del Pueblo en Armas (Organisation of the People in 
Arms, GRP A) similarly pursued a strategy of ‘gestation’, having been established in 
1971 but only emerging publicly in 1979 (Brockett, 1988: 112). The GRP A, like the 
EGP, shared an emphasis on organising in indigenous areas (the Western Highlands). 
Though smaller, GRPA attracted a broader base of support than the EGP, including
A map of of the geographical distribution of guerrialla groups can be found in 
Appendix 2.
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middle-class intellectuals, and the FAR, whose programme was less populist 
(Dunkerley, 1988: 483). During this period the Comité de Unidad Campesina 
(Committee of Peasant Unity, CUC), an indigenous-led but multicultural/multiracial 
peasant union emerged, also pursuing a strategy of secret organising, going public only 
in 1978. This period was one of relatively less overt conflict between the state and 
popular forces, however, the 1976 earthquake would re-open this uneasy tension.
The far-reaching organisational infrastructure of the cooperative movement allowed it 
to respond to the 1976 earthquake that devastated Guatemala, thus giving it the 
potential to control a great deal of the international aid that poured into the country. 
The cooperative movement interfaced with the international community and to an 
extent publicized the plight of indigenous Guatemalans, increasing the perception that 
it represented a threat to the state. In response, the army monopolised much of the aid, 
reinforcing social control while using the resources for the pursuit of individual profit 
(Arias, 1990: 243). This situation was codified into law by the 1978 New Cooperative 
Law, which essentially put the cooperative movement under military control (Sollis, 
1995: 529). Counterinsurgency activities immediately after the earthquake targeted 
cooperative members, 200 of whom ‘disappeared’ in the department of El Quiche in 
the year and a half following the earthquake (Brockett, 1988: 111).
A number of public actions by progressive forces in the years leading up to the most 
brutal counterinsurgency campaign were met by reactionary responses that fuelled 
support for the guerrilla. By 1977 there was widespread support for union rights; a 
miners’ march that year drew a crowd of 100,000 supporters in the capital (Dunkerley,
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1988: 471)/^ The next year, the CUC went public and organised thousands of Indians 
to march under its banner at the May Day demonstrations. Greg Grandin observes, 
‘Not since 1839, when Rafael Carerra’s peasant army occupied Guatemala City had 
this many Mayans gathered together as Indians in a show of oppositional force in the 
ladino capital’ (Grandin, 1997: 18, emphasis original). In 1979, ORPA would make its 
efforts public as well.
The nature of the responses to these activities shows how the political involvement of 
the indigenous population prevokes alarm. ‘ Given the deep-seated mistrust between 
Mayans and ladinos, [its multiethnic character] perhaps was the CUC’s most radical 
and threatening aspect’ (Grandin, 1997: 17). Thus later in May 1978, the army called 
indigenous peasants to the town of Panzos, ostensibly for a meeting to resolve 
conflicts over access to traditional lands that had been usurped for cattle farming, only 
to fire on the defenceless crowd which it immediately buried in a mass grave.^  ^ In 
1980, the leader of the CUC (Vincente Menchu, Rigoberta’s father) and 39 peasants 
who took their case for protection from arbitrary repression to the Spanish embassy 
were burned alive in an army attack (which took place against the wishes of the 
Spanish ambassador). '^* These two events remain watersheds in the national
The success of this march and other instances of Indian-ladino cooperation 
encouraged the CUC to be a multiethnic rather than Indigenous-based organisation.
Dunkerley notes, ‘According to later military reports a major clash with 
‘subversives’ took place, which explained neither the immediate burial of the dead in a 
single mass grave -  alleged to be dug by tractors two days earlier -  nor the fact that 
only one soldier was hurt, with a slight wound to the leg. Well before the Church 
issued its detailed version of a premeditated mass execution the regime’s clumsy 
rendition of events had been undermined by eye-witness accounts...’. Dunkerley, 
Power in the Isthmus: A Political History o f Modern Central America, 477. See also 
Handy, Gift o f the Devil: A History o f Guatemala, 245-6.
Handy notes that ‘Only the ambassador and one peasant survived. The peasant was 
later kidnapped from the hospital where he was recuperating from his injuries’. Handy, 
Gift o f the Devil: A History o f Guatemala, 247.
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consciousness and provoked greater sympathy for the guerrilla in the indigenous 
population.
Counterinsurgency in Guatemaia
Counterinsurgency operates with the rhetoric of development, but aims to remove the 
rural population from a context of potential guerrilla recruitment. In Guatemala two 
main strategies of control were employed: the destruction of villages (over 400 by the 
end of the campaign), with the relocation of the population into ‘model villages’, and 
the forced recruitment of men into paramilitary civil patrols for rural surveillance.
While outwardly their creation was defended through the discourse o f  development 
(and indeed with food to distribute from international relief efforts) model villages in 
fact impoverished peasants and subjected them to specific resocialisation processes 
(Handy, 1984: 262); (Brockett, 1988: 119).’  ^‘Even the military officer in charge of the 
National Reconstruction Committee ... admitted that there were about 250,000 
peasants, “among them children who are forced to eat dirt’” (Handy, 1984: 261). The 
further destruction of indigenous culture was explicitly promoted through techniques 
such as discouraging the use of Mayan languages among children, the assassination of
External actors accepted the developmentalist pretext for the model villages. USAID 
and the international NGO CARE established positions for joint military assistance / 
development programmes. Howard Sharckman, 'The Vietnamization of Guatemala: 
US Counterinsurgency Programs', in Guatemala, ed. Susanne Jonas and David Tobis 
(Berkeley, CA: North American Congress on Latin America, 1974). Roads, for 
example, and other infrastructure that was ostensibly for development, had a strong 
military purpose. Charles Brockett notes: ‘The Agency for International Development, 
which provides much of the financing, defends [roads] as meeting developmental 
objectives, but many observers in the region see other purposes: “You’ll see right 
away that there is always a military outpost at the end of all the roads in the Altiplano. 
The roads are for the security of the country”’. Brockett, Land, Power and Poverty: 
Agrarian Transformation and Political Conflict in Central America, 119.
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Indian elders, and making different indigenous groups live together specifically to 
erode ethnic identities (Handy, 1984: 260); (Brockett, 1988: 118).
Patrullas de Autodefensa Civil (PACs, civilian self-defence patrols) were created 
ostensibly to guard communities from the guerrilla. They included at their height 
900,000 people, nearly 80 percent of the male population in rural indigenous areas 
(Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala, 1999: 119). Although 
communities participated in PACs under threat of elimination, indoctrination was also 
used to promote participation. In the words of the Guatemalan army, ‘Civic education 
is part of psychological action; it begins by providing thorough information about the 
security forces’ chances of success in the counter-subversion struggle’ (Human Rights 
Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala, 1999: 121). As James Dunkerley notes, ‘the 
primary purpose of the patrols was less military than to ensure individual registration, 
control of movement, and dissemination of propaganda. The ambitious long-term 
objective was a coercive state-based ‘incorporation’ of the campesino and particularly 
the Indian into the ‘nation” (Dunkerley, 1988: 496-7).
Yet, despite the roots of its possibilities in racial anxiety and its genocidal activities on 
the one hand, the counterinsurgency project at the same time opens the possibility of 
social control through cultural and identity appropriation. Jennifer Schirmer describes 
the military’s construction of the ‘Sanctioned Maya’ which is a model of the 
indigenous ‘constructed and continually reconstructed through the military’s optic, 
deprived of memory, and mute to the recent “subversive” past’ (Schirmer, 1998: 115). 
She argues.
Such re-creational and guardian discourse should also alert us to the 
military’s view of the indigenous community as a child needing to be 
disciplined, “ladinoized”, entrepreneurized—that is, “forged” to fit the
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“new” Guatemalan state... Part of this forging, it is believed, is 
accomplished by appropriating Mayan symbols to “rescue the Indians’ 
mentality until they feel part of the nation” (Schirmer, 1998: 114).
Identity becomes part of the terrain for control, the economic dimension of which is
manifest in the need to control the population in a specific modernisation process (and
is indeed reflected in the post-conflict state through the commodification of the
indigenous identity, see Chapter 4).
The methods of counterinsurgency are informed by its assumptions about society, as 
are its outcomes. Counterinsurgency destroys what it constructs as the enemy, but it is 
also productive of a new social order: partly through the elimination of challenges and 
partly through resocialisation through violence. It is the violent management of social 
change towards a post-challenge order.
The Recovery of Historical Memory Project (REMHI) of the Archdiocese of 
Guatemala’s Human Rights Office is considered the most comprehensive survey of 
human rights abuses during the war. According to the REMHI interviews, 
counterinsurgency was characterised by constant tension in the rural population, 
generalised, indiscriminate violence against civilians, public displays of horror and 
blatant impunity for government perpetrators (Human Rights Office of the 
Archdiocese of Guatemala, 1999: 9-10). Significantly, violence itself had explicit 
cultural overtones, including the way corpses were left to be found by indigenous 
communities, the targeting of children as victims, and the destruction of traditional 
crops (Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala, 1999: 19, Chapter 2, 
41).
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The social and psychological effects of this indiscriminate climate of terror led to the 
disruption of community life and to an atomisation of community forms. The societal 
effects involved restricted communication among people, withdrawal from community 
organisations, social isolation, and community distrust (Human Rights Office of the 
Archdiocese o f  G uatemala, 1 999: 1 0-11). T his social d isruption is r einforced on an 
individual level by feelings of humiliation, powerlessness and difficulty in 
distinguishing the boundaries between the real and imagined (Human Rights Office of 
the Archdiocese of Guatemala, 1999: 11-12). There are physical effects as well, which 
range from paralysis to acute panic attacks, and ailments such as immunological 
dysfimction and pain (Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala, 1999: 
11-12). There is some suggestion that suicide -  a social issue that rarely affects 
indigenous cultures -  increased dramatically as a result of the counterinsurgency 
campaign (Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala, 1999: 15-16).^
To reiterate, the underlying rationale for controlling the rural population is its assumed 
lack of rationality about the development project. A particular source of anxiety is the 
collective form where it is impossible to distinguish the naïve peasant from the 
contaminated rebel. This anxiety is amplified by the indigenous, understood to be 
ontologically -  racially -  different and historically hostile. The counterinsurgency 
project deliberately aims to disrupt rural life, to disembed it from existing social 
networks, and to reconstruct society in a particular political-economic ideal. Its 
outward regulatory form is very conspicuous and violent. However, in the use of terror
The report notes that in Rabinal municipality, there had been only one suicide in the 
10 years prior to the government campaign there, while during the repression there 
were eight suicides in a two year period. The forensic anthropologists coordinating 
many of the investigations into the human rights abuses in Guatemala have published a 
volume on the massacres in that region: Equipo de Antropoloigia Forense de 
Guatemala, Las Masacres en Rabinal, 2nd ed. (Guatemala: EAFG, 1997).
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and other counterinsurgency techniques, an inward regulatory function is created. The 
new social form silences both community organisations and individual self-expression. 
Technologies of cultivating mistrust within a community are accompanied by 
technologies of cultivating shame within individuals, who internalise community 
atomisation. Counterinsurgency does not merely control the community, it aims to 
control the individual.
Counterinsurgency as prelude to the peace process
The nature of counterinsurgency as socially and subjectively productive must be 
considered in understanding the ensemble of social relations preceding the peace 
process. Counterinsurgency structurally promotes a particular form of modernisation 
open to transnational capital. It does this by understanding political and social 
disarticulation as strategic to development. Disarticulation promotes the continued 
orientation of elite interests towards the international, provides the coercive framework 
for such development, and the conduit for the ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ to 
rationalise the new (re)iteration of society in this form. Likewise, culturally and 
subjectively, counterinsurgency serves to disembed traditional cultures and to atomise 
them. The anxiety of culture, race and modernity is resolved through the destruction 
and subsequent reconstruction of the ‘other’. The ‘Sanctioned Maya’ reflects the 
selective use of cultural symbols in a dehistoricized reconstruction of identity in the 
service of the dominant groups’ vision of the nation-state. This is the political 
subjective dimension of counterinsurgency, the postcolonial passive revolution. In 
what follows, the post-counterinsurgent ensemble of social relations will be considered 
through three lenses: the nature of the state economy and the associated
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understandings of development of economic elites, the new terrain of ‘civil society’, 
and the new discourses of indigenous identity.
The structure of the 'nationar economy
Modernising elites are associated with several sectors of the economy which had risen 
in importance since the 1960s: banking, non-traditional agriculture, maquila 
production, and tourism. These sectors have a new relationship to transnational capital 
and thus require a new role for the state in the economy, vis-à-vis regulation and 
infrastructure. These requirements are understood through a particular concept of the 
‘national’ economy as extrapolated from the microeconomics of the firm, which 
allows for the development and (re)construction of the privatised state. This is not the 
deconstruction of a welfare / developmentalist state, but the positive construction of 
the neoliberal state, a phenomenon overlooked by critiques of neoliberalism that see it 
only as a negative, economic project. However, this constructive aspect of 
neoliberalism strongly influences the position of modernising elites, represented by 
CACIF, and indeed the IFIs, in the peace process.
Banking
After rising in importance throughout the post-reform era, Guatemala liberalised -  and 
as a result, significantly expanded -  its financial sector at the end of the 1980s. This 
programme involved several strategies designed to increase competitiveness and to 
strengthen the solvency of the sector, to modernise the financial system, and to 
improve ‘entry-exit’ conditions in the financial services market (IMF, 1995: 42-43). 
(The modernisation efforts were supported by the Inter-American Development Bank 
(IMF, 1 995: 43)). The number ofprivate b anks nearly doubled in  the period 1 986- 
1994, increasing from 15 to 27 (IMF, 1995: 110).
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The financial services sector is not limited to banks per se: it includes a number of 
large financial groups, which include both financial and non-financial enterprises, 
usually with offshore operations. Many also operate fianciadoras, which function in 
many ways as unregulated banks: they can provide financial services other than 
checking accounts and foreign trade transactions and are not subject to reserve 
requirements (IMF, 1998: 26). The total number of banking and financial institutions 
rose from 25 in 1989 to 53 in 1997 (IMF, 1998: 26).
The banking sector reflects the logic of neoliberal modernisation. Liberalisation of the 
sector does not affect the concentration of economic power, and indeed relies on it in 
practice if not in theory. Forest Colburn and Fernando Sanchez note that large business 
groups took advantage of the banking boom to develop their own lines of credit; they 
quote a central banker from the region: ‘Almost all of the large business groups of our 
region have a bank that functions almost as the treasury of their business’ (Colburn 
and Sanchez, 2000: 73, translation mine). The self-assessment of this sector attributes 
its success to an aggressive modernisation campaign and its investment in personnel 
(Colburn and Sanchez, 2000: 71).
Non-traditional agricultural products
Non-traditional agricultural products grew at a rate of about 15 percent a year in the 
period 1992-97 (IMF, 1998: 30). The growth of this sector is attributed to two 
phenomena; the improvement of technology and cultivation methods, as well as the 
development of ‘niche’ markets, such as supplying the US with fresh berries in its off­
season (IMF, 1998: 30). The logic of non-traditional agricultural products, therefore,
extends beyond that of the traditional agricultural economy, as it requires not just
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greater capital investment (new technologies) but a qualitatively new orientation to the 
global economy through the identification and development of niche markets. This 
dimension is reflected in the understanding of the national economy through the 
microeconomic lens, discussed below.
Non-traditional agricuitural exports in millions of $US
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Maquila
Also understood as a ‘non-traditional’ export by the IMF, the maquila sector began in 
Guatemala in 1978 with the Zona Libre de Industria y Comercio (ZOLIC) (Pérez 
Sainz, 1996: 165). This sector attracts business through a particular regulatory 
environment that includes tax and customs exemptions and favourable exchange rates 
(Pérez Sainz, 1996: 164). According to the private sector organisation for non- 
traditional exporters, the number of maquila enterprises rose from 41 in 1986 to 400 in 
1992, going from a workforce of 5,000 to about 70,000 in the same period (Pérez 
Sainz, 1996: 166-8)."'
97 See also Asociacion Gremial de Exportadores de Productos No Tradicionales, 
([cited 21 March 2002]); available from http://www.agexpront.com/ingles.htm.
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IMF data also shows a dramatic increase in the value of the sector:
Guatemalan maquila exports in millions of $US
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This reflects an increase of 21 percent per annum, 1991-96 (IMF, 1998: 30).
The nature and structure of the maquiladora sector are not insignificant. The sector is 
demographically specific, relying overwhelmingly o n young, single women: women 
comprise 78 percent of the workforce and their average age is 21 years old (Pérez 
Sainz, 1996: 169-70). There is little job security in such positions, which offer very 
short contracts: in Guatemala the norm is 12 months (Pérez Sainz, 1996: 174). Juan 
Pablo Pérez Sainz maintains that the maquiladora sector in Guatemala consciously 
located itself 50 kilometres away from the capital, to distance itself from organized 
labour and to position itself in a more docile, rural, indigenous workforce (Pérez Sainz, 
1996: 173). Indeed, he argues that this form of industrialisation reproduces the labour 
structures of the plantation.
Maquila represents the subjectivity of neoliberalism on several levels. The 
development of the maquila sector consciously built on the weakness of the ZOLIC 
experience: the lack of infrastructure and labour, and the state’s own managerial 
incapacity to deal with such projects (Pérez Sainz, 1996: 165). The understanding of
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the development of those elements -  infrastructure, labour, and the appropriate 
regulatory environment -  proceeds within the logic of neoliberal development. The 
requirements for global competitiveness allow for the state’s participation in creating 
infrastructure, however, state regulation comes in the forms of incentives for foreign 
investment. The state may be involved in providing or indeed training labour, but it 
must be inexpensive, unorganised labour. The Trade Association for Exporters of Non- 
Traditional Products attributes the success of the maquila sector to three factors: the 
level of production efficiency in the sector, the maintenance of low prices that allow 
competition with Mexico, which benefits from trade preferences with the US in 
maquila production, and the ability to produce products as sophisticated as those 
assembled in Mexico (Asociacion Gremial de Exportadores de Productos No 
Tradicionales, 24).
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Tourism
Guatemalan tourism earnings in millions of $US
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As the graph above indicates, tourism is also a sector of significant growth/^ Like the 
other sectors of economic growth, tourism is associated with the development of a 
particular infrastructure. Tourism exceeds maquila production in earnings, and like 
non-traditional exports is understood in terms of a niche market. Tourism reflects a 
particularly vivid manifestation of neoliberal subjectivity in the post-counterinsurgent 
moment: as the niche market it relies on Guatemala’s indigenous population and in so 
doing it also becomes a site of construction of the ‘Sanctioned Maya’.
The relationship of the indigenous to tourism in the post-conflict state is explored 
further in Chapter 4. However, here it is interesting to note how the tourism niche is 
understood by economic elites. Colburn and S anchez describe their interviews with 
business leaders in the region: ‘In Guatemala, they speak of the necessity of utilising in 
a more aggressive manner not only their natural riches but their historical patrimony, 
such as the city of Antigua Guatemala and the Mayan ruins’ (Colburn and Sanchez,
Similar figures can be found in IMF, ’Guatemala: Recent Economic Developments', 
(Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund, 1998), 105-6.
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2000: 79, translation mine). This view reflects the desire for the ‘Sanctioned Maya’ in 
its emphasis on the ancient past and the colonial capital of Central America as 
expressions o f  G uatemala’s n iche m arket. Like the d ehistoricized M aya constructed 
under counterinsurgency, tourism desires an understanding of the ‘historical 
patrimony’ of the nation as including an indigenous element from the irrecoverable 
past, superseded by the colonial project.
The national economy as the firm
The sectors noted above -  banking, non-traditional exports, maquila, tourism -  are 
taken up by CACIF as ‘clusters’ for national economic development. CACIF’s 
understanding of the post-conflict state is constructed through a long standing conduit 
of intellectual and moral leadership in the form of the organization INCAE.^ INCAE 
is a business and management school begun by George Cabot Lodge, then at the 
Harvard Business School, in conjunction with Walter Rostow in the context of John F. 
Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress (Lodge, 1999).*°® While the establishment and 
conduct of INCAE is an interesting phenomenon in itself, the point of intellectual and 
moral leadership of interest here involves the adoption of a credible theory of national 
development that appeals both to CACIF’s evolving economic interests, to the IFIs, 
and to the World Bank.
99 José Pivaral, interview, 3 April 2001. Pivaral noted that CACIF relies on INCAE 
for much of its macroeconomic analyses.
^°°It is interesting to note the other places Lodge established / oversaw management 
schools: Philippines, India, Turkey, and later Iran.
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Michael P orter’s t heqry of The Competitive A Avantage o f  Nations p lays t his r ole. 
This theory provides an account of the national economy that is extrapolated from the 
experience of the firm. The role of the state is to provide the infrastructure for 
productivity and competition. The state’s regulatory fimctions involve establishing 
market mechanisms and social investment is not for social ends per se  ^but for factors 
of productions (which, through the success of the firm, should ultimately lead to social 
ends).
Porter aims to ‘move beyond comparative advantage to the competitive advantage of a 
nation’ (Porter, 1990: 85). He understands competitiveness as productivity (‘the only 
meaningful concept o f  competitiveness at the national 1 evel i s productivity" (Porter, 
1990: 84)). Productivity in turn is seen as constructed by the nation: ‘a nation does not 
inherit but instead creates the most important factors of production -  such as skilled 
human resources or a scientific base’ (Porter, 1990: 78). This move from the 
comparative advantage to competitive advantage involves understanding the nation not 
as a given economic resource base, but as a constructed economy. It is an economy 
whose logic is assembled around the success of the firm.
The theory of The Competitive Advantage o f Nations advocates government action in 
favour of the firm in the name of international competitiveness. It proposes a particular 
form of government assistance to firms but one that, unlike the proscriptions of Import 
Substitution Industrialisation, maintains a central role for the market in national
Gustavo Rodriguez, interview, 4 April 2001. See also: Michael E. Porter, 
'Competitiveness in Central America', in Competitiveness in Central America: 
Preparing Companies for Globalization, ed. INCAE (San Jose, Costa Rica: Latin 
American Center for Competitiveness and Sustainable Development, 1996), as 
discussed below.
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development. Porter argues that government can play a ‘legitimate’ role in ‘shaping 
the context and institutional structure surrounding companies and in creating an 
environment that stimulates companies to gain competitive advantage’ (Porter, 1990: 
86). Government, therefore, should play ‘an indirect, rather than a direct, role’ (Porter, 
1990: 86). He suggests that ‘industry will seek -  and benefit from -  more constructive 
forms of government support, such as assistance in opening foreign markets, as well as 
investments in focused educational institutions or other specialized factors’ (Porter, 
1990: 83).
This paradigm of the international economy is described as ‘The Era of Total 
Competition’ (Porter, 1996: 63). One strategy to take advantage of the opportunities 
afforded by the globalised international economy involves the creation of ‘clusters’ of 
related industries. By creating a network of local suppliers, clusters allow productivity 
to increase throughout the production cycle thus improving international 
competitiveness (Porter, 1996: 95-99). The role of government is to promote this 
process: ‘The new business role of the nation is to serve as the home base for 
implementing regional and global strategies -  for industries and clusters’ (Porter, 
1996: 105). Again, here ‘factor conditions mean not just labor and natural resources, 
but a whole range of attendant areas: transportation, communications, information, 
education, the legal and judicial system, taxation, capital markets and so forth’ (Porter, 
1996: 105).
Porter’s proscriptions for Central American firms involve learning to compete 
domestically and internationally with foreign firms. The rationale for this is that even 
in protected Central American economies, foreign firms are able to compete with local 
firms: Porter argues that Central American states have to be involved in constructing
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the terrain for this competition. In other words, governments need to create a climate 
of stability: ‘There will always be disagreements on social policy, but everyone should 
agree on competitiveness and the value of productivity growth. The biggest sign of 
economic health is often how small the differences are between the opposition and the 
ruling party on economic issues’ (Porter, 1996: 115). Governments should also provide 
‘basic inputs’ -  schools, roads, communication networks, even if it relies on the 
private sector actually to deliver them -  and the proper regulatory environment: 
‘Governments must create a context that fosters innovation and upgrading. Antitrust 
laws and intellectual property protection are part of this’ (Porter, 1996: 115). Finally, 
the government should reinforce the development of clusters ‘by building 
infrastructure, increasing technical training, aiding research, and providing incentives 
to invest’ (Porter, 1996: 115).
Understanding the national economy as the firm authorises the creation of economic 
infrastructure while preserving the role of the market in development. It 
technocratically structures government investment towards developing factors of 
production rather than understanding government spending as social investment 
subject to participatory democratic decision-making. In this sense, the logic of the 
Competitive Advantage o f Nations continues that of the liberal modernisation project 
begun under the counterinsurgent moment.
The new terrain of civil society
As the economy became more ‘ transnationalised ’, so did civil society. The new 
‘modernised’ form of civil society replicates the Western NGO, which is supported 
through international funding.
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External actors and local elites have actively participated in constructing ‘civil society’ 
in a particular image. Peter Sollis argues that in Guatemala the government was 
directly involved in NGO creation, particularly to promote micro-enterprise 
programmes. ‘Mindful of the creative force represented by grass roots, political elites 
have devised a two-part strategy. While encouraging the arrival of US pentecostal 
church agencies, they have also organised their own NGOs’ (Sollis, 1995: 534). These 
organisations reflect the coincidence of cultural destruction of the rationalities of 
liberal economics and counterinsurgency.
As Sollis notes, ‘The scale of NGO funding questions the stereotype of NGOs as small
players in Central America’s unfolding drama. Hard data on funding is hard to gather
because of the large number of funding sources, but estimates put the annual level of
funding at over $200 million annually at the end o f  the 1980s’ (Sollis, 1995: 527).
Jenny Pearce notes that donor preferences have marginalised the more ‘political’ and
less ‘technocratic’ NGOs, or subjected them to ‘capacity-building’ programmes
(Pearce, 1998: 612). She argues:
Most donors prefer the NGO as their model of a civil society organization, 
and many are engaged in turning organizations once seen as social 
empowerers into technical service deliverers and advocacy organizations 
on behalf of the poor. Words such as ‘empowerment’ and ‘participation’ 
are still used, but their meanings have become more anodyne and less 
political (Pearce, 1998: 613).
And she reminds us that ‘associationalism’ did exist prior to the 1980s, but was much
less dependent on outside funding (Pearce, 1998: 613).
The promotion of evangelical churches is an interesting example and one that, perhaps 
not surprisingly, involves a strong US dimension. The number of evangelical 
Protestants in Guatemala increased from three to 25 percent of the population in the
122
period 1960-90, giving it the most Protestants of any Latin American country (Rose
and Brouwer, 1990: 4 3 ) . In the words of the Project for Historical Memory:
The army encouraged these sects as a way of controlling the population.
The sects broadcast their own version of the violence and blamed the 
victims. They advocated structural changes in the religious life of the 
communities based on separation into small groups, messages legitimizing 
the army’s power, and individual salvation. Their ceremonies involved 
mass emotional catharsis. Violence thus became the motivating force 
behind these evangelical sects, which installed themselves throughout 
much of the country (Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of 
Guatemala, 1999: 47).
Rios Montt, who governed in the second half of the counterinsurgency (1981-83) was
indeed a member of a California-based evangelical church, the Church of the Word {El
Verbo, in Guatemala). The rhetoric of the church -  vehemently anticommunist -
informed the counterinsurgency campaign, which became known as his ‘holy war
against communism in the highlands’ (Rose and Brouwer, 1990: 47). It is interesting to
observe that while the army justified its punishment of the people with the claim that
the guerrillas had deceived them, ‘[t]he punishment is sometimes referred to by the
displaced as “the judgement” {el judo), a reference to the Bible which legitimizes the
punishment as an act of paternal authority’ (Stepputat, 1999: 71-72). Elites accepted
evangelical churches because of their promulgation of ‘individual salvation rather than
group solidarity and disciplined work under sanctioned authority’ (Rose and Brouwer,
1990: 44).
Much of the impetus, materials, organisation, and fimding for evangelical churches in 
Guatemala have come from the US and are ‘perceived by many Guatemalans as being
For a study of religious divisions in Guatemala and their economic significance 
firom an anthropological perspective, see: Sheldon Annis, God and Production in a 
Guatemalan Town (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1987).
The RHEMI report is admittedly sponsored by the Catholic Church, which has 
itself been divided between conservatives and liberation theologians throughout the 
war.
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an innovative, modem product from North America’ (Rose and Brouwer, 1990: 44). 
Evangelical schools, which provide free, private education, have been particularly 
successful in Guatemala, where public education only reaches 60 per cent of students 
(Rose and Brouwer, 1990: 5 0 - 5 2 ) .Susan D. Rose and Steve Brouwer describe the 
educational materials associated with these churches: they strongly support free 
enterprise and condemn communism as the work of Satan, characterise the fight 
against conununism as a religious one, promote private property (and suggest that 
Mayans’ failure to embrace private property -  their poor ‘stewardship’ of the land -  is 
why they have been dispossessed), and argue that poverty is the result of laziness and 
lack of discipline.Unlike Accion Catolica, for example, a developmentalist political 
agenda does not accompany the proselytising of evangelical churches: they explicitly 
oppose public health-care clinics and peasants’ cooperatives (Rose and Brouwer, 1990: 
52).
In sum, the terrain of civic participation has been strongly shaped by the effects of war, 
whether through direct repression or through its social and psychological impacts. 
External actors have been able to influence the fragile social and economic conditions 
through the provision of finances, ‘expertise’, and educational opportunity.
In fact, public education reaches 75 percent of students aged 7-14 in urban areas 
and 34 percent in rural areas.
^ ^ h i a  comic but disturbing passage, they note that one pamphlet wrongly quotes 
Stalin as having advised people to “‘undermine the loyalty of citizens in general, and 
young people in particular, by making it easy for them to obtain dmgs of all kinds, 
giving them alcohol, extolling their savagery, and strangling them with sexual 
literature’” . Susan D. Rose and Steve Brouwer, 'The Export of Fundamentalist 
Americanism: US Evangelical Education in Guatemala', Latin American Perspectives 
17, no. 4 (1990): 45.
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Ethnic identity versus ciass identity
Class divisions have existed within Indian society since the 19th century if not earlier,
when an Indian bourgeoisie emerged in the Western highland city of Quezaltenango
(Grandin, 2000). However, a broader phenomenon of the emergence of an indigenous
bourgeoisie follows the agricultural modernisation programmes from the 1960s. As
Greg Grandin notes, in the period 1950-75,
While many Mayans, perhaps a majority, sought seasonal employment on 
coastal plantations to supplement their shrinking milpas (com plots), a 
significant number of Indian stepped up their nonsubsistence economic 
activities, such as labour recmitment, commerce, manufacturing, and 
specialized agricultural production. Studies conducted at this time describe 
increased social stratification and capital accumulation within communities 
(Grandin, 1997: 10-11).
He underscores that although this period represents an intensification of land and other
economic pressures, ‘members of this new indigenous bourgeoisie usually emerged
from the same hierarchical networks that for centuries had generated community
leadership’ (Grandin, 1997: 11-12). Nonetheless, these factions did struggle in
‘intellectual and moral leadership’ for the political leadership of indigenous
communities. In the 1960s the contest was between the bearers of traditional authority
'costumbristas" and the commercial sector / bourgeoisie associated with Accion
Catôlica while by the mid-1970s radicalized Indian campesinos who rejected both
claims to authority joined the debate (Arias, 1990: 251).
The counterinsurgent moment generated an ‘ethnicisation’ of popular politics, in 
putting ethnic identity at the centre of the conflict. However, while from the 
criollo/ladino perspective the indigenous population might seem like an 
undifferentiated mass of ‘Indians’, the Maya in Guatemala actually involve 23 distinct 
linguistic groups where political consciousness historically was local rather ‘pan- 
Mayan’. Indeed, popular organising would need to overcome these language barriers;
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figures such as Rigoberta Menchu have commented on the irony of relying on the 
colonial language to defend indigenous culture because of the difficulties of organising 
in any other way. The CUC’s initial success involved its class-based analysis, which 
attracted both Indians and poor ladinos. However, the CUC did develop materials 
specifically to mobilise Indians into the political struggle. The Declaracion o f Iximché 
was the product of CUC consultation with Indian leaders on the plight of the 
indigenous. It concluded with a phrase fi*om one of the foundational Mayan stories, the 
Popol Vuh, which became a slogan for popular organising -  ‘That all arise, that all be 
called. That there be neither one nor two groups among us who remain behind the 
rest!’ (Arias, 1990: 254). From this point, and in response to the comprehensive 
militarisation of the highlands, many indigenous groups joined the guerrilla.
The appeal to ethnicity opened up the debate as to what the nature of the ‘(pan-)
Mayan’ identity involved, and whether discrimination should be considered
predominantly in terms of race or class. Grandin observes, ‘A closer examination of
the 1 anguage ofthepopular and revolutionary movement reveals a cultural struggle
being waged not simply in the contested zone separating ladinos and Indians but
within the ideological boundaries that mark the essence of what it means to be Mayan.’
(Grandin, 1997: 12-13). Arias also describes the challenges of this move:
Ethnic identity has been transformed in the search for political force. Now, 
identity was a tangible, verbalized, phenomenon, around which the 
articulation of political practices was sought. But the symbolic practices, 
the worldview, and the unconscious codes had been discarded without the 
formation of new ones to substitute for them. Thus, in concrete practice, 
just as identity was being talked about more openly, it was experiencing its 
deepest crisis (Arias, 1990: 251).
The CUC forged a pan-Mayan identity with ‘elements of liberation theology, marxism 
and Guatemalan nationalism’ (Grandin, 1997: 21-22). However, other movements
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would seek to define ethnicity in terms that excluded class and preserved the Indian 
bourgeoisie (Arias, 1990: 252-3). Deborah Yashar argues that Mayan nationalist 
groups are ‘smaller and more middle-class than ... the popular organizations -  which 
at times has created tensions on all sides about more authentic representation and 
debates over whose interests are being promoted by the respective organizations’ 
(Yashar, 1997: 254). A genuine concern for issues of ethnicity and gender did enter the 
expressed concerns of the ‘traditional “popular”- (i.e., class-) based organizations’ 
(Yashar, 1997: 254). However, as the conflict progressed, the nature of organising 
moved away fi*om calls for material changes to questions of human and civil rights 
(Yashar, 1997: 253).
Moreover, external support proved more amenable to ‘Indian rights’ than ‘peasant 
rights’ or armed resistance. Grandin suggests, ‘as the repression mounted and the 
rebels lost ground, class-based Mayanism has increasingly sought legitimation by 
presenting the struggle in cultural terms, supported by increasing international 
attention to indigenous rights’ (Grandin, 2000: 25). The new generation of 
‘postcounterinsurgency community leadership ... notably avoids directly addressing 
social problems such as land shortage or endemic poverty’ (Grandin, 2000: 25). 
Ultimately, the ‘classless’ Indigenous identity would win out in the peace negotiations.
Conclusion
Reading the Guatemalan ensemble of social relations through the lens of 
disarticulation brings into relief particular tensions that characterise its historical and 
material construction over time. These tensions are related to an evolving problematic
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of liberal modernisation: race, force, the relationship between public and private, and 
the nature of peripheral capitalism’s incorporation into the international economy.
The expansion of coffee agriculture, with its particular labour requirements and 
geography, institutionalised race and coercive labour practices as a dimension of 
disarticulation. The vulnerability of coffee production to international economic 
conditions and the resultant introduction of US-based multinational capital into the 
Guatemala, in part associated with a genuine attraction to US-style modernisation, 
reflect the objective and subjective international dimension of disarticulation. The 
modernising ethos persistently, both 'internationally’ and ‘domestically’, involved the 
subjective construction of race hierarchies as part of their understandings of advanced / 
developed and backwards / traditional. The nationalist-capitalist backlash against the 
contradictions generated in by the expansion and intensification of disarticulation 
mitigated its worst effects materially, by offering to change the economic mode of 
production for the most marginalised. Yet its project was limited and did not 
incorporate domestic elites, whose perception of modernisation (indeed a matter of 
internal division) still lay with international markets and finance, not with the 
extension of small scale capitalism and the creation of local markets. 
Counterinsurgency becomes the manner in which a coalition of elite interests reverses 
the reforms that threatened to undermine the bases of disarticulation locally and in 
terms of Guatemala’s relationship into the international pohtical-economy.
Under the reconstruction of disarticulation through counterinsurgency, the ensemble of 
social relations becomes modified economically, socially, and subjectively. 
Economically, the material bases for a new understanding of modernisation develops 
with the expansion of banking and finance, non-traditional agriculture, maquila, and
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tourism. Socially, key elements of civil society -  the voluntary sector and religion -  
are each transformed into new understandings of the ensemble of social relations, 
which privilege international understanding of depoliticised, technical strategies of 
development on the one hand and the atomised entrepreneur on the other. Similarly, 
the social effects of counterinsurgency reconstructs the Mayan identity in a sanctioned 
form: classless, atomised, and for which culture must be understood through a narrow 
conception of rights rather than a fuller understanding involving questions of its 
political-social-economic bases. These transformations occur initially through US 
involvement in the post-coup state, but evolve with the global historical bloc to 
become increasingly ‘neoliberaT from the 1970s.
Understanding these modifications of the ensemble of social relations (ever informed 
by residual ‘common sense’ understandings), particularly in the counterinsurgent 
moment preceding the peace process, is important for understanding the perspectives 
of different groups entering the negotiations, how their goals are constructed, what is 
seen to be legitimate terrain for compromise. It is to the peace process that the next 
chapter turns.
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The Peace Process
As per the Gramscian framework outlined in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 described the 
ensemble of social relations in Guatemala, the construction of the disarticulated, 
counterinsurgent state, and the emerging crisis of the counterinsurgent state under the 
logic of a neoliberal world order. This chapter examines the peace process as a 
resolution to that crisis and its project of reconstructing a neoliberal state through the 
post-conflict reconstruction plans articulated in the text of the accords.
The counterinsurgent state suffers from internal contradictions that generate such 
repression as to become unwieldy for neoliberalism, largely in the lack of security for 
capital associated with a military unaccountable to economic elites and a rapidly 
expanding debt. The Guatemalan peace process follows directly on a domestic effort at 
‘démocratisation’ that preserves a certain set of social relations, essentially involving 
economic elites re-subordinating the military, and a regional/international effort to 
control the excesses of Reagan’s late Cold War policies in the region, associated with 
economic elites’ endeavours to improve their international standing for finance and 
development. These conditions establish certain parameters for the Guatemalan peace 
process, particularly vis-à-vis understandings of démocratisation and the need to 
rebuild civil society.
This discussion, then, has much in common with William I. Robinson’s arguments 
about the authoritarian-democratic transitions. He suggests that authoritarian regimes 
became seen as inefficient for political stability as globalisation generated widespread 
démocratisation movements. The response of the US, acting on behalf of a 
transnational elite, was to co-opt the idea of democracy called for by such movements,
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defining it in terms of ‘polyarchy’ where ‘a small group actually rules and mass 
participation in decision-making is confined to leadership choice in elections carefully 
managed by competing elites’ (Robinson, 1996: 49), and to emphasise political 
intervention into civil society to reconstruct it as an arena to buttress elite political 
projects (Robinson, 1996: 28-29).
However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the analysis here differs from Robinson’s in its 
understanding of power and the ultimately related concern of agency in international 
relations. Thus, while the Guatemalan case does indeed support the idea that a 
‘polyarchic’ definition of democracy was at work, this was established through 
Guatemalan elites’ control of the return to civilian rule and through the multilateral 
negotiations of the regional peace processes of the 1980s. Likewise, the notion of the 
need to (re)build civil society as a reflection of the ‘political centre’ was constructed 
through multilateral negotiations. This is not to say that the intellectual and moral 
leadership within the US regarding the understanding o f  democratisation within the 
context of polyarchy that Robinson describes was not influential in constructing 
polyarchy internationally: merely that it should not be associated exclusively with the 
agency of the United States.'^ Rather, ‘common sense’ understandings of both 
democracy and civil society become established through international processes of 
consensus-building around certain international problems.
Robinson particularly analyses ‘two of the most widely cited and circulated 
volumes [in the US]’ -  Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for  
Democracy, edited by Guillermo O'Donnell, Phillippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence 
Whitehead and Democracy in Developing Countries^ edited by Diamond, Larry, 
Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset -  as commissioned with 
the intent of informing US policy on démocratisation Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: 
Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony^ 45
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Indeed, the analysis offered here finds Robinson’s description of the technologies for 
managing authoritarian-democratic transitions that comes the US démocratisation 
literature very apropos. A successor to theories of political development (those central 
to counterinsurgency, as per Chapter 3), this literature likewise relies on the reification 
of order in the social sciences as the key political ‘good’ (Robinson, 1996: 46-48). It 
restricts deeper definitions of democracy in the name of avoiding a regression to 
authoritarianism: ‘Popular forces have to be restrained in order to assure a stable 
transition, and are held responsible for jeopardizing “democracy” by inducing with 
their social demands a resurgence of authoritarianism’ (Robinson, 1996: 64). Elections 
are a key legitimating feature of this system, yet the undemocratic nature (indeed 
purpose) of elections is explicit; according to O’Donnell and Schmitter, ‘put in a 
nutshell, parties of the Right-Center and Right must be “helped” to do well, and parties 
to the Left-Center and Left should not win by an overwhelming majority’ (Robinson, 
1996: 65). Furthermore, (Robinson, 1996: 64)the requirement for orderly transitions 
leads to trade-offs between popular demands and the promise of participation in the 
consolidated, post-transition ‘democracy’ in two areas: the economy and the military. 
However, such trade-offs are not -  as they are cast -  temporary, transitional 
concessions; rather, they become structural features of the post-transition order 
(Robinson, 1996: 65). The Guatemalan peace process similarly u sed elections in an 
unreformed system to legitimate the negotiations and engaged in a number of strategic 
deferrals of essential issues, as discussed further below.
The impulse to engage in the peace process reflects the global order, however not 
merely in terms of neoliberal regimes of production, but the end of the Cold War, 
which changes the logic of the ‘revolutionary option’. This development affects the 
relationship between industrialised and developing countries, it is implicated in the
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constuction of the ‘common sense’ understanding within industrialised countries, their 
solidarity support, and the attraction of a negotiated settlement to both s ides of the 
conflict for different reasons. This chapter explores the conditions leading to the 
Guatemalan peace process, the negotiations themselves, and the post-conflict state as 
articulated in the peace agreements through a Gramscian lens sensitive to the 
opportunities and limitations regarding progressive social change in such 
circumstances.
These stages of the peace process each can be understood through the constituent 
elements of Gramscian politics: the construction of ‘common sense’ understandings of 
democracy and civil society through the regional peace processes of the 1980s, 
intellectual and moral leadership associated with the agenda setting phase of the 
negotiations that disciplined the guerrilla with the ‘end of the revolutionary option’, 
and the use of civil society to legitimise the peace process under the period of UN 
conciliation. The negotiations also engaged in deferral strategies for postponing 
discussion of the ‘essential’, leaving economic and military issues to a particularly 
undemocratic end-game, the result of which can best be understood in terms of the 
Gramscian conception of caesarism.
As discussed in Chapter 2, caesarism reflects a limited or ‘passive’ form of hegemony, 
manifest in ‘autonomisation’ of the bureaucracy and trasformismo, where the 
opposition is co-opted into the establishment (Forgacs, 1988: 248). Caesarism occurs 
where the integral state lacks the institutional framework for the ‘deeper’ hegemony 
possible in advanced liberal democracies; in Italy, caesarism was manifest both in the 
‘parliamentary dictatorships’ that precede fascism and fascism itself (Gramsci, 1991: 
227-8). As David Forgacs observes, ‘in treating Fascism as a form of Caesarism and of
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“revolution-restoration”, Gramsci illuminates its novel and dynamic character’ 
(Forgacs, 1988: 248, emphasis original). In Guatemala the consensus around the peace 
agreements would be somewhat ‘unstable’ (always a feature of caesarism in its initial 
stages); the novelty of its ‘revolution-restoration’ as an attempt to resolve the 
contradictions of counterinsurgent disarticulation would involve the modernising 
private sector, brought to government in the 1995 elections, brokering agreements over 
the deferred ‘essential’ with the URNG with the active involvement of the 
international community.
The blueprints for the post-conflict state that emerge from this process (re)construct 
the neoliberal state and subject. As the textual analysis of the accords in the final 
section of this chapter illustrates, the accords not only construct neoliberalism in its 
more conventional guises -  subjecting its marginal land redistribution to market 
mechanisms, for example -  but also by framing citizenship in terms of economic 
agency and through the construction of a neoliberal homo economicus, as discussed in 
Chapter 2. The power of dominant interests is maintained through the preservation of 
coercion, which is ‘relocated’ objectively -  through a transition from the military to 
police -  and subjectively, though the persistence of impunity.
The crisis of the counterinsurgent state
Chapter 3 described the disarticulated ensemble of social relations constructed through 
the post-reform era in Guatemala. This order was established and maintained through a 
counterinsurgent state, which embodied a number of tensions in its mission of securing 
and reconstructing society. Counterinsurgency tries to eliminate the marginalised 
elements of society produced by social disarticulation through coercive reconstruction
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or genocide. Yet this fundamental antagonism of needing to secure a social order that 
is assumed yet does not exist forces counterinsurgency into a continual obfuscation of 
public and private to avoid exposing its contradictions while justifying its need for 
dramatic social control. Counterinsurgency requires continuous management in its 
movement between articulating the ontological threat to the body politic and obscuring 
the organic, self-produced nature of that threat, i.e., that the threat that has been 
identified is integral to and produced by the body politic itself.
The return to civilian government in 1986 can be read as a readjustment of 
counterinsurgency necessitated by its own contradictions: it involved both a prior 
securitisation through the intensification of the military campaign, yet, at the same 
time, this securitisation process exposed the contradictions of counterinsurgency and 
put the more fundamental question of disarticulated modernisation at risk through its 
economic policies and by compromising access to international markets and finance. 
The move to formal civilian ‘democracy’ provided only a slight, highly controlled 
political opening that in fact legalised certain elements of the counterinsurgency in a 
new constitution. In a small move towards ‘consensual’ governance, the coercive 
apparatus of society was maintained.
The return to civilian government in Guatemala begins in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
Military mismanagement and corruption in the 1970s had alienated junior officers and 
much of the organised private sector (McCleary, 1999: 41). The Guatemalan economy
The emphasis in the literature on the return to civilian rule illustrates the great 
normative purchase of the idea parliamentary democracy. Guatemala’s previous 
civilian government was elected in 1970. In the reading offered here, then, this 
reification of ‘démocratisation’ reflects a liberal democratic reaction that assumes that 
elections would inherently be sufficient to end counterinsurgency.
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deteriorated rapidly in the late 1970s and early 1980s: the foreign debt (previously the 
second lowest in Latin America) tripled, financed by short-term, high-interest loans: 
the payments by the mid-1980s amounted to 40 percent of the total value of exports 
(Moreno, 1994: 45). By 1982, the tensions had become particularly pronounced: 
internationally, Guatemala had become a pariah (even the Reagan State Department 
had referred to the regime as ‘a bunch of thugs’ (Trudeau, 1993: 47)), junior officers 
felt the military leadership was out of touch with the realities of the counterinsurgency 
that had been escalated in 1981, and economic elites were being asked to pay for the 
intensified military campaign while officers themselves profited through graft 
(McCleary, 1999: 45-47).
These tensions led to two coups in the early 1980s -  General José Efrain Rios Montt in 
1982 and General Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores in 1983 -  inspired by a ‘reformist’ 
ethos, albeit a sense of reform that included military victory over the insurgency as 
part of its agenda. Rios Montt was initially viewed as someone who would re­
subordinate the military toeconomic elites, aIthough he soon o verstepped his remit 
with an independent (and evangelical) sense of modernisation that alienated the private 
sector (Trudeau, 1993: 60-3); (McCleary, 1999: 5 5).*®* He initiated a programme to 
prepare Guatemala for new elections, though his comprehensive reorganisation of the 
requirements for political parties weakened established political parties under ‘the
Rios Montt was Guatemala’s first evangelical president. For a discussion of the 
relationship between his faith and his presidency, see: David Stoll, Is Latin America 
Turning Protestant? The Politics o f Evangelical Growth (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1990), Chapter 7. Rachel McCleary notes that ‘Rios Montt preached 
on Sunday radio as part of his “New Guatemala” propaganda campaign. He used the 
opportunity to preach moral values, but he also aired publicly his differences with the 
private sector and other with whom he was not in agreement’. Rachel M. McCleary, 
Dictating Democracy: Guatemala and the End o f Violent Revolution (Gainesville, FL: 
University Press of Florida, 1999), 55.
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half-true rationale that the party system needed to be opened up’ (Trudeau, 1993: 
61).*°^  Rios Montt further alienated himself from economic elites in his declaration that 
he would serve additional time in office (to compensate for the electoral fraud 
perpetrated by his predecessor) and in his fiscal policy which marginalised CACIF 
(McCleary, 1999: 52-55). He also lacked a strong base in the military, relying on a 
young junta for his support (McCleary, 1999: 55). Thus, the military viewed the coup 
to replace him as a corrective to continue the basic principles of counterinsurgent 
‘reform’: “‘The message was right, but the messenger [Rios Montt] was wrong’” 
(McCleary, 1999: 55-56, quoting: Francisco Beltranena)."°
Under Mejia Victores, Rios Montt’s plans for a National Constituent Assembly tasked 
with drafting a new constitution were realised in July 1984 elections. The new 
constitution, drafted a year later, included greater scope for political organising, 
although it followed on an amnesty (covering the years 1982-86) that significantly 
insulated the armed forces (Dunkerley and Sieder, 1996: 83). The provisions of new 
constitution facilitated the formation o f  political parties, recognised the multi-ethnic 
nature of the Guatemalan state, and created new offices such as those of the Human 
Rights Ombudsman and the Constitutional Court (Azpuru, 1999: 102). However, it 
also legalised the institutions of counterinsurgency such as civil patrols (PACs), model 
villages, and the coordinating councils that subordinated development projects to 
military command (Dunkerley and Sieder, 1996: 83). Jennifer Schirmer argues that 
military officers were aware of ‘ingenuity’ of ‘immersing counterinsurgency structures
Continued repression meant that there was not a significant opposition in the 
elections o f  1 984 and 1 985. Robert H . Trudeau, Guatemalan Politics: The Popular 
Struggle for Democracy (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 69.
Francisco Beltranena was a founder and board member of the military’s Centro de 
Estudios Estratégicos para la Estabilidad Nacional (Centro ESTNA).
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within the 1985 constitution written by the National Constituent Assembly’ (Schirmer, 
1998: 77). As Robert H. Trudeau observes, ‘Each of these changes reduced the need 
for open military repression, while at the same time providing the appearance of new 
levels of popular participation and democracy’ (Trudeau, 1993: 66).
The less frequently noted ‘national discussion’ of the Mejia Victores regime took place 
between economic elites -  CACIF -  and the military.*" As the early 1980s saw the 
tensions in the contradictions of military rule bring elite pressures for reform, CACIF 
reorganised to enhance its capacity to affect government policy: this restructuring was 
led by ‘a younger generation of entrepreneurs’ who valued neoliberalism (McCleary, 
1999: 57). Restructuring initially alienated traditional agricultural elites, but they 
returned to CACIF in 1985 in the context of National Commerce Commission 
negotiations between CACIF and the government on the implementation of a 
September 1983 IMF credit agreement (McCleary, 1999: 60-1)."^ CACIF was able to 
pressure the resignation of both the minister of finance and the minister of economy of
This account relies on Rachel McCleary’s detailed examination of CACIF, 
although it disagrees with the normative nature of her assessment that capitalism 
promoted ‘démocratisation’, given the elitist definition of democracy that it relies 
upon. Nonetheless, such claims expose the influence oftheprivate sector, which is 
illuminating. McCleary, Dictating Democracy: Guatemala and the End o f Violent 
Revolution . For a discussion of how such elite-oriented theories rely on the separation 
of the political and the economic to justify economic inequalities, only to later reunite 
them with claims about the affinities between capitalism and democracy, see 
Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony, 52- 
56.
Indeed, at this point CACIF was able to consolidate virtually all of the ‘organised 
private sector, incorporating previously independent USAID organisations’. McCleary, 
Dictating Democracy: Guatemala and the End o f Violent Revolution, 58. The 
Commerce Commission was a public-private forum called at the behest of CACIF. 
The suspension of the IMF agreement, among other consequences, led to an 
acrimonious debate about the source of inflation in Guatemala: the government 
blaming it on capital flight and the private sector blaming it on corrupt government 
and debt. McCleary, Dictating Democracy: Guatemala and the End o f Violent 
Revolution, 6\.
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the Mejia Victores government, in part through organising in a work stoppage that
involved government officials (McCleary, 1999: 61). Ultimately, this confrontation
between the government and CACIF was resolved through a ‘National Dialogue’ (that
also included some labour representation) in late April 1985, which consolidated
CACIF’s policy-making prowess:
CACIF successfully had asserted it control over fiscal and economic 
policy. It had become the crisis negotiator par excellence and would 
remain the main defense instrument for the private sector. No 
administration henceforth could enact into law a bill relating to the 
economic and fiscal aspects of the country without negotiating beforehand 
with CACIF (McCleary, 1999: 62).
This political victory reflected neoliberal economic principles, which CACIF
supported both because of the ‘organic’ composition of its reconstructed leadership
and because of the related issue of the international economic environment of the
day.'"
The elections of 1986, although ‘procedurally correct’, remained a contest of the 
right/centre-right and were notable for their absence of discussion of both military 
accountability -  corruption or human rights abuses -  and socio-economic reform 
(Trudeau, 1993: 69-71). According to Robert Trudeau, both the army and CACIF 
‘made clear that they would not tolerate reform proposals after the inauguration’ 
(Trudeau, 1993: 71). Vinicio Cerezo, a Christian Democrat, won, having cultivated the 
support of CACIF with commitments to its economic agenda, promises not to 
introduce land reform, and his concern for policies that might provoke capital flight 
(Dunkerley, 1990: 249, Dunkerley, 1988: 501). These elections were widely seen as
For example, Guatemala’s modernising elites were keen to take advantage of the 
US-led Caribbean Basin Initiative (which emphasised non-traditional exports), in 
addition to the pressures of international creditors, who emphasised the liberalisation 
of markets and export led growth. McCleary, Dictating Democracy: Guatemala and 
the End o f Violent Revolution, 50-51, 63.
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motivated by then  eed t o i mprove G uatemala’s image i ntemationally on ther  elated 
fronts of human rights abuses and the need for sufficient legitimacy to attract 
international finance.
The return to civilian rule was accompanied by a constitution that protects the military 
and the reassertion of private sector elites’ control over economic policy. The 
constitution would later serve as the foundation for the peace process and the elections 
that would endorse it. This ‘démocratisation’ process informed Guatemalan 
participation in regional peace processes (similarly motivated by improving its 
international image), which would lead to the national dialogue and the peace process.
Regional peace processes
The Guatemalan national peace process follows on two regional peace processes, 
Contadora and Esqufpulas, the latter of which is associated with Guatemala’s civilian 
government’s search for international legitimacy. These peace processes establish the 
international community in the region, and the p ossibility for addressing the ‘social 
bases of conflict’, however, within parameters dictated by efforts to secure the 
progressive Sandinista government in Nicaragua.
Contadora
The first efforts at regional peace-building in Central America occur through the 
Contadora Process in 1983, an initiative of Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama 
to prevent the US, in the throes of the Reagan administration’s aggressive regional 
foreign policies, from getting directly militarily involved in the Sandinista revolution
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in Nicaragua (Bagley, 1986: 2-3)."'^ A primary element of the Contadora initiative’s 
attempt to mitigate US militarism involved actively redefining the conflicts as the 
result of internal considerations -  poverty, injustice, repression -  in contrast to the 
Reagan administration’s claims of Soviet-Cuban subversion to understanding them 
(Bagley, 1986: 3); (Moreno, 1994: 56); (Aguilar Zinser, 1988: 101)."^ Nonetheless, in 
the course of negotiations over the course of three y e a r s , t h e  Contadora process 
emerged with a rather paradoxical emphasis on conflicts among states in the region, 
not those within them, a construction that could appeal to both extremes: the 
Sandinstas, who wished to eliminate Honduran and potentially Costa Rican support for 
the contras as well as the Salvadoran government under threat from the revolutionary 
Frente Farabundo Marti de Liberaciôn Nacional (FMLN; (Aguilar Zinser, 1988: 103, 
08).""
See also: Adolofo Aguilar Zinser, "Negotiation in Conflict: Central America and 
Contadora', in Crisis in Central America: Regional Dynamics and US Policy in the 
1980s, ed. Nora Hamilton, et al. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1988), and Dario Moreno, 
The Struggle for Peace in Central America (Gainsville: University of Florida Press, 
1994), chapter 3. Moreno contains the main Contadora texts (communiqués and 
agreements) in English.
The initiative remained, as Bruce Michael Bagley has observed, within distinctly 
‘moderate’ parameters: ‘the Contadora countries were also unanimous in their desire to 
moderate and contain the revolutionaries in Nicaragua and El Salvador’. Bruce 
Michael Bagley, 'Contadora: The Failure of Diplomacy', Journal o f Interamerican 
Studies and World Affairs 28, no, 3 (1986): 3.
The Contadora process has been compared to a cat with nine lives because of its 
resilience despite what seemed like impossible set backs. Bagley, 'Contadora: The 
Failure of Diplomacy': 4. What seems clear is that at different points both the 
Sandinistas and the Reagan administration renewed their involvement in the process 
for diplomatically strategic reasons, in the Nicaraguan case to put Washington on the 
defensive and in the latter case often to appear to be working in good faith to the US 
Congress and thus justify greater aid to the contras.
Similarly, references to foreign bases could imply either the US in Honduras and El 
Salvador or concerns about a Cuban / Soviet presence in Nicaragua. Aguilar Zinser, 
"Negotiation in Conflict: Central America and Contadora", 108.
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The US participated in the Contadora process despite significant evidence that it would 
not accept the basic premise of recognising the Nicaraguan revolution in exchange for 
its ‘containment’ (Bagley, 1986: 22),"® Its objections were repeatedly fi*amed in terms 
of questions of democracy and verification. The US responded to the first declaration 
of the process, the Cancun Communiqué, with the objection that ‘only by ensuring fi'ee 
and open participation in the democratic process can the people of Central America 
achieve reconciliation within their societies’ (Moreno, 1994: 59, quoting the 
Congressional Record, 15 May 1984: S5758). The Reagan administration reacted 
similarly to the accord on procedural norms with the statement that, in addition to the 
reduction of military forces and the end of ties to Cuba and support for the FMLN in 
El Salvador, the US wanted Nicaragua to “‘permit democratic pluralism to flourish at 
home’” (Bagley, 1986: 8, quoting then Secretary of State George Schultz). Likewise, 
the Revised Act was met with the accusation that Nicaragua had rejected the key 
elements of that text relating to internal démocratisation (Bagley, 1986: 8). (The 
Sandinistas’ unexpected acceptance of the Revised Act put the Reagan administration 
on the defensive.) The notion of démocratisation became integrated into the Contadora 
texts and would represent a significant norm in future regional initiatives."^
In addition to its continued support for the contras throughout the Contadora 
process, an oft-cited example is the 1984 report of a commission chaired by Henry 
Kissinger that argued that Contadora was not necessarily in the US national interest 
and that “‘force remains an ultimate recourse” of US policy’ Bagley, 'Contadora: The 
Failure of Diplomacy": 7. See also: James Dunkerley, The Pacification o f Central 
America (London: Institute of Latin American Studies, 1993), 37.
The purpose here is to describe the international dynamic of the regional peace 
processes, not to assess the Sandinista revolution per se. However, it bears observation 
that even by conventional, ‘institutional’ measures -  such as a constitution protecting 
fi*eedom of speech, assembly, movement, and the right to due process; the separation 
of powers; and regular elections -  the Sandinistas had as strong a claim to democracy 
as several of its neighbours. Robinson, Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US 
Intervention, and Hegemony, 216.
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The European Community initiated an annual conference with the Central American 
governments, the San José dialogue, in 1984 to provide a forum to discuss economic 
assistance and support for the Contadora process (Whitehead, 1996: 233) (Biekart, 
1999: 176). Initially, official European assistance often supported the Sandinista 
revolution; several Social Democratic governments (including Spain, Sweden, West 
Germany and France) responded to a call by the Socialist International for such 
support (Biekart, 1999: 175-6). European governments, in contrast to the US, 
understood the origins of the conflicts in terms of economic and social causes, 
however, after the early 1980s ‘open European support for the Sandinista government 
became less clear-cut and shifted towards more “neutral” statements calling for the 
establishment of democratic principles and strict observance of human rights’ (Biekart, 
1999: 176).
A similar expansion and transformation can be observed in private European aid. Kees 
Biekart identifies four stages of European private aid activities in Central America: 
the arrival of such agencies in the early 1980s, their activities under 
counterinsurgency, their policy transitions around the 1 987 Esquipulas II agreement 
and their interventions after 1989 (Biekart, 1999: 182). He argues there are several 
reasons for their significant growth, firom a dozen prior to 1980 to over a hundred 
organisations by the late 1980s: support for the Sandinistas from progressive circles, 
the alternative they provided European governments to challenge discretely the 
Reagan administration, the larger trend in which European private aid agencies 
became increasingly significant in the international aid sector (Biekart, 1999: 182-4).'^ ®
According to Biekart, ‘Although exact figures are difficult to acquire, in 1987 the 
forty largest European private aid agencies channelled approximately US$ 130 million 
to Central America, a figure that increased to almost US$200 million in 1992. In
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Initially, private aid largely involved emergency assistance (Biekart, 1999: 206). 
However, the democratic transitions in the region ‘generated confusion about the new 
“political agenda” of private aid agencies and fuelled concern that the “era of solidarity 
aid” had ended’ (Biekart, 1999: 208). This development resulted in a new form of 
European private aid: ‘Instead of popular education and institutional support for 
strengthening organisations in civil society, support shifted to management and 
training methods to strengthen the capacity of organisations in order to increase their 
likelihood of economic sustainability’ (Biekart, 1999: 208). OECD figures for 
European and US bilateral assistance to the region over the period 1980-2000 are 
shown below,followed by multilateral aid figures for comparison.
B ilateral Aid 1980-1990 in US$ M illions
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relative terms this was about ten percent of total bilateral and multilateral aid flows to 
the region and more than forty percent of total bilateral aid flows to Central America 
of all the European governments combined’. Kees Biekart, The Politics of Civil 
Soceity Building: European Private Aid Agencies and Democratic Transitions in 
Central America (Utrecht: International Books, 1999), 182.
European bilateral aid includes contributions from the following countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. These 
charts were calculated based on total net receipts.
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Although it failed to produce a peace plan for the region, the Contadora process 
established important understandings that would inform the parameters of future 
discussions: the weight given to redefining the causes of conflict in ‘local’ terms; the 
involvement of Europe in the region, and a particular understanding of
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‘démocratisation’. The process also set the stage for the Esqufpulas agreements, which 
would play a more direct role in shaping the Guatemalan peace process.
Esqufpulas
The Esqufpulas meetings, initiated in 1986, are associated with the elections of Vinicio 
Cerezo in Guatemala and of Oscar Arias in Costa Rica. Cerezo called the first meeting, 
Esqufpulas I, in late May 1986 to continue Guatemala’s policy of ‘active neutrality’ in 
the regional peace efforts as a way to reduce Guatemala’s international isolation 
(Godoy, 1987).*“ (Indeed, at his inauguration in January 1986, Cerezo had the Central 
American heads of state in attendance endorse the Caraballeda declaration, essentially 
a reiteration of the Contadora process’ 1984 Revised Draft treaty (Bagley, 1986: 15); 
(Moreno, 1994: 69).) Esqufpulas I did not create a clear plan for the end of conflict, 
but it did reiterate the principle of regional democracy -  understood as Westem-style 
liberal democracy -  as a solution to conflict, and pressured Nicaragua to transform 
itself towards that ideal (Moreno, 1994: 75).
Oscar Arias took up the regional peace process and invested it with active leadership 
and personal diplomacy, particularly vis-à-vis Western Europe and the (then) 
European Community (EC; (Andersen, 1992: 444).*“ Indeed, the Arias effort 
understood that European support for the Sandinistas was waning and ‘capitalized on 
these attitudinal shifts, securing official support from both individual governments and
‘Active neutrality’ was begun under Mejfa Victores. In Cerezo’s efforts to 
consolidate the policy (‘Active neutrality means not only that we are neutral, but also 
that we seek and propose formulas for negotiated settlements to conflicts’) he 
declared: ‘Guatemala’s international isolation is a thing of the past’. Julio Godoy, 
'Duarte, Arias Visits End Year of Diplomatic Successes', Inter Press Service, 4 
December 1987.
For an explanation of the domestic factors behind Arias’s election and regional 
peace initiative, see: Moreno, The Struggle for Peace in Central America, chapter 4.
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the European Community prior to the 1987 Esquipulas meeting’ (Andersen, 1992: 
451-2). Widespread support for the initiative divided both the Reagan and Thatcher 
governments between conservative hardliners and more centrist Arias supporters 
('Arias's Central American peace plan gains European support,' 1987) (Steele, 1987).
Esquipulas H, the Arias peace plan, was signed 7 August 1987. It called for the end of 
outside support to insurgencies, internal démocratisation and elections, and national 
reconciliation (Moreno, 1994: 191).‘^ '‘ In its emphasis on controlling insurgencies, the 
plan privileged the governments in office (requesting that ‘the irregular forces and 
insurgent groups operating in Central America ... refi*ain from receiving such aid in 
order to demonstrate a genuine spirit of Latin Americanism’ (Moreno, 1994: 195)). It 
also specifically thanked the European Community and asked ‘the international 
community to respect and assist our efforts. We have our own approaches to peace and 
development but we need help in making them a reality. We ask for an international 
response which will guarantee development so that peace we are seeking can be a 
lasting one’ (Moreno, 1994: 191-2). The construction of a regional peace process 
around the legality of the elected governments of the region, which was largely 
supported by European governments, also meant an end to private ‘solidarity’ 
assistance: Esquipulas was perceived as the ‘end to the revolutionary option’ by 
private European aid agencies (Biekart, 1999: 209).
Laurence Whitehead argues that the primary difference between Contadora and 
Esqufpulas involved the latter’s stress on the ‘necessity for internally democratic
This and the next two citations in this paragraph refer to the text of the agreement, 
which can be found in: Moreno, The Struggle for Peace in Central America, appendix 
5.
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processes’ (Whitehead, 1996: 245). According to interviews with the Costa Rican 
Foreign Minister, Arias ‘assured the Reagan administration that, unlike Contadora, his 
peace plan would result in the restructuring of the Nicaraguan policy’ (Moreno, 1994: 
86-87). Such ‘démocratisation’ was code for ensuring the peace process would not 
legitimise the Nicaraguan regime (Moreno, 1994: 87). Thus the Arias peace process, 
‘brought an imposing array of international pressures to bear on the Sandinistas, 
forcing them to democratize [sic.]. The Sandinistas were confronted not only with the 
contras and the United States’ economic embargo, but also with a more sceptical 
Western Europe and an increasingly reluctant Soviet Union’ (Moreno, 1994: 134).
The Esqufpulas programme also amplified Contadora in its involvement of multilateral 
agencies in the region. As Robert Andersen observes, ‘The Arias Peace Plan 
developed outside of the context of either the United Nations or the Organization of 
American States but, in contrast to Contadora, incorporated and heightened the profile 
of both organizations (particularly the United Nations) in the implementation of the 
accords’ (Andersen, 1992: 444). The Esqufpulas II agreement created a role for the UN 
as a monitoring force, the UN Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA). In 
principle, peace processes would occur simultaneously within the five countries of the 
Isthmus, however, the UN’s ‘management of the armed conflicts’, as Stephen Baranyi 
puts it, occurred sequentially: Nicaragua (1989-90), El Salvador (1990-94) and 
Guatemala (1994-96 for the peace process itself, with an ongoing presence for the 
implementation of the agreements, (Baranyi, 1996: 248). (The Salvadoran case 
particularly would serve as an example for the negotiators of the Guatemalan 
agreement, especially regarding the necessity of coordination between the UN and the 
IFIs (the IMF and the World Bank; (Burgerman, 2000:, Whitfield, 1999).)
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European and US involvement in Central America converges through the regional 
peace processes. Kees Biekart suggests the mutual terrain of what were commonly 
understood to be divergent perspectives when he observes ‘The United States and the 
majority of European governments had different views about how to rebuild the 
‘'political centre” that was destroyed by authoritarian regimes in the late 1970s, and 
about how to strengthen civil society' (Biekart, 1999: 173, emphasis added). Though 
their analyses of the causes of the region’s conflicts differed (‘local’ versus ‘external’). 
Northern governments were unified in seeking to establish a political centre and 
rebuild civil society. The political divisions within the US on its policy in the region, 
furthermore, were significant. Laurence Whitehead captures the bounded nature of the 
US-EU differences in observing that not only was US opinion deeply divided (‘with 
many Democrats closer to Brussels than to the White House in their definitions of the 
issues’), but that ‘successful European policy could hardly be rated a moral affront to 
the United States’ (Whitehead, 1996: 234).'^  ^Whitehead emphasises the compatibility 
of Western interests, characterising the situation in terms of a ‘carrot and stick’ 
approach, where ‘through a process of tacit co-operation the EC acquired the function 
of offering the carrots leaving the USA free to concentrate on administering the sticks’ 
(Whitehead, 1996: 235).
The regional peace processes, in a reflexive dynamic with the process of 
‘démocratisation’, created a particular landscape for intemational involvement in the 
region based on particular norms. Démocratisation is understood as narrow electoral, 
democracy and in terms that allow for the ‘legitimate’ reconstruction of the
Indeed, Adolofo Aguilar Zinser argues that the Contadora process failed in part 
from its lack of initiative in lobbying the US Congress against the Reagan 
administration’s policies. Aguilar Zinser, TSlegotiation in Conflict: Central America 
and Contadora', 109-10.
149
Nicaraguan polity. The simultaneous delegitimisation of insurgency affected the 
possibilities for ‘solidarity’ assistance and the revolutionary option. Civil society 
becomes the site for reconstructing the ‘political centre’, and as the conflicts are 
increasingly secured, this assistance becomes increasingly technical in nature. The 
relative success of the Arias peace plan in consolidating intemational support for a 
‘local’ reading of regional conflicts -  the ‘social bases of conflict’ -  in the face of the 
Reagan administration’s policies nonetheless establishes quite narrow parameters for 
such issues. The norms that emerge out of the regional peace processes are constmcted 
so as to allow for the continuation of elite mle, under the rubric of negotiated peace.
The Guatemalan peace process
The move to civilian rule in Guatemala constmcted a constitution that provided a 
slight political opening but also legitimised the coercion of counterinsurgency. The 
regional peace processes served as a form of intellectual and moral leadership that 
constmcted the parameters of the Guatemalan peace process, particularly in terms of 
the dominant definition of democracy as the end of the revolutionary option. It also 
established the use of electoral democracy and civil society as means of illustrating 
consent, both elements that would be reiterated in the Guatemalan peace process. Yet 
the national peace process also provided a second moment of social transformation, 
largely designed to resolve the ongoing insurgency that could now no longer be 
eliminated militarily -  regardless of the military’s ability to do so -  due to the logic of 
the regional processes in which Guatemala had become involved. It therefore raises 
new questions of the possibilities for social change.
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The scale of the peace process in Guatemala is significant, involving on the order of 17 
agreements over eight y e a r s . I n  this section, the negotiations prior to the 1995 
elections are examined. In the agenda setting phase of the negotiations, the 
problematic of establishing a common terrain for negotiations involved the 
intemational sponsorship of discussions between the URNG and various social sectors 
that established the electoral system as a central legitimating feature of the process. 
When negotiations stalled, a governmental crisis allowed private sector elites to lead a 
‘consensus-building’ process that would underscore its dominant position in ‘civil 
society’. UN conciliation in the peace process would further constmct a legitimating 
role for civil society within significant limitations; in this process rights become 
understood as exclusively political and the ‘essential’ is deferred until after the 1995 
elections, a moment of ‘democratic’ participation that would in fact destabilise the 
peace process.
As discussed below, the process included agreements between various parties, not 
necessarily exclusively the government and the guerrilla (URNG), thus the number 
varies according to what criteria are used. Further, not all of the agreements between 
the government and the URNG are substantive agreements, several are procedural. The 
substantive agreements between the URNG and the government are commonly 
understood as: Framework Agreement for the Resumption of the Negotiating Process 
(Mexico, 10 January 1994), Comprehensive Agreement Human Rights (Mexico, 29 
March 1994), Agreement on Resettlement of the Population Groups Uprooted by the 
Armed Conflict (Oslo, 17 June 1994), Agreement on the Historical Clarification (Oslo, 
23 June 1994), Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples (Mexico, 31 
March 1995), Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation 
(Mexico, 6 May 1996), Agreement on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and on the 
Role of the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society (Mexico, 19 September 1996), 
Agreement on the Basis for the Legal Integration of the Unidad Revolucionaria 
Nacional Guatemalteca (Madrid, 12 December 1996), Agreement on a Firm and 
Lasting Peace (Guatemala, 29 December 1996). The Agreement on Constitutional 
Reforms and the Electoral Regime (Estocolmo (Sweden), 7 December 1996) was 
considered procedural, although it has significant implications for the fate of several 
substantive accords, as discussed below.
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Agenda setting
When speaking about the motivations to participate in the peace process, ‘pro’-peace 
members of CACIF cite issues such as the need for security for tourism, capital 
(financial regulations and the rule of law), and sufficient stability for long term 
economic planning (Briz, 2001); (Pivaral, 2001); (Gonzalez, 2001). The ‘anti’-peace 
process p erspective, b y contrast, e xpressed i tself t hrough the s ense t hat them ilitary 
option of defeating the ‘illegal/lawless’ insurgency still existed or that congress -  not 
the ‘narrow, elitist’ peace negotiations -  was the appropriate venue for discussing 
political change (Gonzalez, 2001); (Briz, 2001). The URNG describes its involvement 
in the peace process in terms of a gradual process of beginning to explore the 
possibility of a political solution, understood as the ability to establish the social bases 
of war as the foundation for negotiations (Noriega, 2001); (Asturias, 2001).
The first phase of the peace process involved an agenda setting process. Esquipulas II 
called for the formation of a Comision Nacional de Reconciliacion (National 
Reconciliation Commission, CNR), which sponsored a national dialogue that brought 
peace explicitly onto the national agenda. The URNG and the CNR signed the Oslo 
Accord, subtitled the ‘Basic Accord for the Search for Peace through Political Means’, 
(30 March 1990) which promoted the idea of discussions between the URNG and 
various sectors of society. The URNG subsequently (June-October 1990) held 
meetings with political parties, CACIF, religious representatives, labour and popular 
organisations, and representatives of small business, cooperatives, and academe. These 
internationally-hosted meetings resulted in a number of texts regarding goals for the 
process.
152
The meeting with the political parties resulted in the 'Acuerdo de El Escorial\ signed 
by many political parties, the URNG, and the CNR. It contained five points promoting 
the Oslo Accord and institutional reform to advance democracy in Guatemala, 
including reform of the judicial system, respect for the rule of law and a ceasefire 
during the electoral process {Acuerdo de El Escorial). Thus the agenda of privileging 
electoral politics was established with the commitment of a ceasefire, but with no 
specifics on the reform of the electoral system to ensure participation. Indeed, electoral 
reform would only be discussed at the end of the peace process, after the 1995 
presidential elections. The meeting between CACIF and the URNG failed to produce a 
joint document, although both sides did nonetheless issue declarations to express their 
good will towards the process.CACIF noted in the first point of its declaration the 
importance of ‘the eradication of violence, as [the] necessary element for Guatemala to 
achieve sustainable and stable economic and social development’ underscoring the 
economic purpose of the peace process {Comunicado del CACIF en Ottawa).
Jorge Serrano Elias was elected in 1991, and continued the peace process, albeit 
initially only reiterating the Oslo Accord through a renegotiated ‘ Agreement on the 
Procedure for the Search for Peace by Political Means’ (Mexico, 26 April 1991). In the 
peace platform put forward by the URNG in May 1992, a particular understanding of 
development emerges: one of national development based upon education, health, 
nutrition, housing, support for small and medium producers and businesses, and the 
reform of land tenure, foreign trade, foreign investments, and taxation (URNG, 1992).
The URNG and CACIF accounts of this meeting differ significantly: the URNG 
describes it as very combative, tense, and aggressive, while the private sector 
described it as the occasion where the private sector communicated its good will 
towards open communication. Amoldo Noriega, interview, 25 April 2001; Eduardo 
Gonzalez, interview, 24 April 2001.
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(The negotiations would privilege and reconstruct the URNG’s social development 
agenda in a particular way, while marginalising its economic and fiscal agenda, as 
discussed below.) As the negotiations progressed, the URNG would become 
increasingly convinced that rural development rather than land reform was necessary 
to solve the problems in the countryside (Noriega, 2001). Significantly, the URNG 
called for civil society representation with observer status in the negotiations (URNG, 
1992).
The first phase of the peace process provided intellectual and moral leadership 
establishing certain elements of the peace process, particularly the question of the use 
of the electoral system to promote democracy and the need for economic development 
as part of the peace accords. It also established the URNG’s support for the 
involvement of civil society, albeit a role limited and defined by the negotiating 
parties.
Crisis and 'Consensus Inc.’
The second phase of the peace process involves the crisis of the Serrano government 
that ended in an unsuccessful attempt to recover power through a self-coup (auto- 
go Ipe or Serranazo). Negotiations had stalled; the period leading to the Serranazo was 
marked by a period of social unrest and military exchanges. The government’s 
coalition began to break down in early 1993, which led to the auto-golpe in May 1993 
(Palencia Prado, 1996).*^ ® The auto-golpe failed and brought the Human Rights
Serrano’s auto-golpe has been compared to that of Fujimori in Peru. See: 
McCleary, Dictating Democracy: Guatemala and the End o f Violent Revolution , for 
how the similarity may have pressured intemational actors to respond.
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Ombudsman to the Presidency through a new mechanism, the Instancia Nacional de 
Consenso (National Consensus Body, INC).
The Instancia emerged from the ‘Foro MultisectoraV -  CACIF’s renamed Strategic 
Committee -  which then invited broader participation, from the alternative / popular 
''Foro Multisectoral Social’ (McCleary, 1999: 110, 27). The ‘popular’, ‘democratic’ 
response to the auto-golpe was in fact strongly dominated by CACIF (McCleary, 
1999: 192). The discourse of elite-led theories regarding the Instancia is that it was 
characterised by ‘compromise and negotiation’ and that it ‘represented the political 
will of Guatemalan society’ (McCleary, 1999: 192). In fact, popular organisations felt 
they had little alternative but to follow the private sector’s lead. One union leader 
noted that ‘for the unions and popular movement there was no other choice but to 
participate in the [INC], despite the risk this represents. We had to take advantage of 
the spaces opening up ... because to the contrary, only political and business sectors 
would have resolved the problem’ (Central America Report, 1993). This sense may 
have been exacerbated by the failure of the URNG to take a stand on the crisis, due in 
part to its still tentative participation in the peace process at this stage (Noriega, 2001); 
(Azpuru, 1999).
The intemational community strongly condemned the Serranazo, which assisted 
domestic actors in coalescing around a rejection of such auto-golpe tactics, yet also 
thus implicitly endorsed the resolution of the crisis in terms of the organisation of 
‘civil society’ by economic elites (Jonas, 2001); (Central America Report, 1993).
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UN conciliation and the Civil Society Assembly
The bulk of the agreements were signed 1994-1996 under UN conciliation. The 
resolution of the Serranazo led to the Ramiro de Leon Carpio assuming the Presidency 
in June 1993. Despite having been Human Rights Ombudsman, de Leon Carpio’s 
initial treatment of the peace process had a destabilising effect in its introduction of a 
set of new rules for the negotiations. Intemational pressure on the government led to 
the signing of a procedural accord bridging this impasse (Aguilera, et al., 1996).
The 1994 Framework Accord (Mexico, 10 January) did three noteworthy things. First, 
it institutionalised the role of the intemational community in the peace process: UN 
involvement was intensified from observer status to that of moderator, and the Groups 
of Friend states (involving the US, Spain, Mexico, Norway, Colombia, and Venezuela) 
was officially formed, tasked with providing ‘security and firmness’ to the 
commitments (Palencia Prado, 1996: 20).'^  ^Second, the Framework Accord collapsed 
into one theme the ‘socio-economic aspects’ and ‘agrarian situation’ (Baranyi, 1995: 
6). This is the first step in a narrow conceptualisation of the agrarian situation, which 
would be further reified in the Socio-Economic Accord. Finally, the Framework 
Accord established a formal role for the Asamblea de Sociedad Civil (Civil Society 
Assembly, ASC).
The ASC emerged from the National Reconciliation Commission of the first phase of 
the negotiations, and was headed by Msgr. Quezada Turuno, the former president of 
that Commission and ex-conciliator of the peace process. The Framework Accord gave
Rodrigo Asturias argues the URNG requested the US as a ‘friend’ government, 
given its sense that US foreign policy had changed and it would have the influence to 
ensure the Guatemalan government lived up to its commitments. Rodrigo Asturias, 
interview, 6 April 2001.
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the ASC the right to ‘advise’ (in a non-binding way) the formal negotiating process 
and the right to either accept or reject the accords; it became a parallel organisation to 
the formal peace process.
The role given to the ASC is significant in several respects. The ASC is put into the 
position of informing the national discussion from the margin: needing to create its 
own consensus first, andthen bring its positions to the table. In at 1 east two areas, 
significant compromises took place in the ASC before reaching the formal negotiating 
table regarding indigenous autonomy and land (Sieder, 1997: 68); (Pahna Murga, 
1997). Furthermore, CACIF, with its independent resources, did not participate in the 
ASC."° It had different access to the negotiations, lobbying the peace commission 
(COPAZ), the Group of Friends, the UN moderation and even the URNG directly, 
rather than presenting its proposals directly to the negotiations as the ASC did 
(Krznaric, 1999: 12)."' Nonetheless, several ASC proposed texts (e.g., regarding the 
Armed Forces Accord) were adopted by the URNG and became the basis for 
negotiations with this support. The URNG held the view that the ASC played a big 
role in the negotiations and had excellent results as a reference point for popular 
claims (Asturias, 2001).
For a discussion of the resources CACIF was able to bring to the negotiations, see 
McCleary, Dictating Democracy: Guatemala and the End o f Violent Revolution .
As Roman Krznaric has pointed out, analyses that examine the empowerment of 
‘civil’ groups ‘informal’ political processes should not neglect the power that ‘uncivil’ 
groups may wield in these processes as well. He considers CACIF an ‘uncivil’ group 
because of ‘its historical propensity to support non-democratic politics and, more 
broadly, ... its attempts to limit citizenship rights in order to preserve economic 
privileges’. Roman Krznaric, 'Civil and Uncivil Actors in the Guatemalan Peace 
VrocQSs\ Bulletin o f Latin American Studies Research 18, no. 1 (1999): 15.
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The status of the ASC as a more publicly accountable body made it more vulnerable to
pressure from intemational organisations. Roman Krznaric notes:
After the withdrawal of Quezada Toruno from the presidency of the ASC 
and during much of the rest of 1995, the information flow from the [UN] 
moderation to ASC was limited, which undermined the Asamblea's 
lobbying efforts. At other times the UN moderation attempted to limit ASC 
lobbying efforts more directly. After the Xaman massacre of returned 
refugees on 5 October 1995, for example, the UN asked the Asamblea to 
“not make too much noise” about the massacre as this would damage the 
peace process (Krznaric, 1999: 12).
Thus, the ASC not only provided a forum for expressing opinions but also for
containing that participation. Krznaric remarks that, ‘Actors within the Asamblea and
outside observers agree that it would have been possible to have had a greater impact
on the negotiations. More of its proposals could have been accepted in the accords,
particularly on the Socioeconomic theme. Efforts to make the negotiations more
transparent also largely failed’ (Krznaric, 1999: 10).
The ASC is often described as an arena that built the political capacity of popular 
organisations. Susanne Jonas, for example, argues that the ASC gave groups that 
rejected electoral politics new political experiences that provided a basis for their 
participation in the 1995 elections (Jonas, 2000: 13). But the disciplining function of 
this new expertise is also clear: as Gabriel Aguilera suggests (unselfconsciously), ‘the 
ASC became another arena of permanent negotiation in which participants perfected 
their understanding of tolerance and mutual concessions, taking into account that they 
reflected heterogeneity in their political criteria and in the social interests that they 
reflected’ (Aguilera, et al., 1996: 23-23). The expectation is that organisations will 
converge into the ‘apolitical centre’, an area defined by powerful actors’ sense of what 
is realistic and maintains stability. Thus the very claims of the ASC providing
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experience to popular organisations so that they might reincorporate into electoral 
politics expresses the logic of trasformismo.
The ASC was ultimately unsustainable. Three themes affected its longevity: the 
leadership vacuum left by the resignation of Mnsr. Quezada Turuno, the relatively 
specific mandate accorded to it by the Framework Accord, and the participation of 
some of the ASC in the 1995 elections as candidates for the Frente Democratico de 
Nueva Guatemala (FDNG; (Palencia Prado, 1996); (Krznaric, 1999: 9-12). The ASC 
was not an ‘organic’ political body, not because there was no pressure for social 
participation, but because it artificially aggregated too many positions.The departure 
of FDNG candidates and the failure to replace them exacerbated tensions between 
‘radical’ and ‘centrist’ positions, provoking the departure of the Atlixco 
(academic/small business) sector and ultimately the creation of another body (the 
Democratic Civic Forum for Peace (FOCIDEP); (Krznaric, 1999: 10). The difficulty 
that the Atlixco sector perceived in relating to the popular movement illuminates the 
role this sector played as ‘organic intellectuals’, supporting the status quo.‘”
Four agreements were signed before the 1995 elections: accords on human rights, 
resettlement of refugees, ‘historical clarification’ (i.e., the principle of establishing a 
truth commission), and indigenous rights. All four of these accords exclude or defer
It should be noted that the ASC did successfully keep out ‘army front- 
organisations’. Krznaric, 'Civil and Uncivil Actors in the Guatemalan Peace Process': 
9.
‘Many sectors consider that Atlixco has tried to monopolise the Asamblea. The 
Atlixco group take the position that is was an ‘open minority’ in ASC and that the 
Asamblea is plagued by ‘sectarianism, hegemony and dirigismo’, with some 
individuals and groups having disproportionate influence in ASC and its various 
committees, such as the organising committee’. Krznaric, 'Civil and Uncivil Actors in 
the Guatemalan Peace Process': 10.
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land and economic issues until the negotiations for the Socio-Economic Accord. The 
two accords on rights, which are considered quite successful, thus construct a mutually 
reinforcing understanding of rights as devoid of a socio-economic dimension. 
Generally the guerrilla supported the order in which the issues were to be negotiated, 
based on the URNG’s 1 ongstanding principle that substantive i ssues should precede 
operational issues (Noriega, 2001). Yet this deferral of key issues around the elections 
had the effect of removing them from more popular pressures due to the tenuous 
outcome of the poll (discussed further below). The appeal to elections as part of the 
peace process in itself must be problematised: although little appears in the literature 
about objections to the elections -  suggesting they were widely understood to be part 
of the ‘democratic’ process -  when asked whether electoral politics work for the left, 
the guerrilla and popular / Maya organisations suggest that they do not: either due to 
lack of resources and experience (Asturias, 2001); (Macahio, 2001), or due to 
structural racism and exclusion (Raymundo, 2001) (Tiney, 2001).‘^ '*
‘The Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights’ was agreed in March 1994. This 
accord’s scope only applied to the immediate situation and established the UN 
verification mission (MINUGUA). Violations worsened in the period between the 
accord’s signature and MINUGUA’s arrival in November (Jonas, 2000: 45). 
Nonetheless, MINUGUA itself has been considered a great success in lifting the 
pronounced ambience of fear that existed before its arrival (Palencia Prado, 1996: 34); 
(Louise, 1997: 57). It has particularly functioned as a dissuasive presence against
In fact, participation reached its lowest point of the period 1950-1999 in 1990, with 
only 14.1 percent of those eligible voting. The figure was 14.5 percent in 1994 and 
33.3 percent in 1995. Horacio Boneo and Edelberto Torres Rivas, '^Por Que no Votan 
los Guatemaltecos? Estudio de Participacion y Abstencion Electoral', (Guatemala: 
Tribunal Supremo Electoral, 2001).
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further human rights abuses (Louise, 1997: 61). MINUGUA has undoubtedly played 
an important role in opening political spaces and reducing fear in Guatemala. 
However, the boundaries of its presence must also be considered. MINUGUA has an 
explicit institution-building mandate, which reflects the evolving notion of UN 
peacekeeping that emerged from B outros B owtios-GhaXi^s Agenda fo r  Development, 
with two main components: capacity building in juridical institutions and educational 
dissemination of human rights information (raising awareness of human rights). 
MINUGUA explicitly focused on civil and political rights as ‘priority rights’ for 
verification, to the exclusion of economic and social rights (Baranyi, 1995: 6). In 1995, 
Stephen Baranyi argued that this distinction ‘could undermine future demands for the 
respect of economic and social rights’, which did indeed come to pass by the 1996 
Socio-Economic Accord (Baranyi, 1995: 6)."^
In June 1994 the ‘Agreement on the Resettlement of Population Groups Uprooted by 
Armed Conflict’ (Oslo, 17 June) and the ‘Agreement for the Establishment of the 
Commission to Clarify Past Human Rights Violations and Acts of Violence that have 
Caused the Guatemalan Population to Suffer’ (Oslo, 23 June) were signed. The former 
involves the creation of a ‘comprehensive reintegration plan’ to promote the safe 
return or resettlement of displaced people and refugees."^ Though it recognised land
Another concern is that ‘institutional strengthening could modernise and legitimise 
institutions which are inherently unwilling to protect human rights by enforcing the 
law’. Stephen Baranyi, The Challenge in Guatemala: Verifying Human Rights, 
Strengthening National Institutions and Enhancing an Integrated UN Approach to 
Peace', (London: The Centre for the Study of Global Governance (London School of 
Economics), 1995), 19.
Although by any measure an enormous problem in humanitarian terms and by 
proportion of the population, estimates regarding the magnitude of the displaced 
population vary significantly. According to Diana Pritchard, the counterinsurgency 
resulted in 500,000 internally displaced people, 44,000 recognised and an estimated 
110,000 undocumented Guatemalan refhgees throughout Mexico. Diana Pritchard,
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and land tenure as elements of this process, it deferred the substantive discussion of 
them until the Socio-Economic Accord.Because the accord would not go into 
immediate effect, it was subject to criticism by representatives of refugee committees 
(Jonas, 2000: 74).
The accord on Historical Clarification is considered the weakest of Guatemalan peace 
accords (Wilson, 1997: 19). It created a commission for Historical Clarification limited 
in scope (only abuses ‘linked to the armed conflict’), time (six months, extendable to 
one year), legal prowess (no powers of search, seizure, nor subpoena) and that could 
not identify individual perpetrators (Wilson, 1997: 20). Gabriel Aguilera argues that, 
given serious disagreements, this accord was signed ‘only thanks to a particularly 
intense intervention of intemational actors, especially one of the friend countries, that 
principally pressured the insurgents’ (Aguilera, et al., 1996: 18). The accord provoked 
public outrage and represented a loss of credibility for the URNG, which affected its 
ability to negotiate subsequent issues (Wilson, 1997: 24); (Aguilera, et al., 1996: 18). 
This document was considered weak not only vis-à-vis the initial text proposed by the 
ASC, but also vis-à-vis the S alvadoran agreement for a truth commission (Baranyi, 
1995: 9).
'Refugee Repatriation and Reintegration', in Central America: Fragile Transition, ed. 
Rachel Sieder (London: Macmillan, 1996), 122. Finn Stepputat provides higher 
figures: one million internally displaced people and on the order of 350,000-400,000 
refugees abroad, primarily in Mexico and the US. Finn Stepputat, 'Politics of 
Displacement in Guatemala', Journal o f Historical Sociology 12, no. 1 (1999): 55.
The language of the Resettlement Accord understands land as a question of title, 
underscoring property rights, and reiterates the constitution as the basis for 
participation in agrarian development; see the discussion of the texts of the Socio- 
Economic Accord below as well.
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With the November 1995 election in mind, the UN pressured the parties to conclude 
negotiations of substantive themes by August 1995 (Aguilera, et al., 1996: 246). The 
Indigenous Rights Accord was signed in late March 1995. In many respects a far 
reaching accord, it recognises the Guatemalan nation as ‘multi-ethnic, multicultural 
and multilingual’, and ‘respect the identity and political, economic, social, and cultural 
rights of the Maya, Garifima and Xinca peoples’ {Agreement on the Identity and Rights 
o f Indigenous Peoples, 1995: para. 3-4). As noted in the Introduction, Christopher 
Chase-Dunn calls the accord ‘a conceptual breakthrough that many other countries 
should emulate’ (Chase-Dunn, 2000: 109). This achievement of the acknowledgement 
of indigenous rights -  e.g., to bilingual education, freedom from discrimination, the 
protection of indigenous names and sacred sites, etc. -  in a structurally racist society is 
very significant.*^*
In fact, it has been argued that the strength of the text of the Indigenous Rights Accord 
and the political mobilisation of the indigenous community around the accords are two 
primary foundations for c laims of ‘empowerment’ during the peace process. Rachel 
Sieder argues that:
more than any other factor...it was probably the independence and self 
confidence of Mayan actors in the peace process which confirmed the 
transformation in indigenous identity politics. During discussions of the 
[indigenous accord], it became evident that non-indigenous intermediaries 
were no longer necessary... (Sieder, 1997)
Nonetheless, there are several drawbacks to how the accord was agreed. Notably, as
per the structure of the negotiations generally, indigenous representatives were not
able to sit at the negotiating table (Sieder, 1997: 68). Furthermore, there was
Many indigenous groups are satisfied with the accord, but not that it relied upon a 
package of constitutional reforms that failed, as discussed further below. Francisco 
Raymundo, interview, 2 April 2001.
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significant compromise on the issue of Mayan autonomy within the ASC -  i.e. 
between Maya and non-Maya groups -  before proposals reached the actual negotiation 
table (Sieder, 1997: 68). Kay Warren reports, ‘Mayanists hold that the accord process 
was seriously compromised by secrecy, limited Maya input, and disregard of 
indigenous norms of consultation with communities and elders. Of great concern is the 
fact that the final document dealt only obliquely with collective rights’ (Warren, 1998: 
5 6 ) . Finally, two key issues were deferred to subsequent accords: the issue of Mayan 
lands and demilitarisation in Mayan communities (Sieder, 1997: 69-70); (Aguilera, et 
al., 1996: 247).
The text of the Indigenous Rights accord engaged in two further ‘deferral’ tactics. Key 
elements -  centrally the redefinition o f  Guatemala as a ‘national unity, multiethnic, 
multicultural, and multilingual’, the recognition of all existing languages, and the 
protection of spiritual practices {Agreement on the Identity and Rights o f Indigenous 
Peoples, 1995: %IV A, IHA2a, IUC3) -  would also be contingent on constitutional 
reform (dealt with in one of the final operational accords, as below). The agreement 
also relies on the establishment of joint commissions to explore education reform, 
‘reform and participation’ in national life and land rights. These commissions would 
be composed of equal numbers of government representatives and representatives of 
indigenous organisation. Crucially, they are established to operate by consensus. In 
fact, the consensus requirement led to long delays in the resolution of the themes that 
the joint commissions were established to deal with and the indigenous organisations
Even representatives of such prominent organisations as the widow’s association 
CONAVIGUA express the sentiment that the negotiations took place in a context 
‘very isolated form the population’. T. Macahio, interview, 23 April 2001.
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that participated in the commissions lost credibility among the popular sectors 
(Raymundo, 2001); (Tiney, 2001); (Macahio, 2001).
The Guatemalan peace process before the 1995 elections is marked by the cultivation 
of consent through intemational support in agenda setting, through the resolution of 
the auto-golpe, and with mechanisms such as the ASC under UN mediation. UN 
conciliation is marked by an elaborate effort to involve civil society in the 
negotiations, however, one that does not overcome the pre-existing social power 
inequities in Guatemala; it functions precisely to preserve elite power and to cultivate 
the appearance of broad popular consent through ‘participation’ in ‘openly contested’ 
negotiations. While the UN’s presence via MINUGUA clearly improved the 
conditions for popular organising, which contributed to participation in formulating the 
Indigenous Rights Accord, the UN also undermined the URNG’s position in the 
negotiations in its pressure for limited historical clarification. The categorical deferral 
of socio-economic issues constmcts a narrow understanding of rights as purely 
‘political’, devoid of socio-economic content, while other deferral strategies -  the 
electoral dimension of constitutional reform, consensus-driven joint commissions -  
would later compromise the implementation of the agreements.
Negotiating the ‘essentiar
The November 1995 elections would open up questions of intra-elite differences 
regarding the solution of the contradictions of counterinsurgency. They resulted in a 
run-off between the CACIF-oriented the Partido de Anvanzada Nacional (National 
Advancement Party, PAN) and the Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (Guatemalan 
Republican Front, FRG), which the PAN’s Alvaro Arzu won by two percent. The FRG
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is the party of Efrain Rios Montt; constitutionally barred from holding presidential 
office again, Montt was still seen to be the behind-the-scenes leader of the party. The 
PAN has a strong relationship with CACIF and fewer ties to the mihtary; indeed Arzu, 
specifically sought independence from the military in the negotiations (Arnault, 2001).
The election can be read as a contest over the resolution of counterinsurgency. The 
FRG represented one solution: a right-wing, populist-military solution that would 
marginalise the ‘establishment’ private sector while promising evangelical renewal. 
Rios Montt was associated with a counterinsurgency ‘development’ programme, 
Jusiles y  frijoles ’ (‘guns and beans’), that included the promotion of community-based 
nontraditional agrarian export-led growth. Before he lost CACIF’s confidence, 
McCleary argues that ‘economic elites welcomed opportunities for economic growth 
through state-led trade liberalization’, ‘as long as this export-led model focused on 
small producers and did not entail confiscation of assets by the state’ (McCleary, 1999: 
48-49). The FRG ran in the 1995 elections on a platform of economic liberalisation 
and privatisation as did the PAN, yet it sought to pursue a developmentalist project 
independent from CACIF (FRG, 2001). The PAN, on the other hand, in its ‘pro-peace’ 
platform, implied the resolution of counterinsurgency through the subordination of the 
military to civilian government with the support and ‘modernising’ economic agenda 
of CACIF, including sectors such as tourism, that required the end to military excess.
Neither of these positions entirely resolves both elements of disarticulated 
counterinsurgency: one maintains the counterinsurgent military while challenging the
One of the great controversies since 2000 has been Rios Montt’s challenges to the 
constitutional limitations on his participation in politics, discussed further in the 
Conclusion.
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privilege of the dominant economic elite; the other maintains the economic privilege 
of a particular modernising agenda while subordinating the military. Yet both express 
a kind of caesarism in their two forms of novel ‘revolution-restoration’. Each implies a 
different form of trasformismo, cooptation of the economic through a developmentalist 
proj ect in  the c ase o f  the F RG, and c ooptation o f  the t hreat to d  isarticulation -  the 
guerrilla and the ‘dangerous’ elements of civil society -through the assimilation into 
electoral and consensual governance processes, in the case of the PAN. This debate 
represents the backdrop of the negotiations of the essential: it embodies enormous 
tensions precisely because of the divergent natures of the attempts to restore (certain 
elements of) the social order. Such tensions would be significant in the accords’ 
implementation (discussed further below and in the conclusions).
Nonetheless, taken together the FRG-PAN showing illustrated above all an 
unreformed electoral system’s preference for an elite-oriented solution to the 
contradiction o f  c ounterinsurgency. W hatever the r elative i nstability o f  the c aesarist 
solutions represented by the FRG and the PAN, by this point popular forces had been 
‘secured’ by the peace process to a significant extent, through their incorporation into 
electoral politics and the governance project implied by an organised civil society.
To leftist analysts such as Edelberto Torres-Rivas, the FRG/PAN contest reflected ‘the 
“deideologification” o f  the e lectoral d ebate, t he distaste for p olitics, t hat t ook p lace 
everywhere, which reduced itself to a poor [political] programme, to a basic package 
of small material offerings and a millionaire’s game of telegenic images’ (Torres- 
Rivas, 1997: 25). Yet, two features of the election promoted a sense of contestation. 
One was the unprecedented call by the URNG for public participation. The second was 
the unexpected showing of the leftist coalition party Frente Democratico Nueva
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Guatemala (FDNG), which won six (of 80) seats. Jonas, for example, concludes ‘Until 
they actually occurred, such results had not been believed possible in Guatemala’ 
(Jonas, 2000: 47). Clearly, however, the magnitude of this result was relatively 
insignificant v is-a-vis d ominant i nterests. E lectoral r eform would be one o f  the last 
issues dealt with in the accords, as discussed below.
The narrow electoral victory of ‘pro-peace’ forces would enhance the position of the 
PAN in the negotiations: ‘Armed with this specter [of the FRG], the PAN government 
was consistently able to gain a reluctant nod fi-om the intemational community, even in 
the face of progress backwards [sic.]’ (Jonas, 2000: 176). It is in this context that the 
signing of the subsequent accords, dealing with socio-economic issues, military 
reform, the reintegration of the guerrilla and electoral reform, should be considered.
Socio-Economic Accord
The Socio-Economic Accord was signed in May 1996. As with previous accords, 
notably the Indigenous Rights agreement, the ASC played a moderating role in 
bringing the text of a potential accord c loser to dominant interests, which was then 
further compromised in the negotiations proper. The URNG saw the agreement in 
terms of the exigencies of external realities and the historical moment, but sought to 
emphasise the opportunities for future improvements that the accords afforded. 
Intemational actors considered the accord a success in its ability to appeal to 
intemational donors (World Bank, IMF) and to powerful local actors, especially 
CACIF, which declared the accord a great achievement.
The ASC functioned as a fbmm for mitigating popular demands for land reform in its
discussions of a potential socio-economic accord, debating but ultimately not including
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in its proposals a redefinition of land ownership and use based on the ‘social function’
of property (Palma Murga, 1997: 76). Gustavo Palma Murga notes that:
The ASC proposals made tacit concessions to the neo-liberal 
preoccupations of the private sector. They recommended more ‘rational 
and efficient use of the land’ not only to increase production and meet 
historical grievances, but also to reflect the competitive ‘comparative 
advantage’ of Guatemala in the new global economy (Pahna Murga, 1997:
76).
The negotiated texts of the accord received less enthusiastic reception from popular 
organisations, whose reactions varied from vocal opposition to resigned acceptance, 
concerned primarily with the possibilities for the accord to address land conflicts 
(Palma Murga, 1997: 78). Palma Murga argues that many popular organisations 
perceived that the guerrilla’s concessions on land were related to concluding the 
negotiations quickly in order to further their own political ambitions in the post­
conflict state (Palma Murga, 1997: 7 8). Ultimately the ASC did endorse the S ocio- 
Economic Accord -  after a two month delay -  in July 1996 (Jonas, 2000: 52).
The guerrilla had come to the conclusion that liberalism was an inevitable feature of 
the post-conflict state. Torres-Rivas notes that the URNG document, Guatemala: Full 
Democracy, Revolutionary Goal at the end o f the Millennium^ which articulates the 
position that the purpose of revolution can be democracy, also shows their decision to 
accept liberal democracy and self-regulating markets as the ‘scenario that must be 
lived with at the end of this century’ (Torres-Rivas, 1997: 41). '^“ A common response 
fi*om guerrilleros regarding their compromises during the peace negotiations was that 
‘the correlation of forces was such that...’ such compromises were necessary
Unfortunately Torres-Rivas does not provide a citation and I have been unable to 
acquire a copy of this statement; the date of issue of which would of course be very 
interesting. It does not appear explicitly in the URNG’s 1992 proposals to the 
government. URNG, 'Una Paz Justa y Democratica: Contenido de la Negociacion', 
(Guatemala: 1992).
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(Noriega, 2001) (Asturias, 2001). The official response of the URNG involved a 
cautiously optimistic emphasis on the positive: that the accord represented the first 
engagement in land reform in years (Palma Murga, 1997: 78), and that the accord ‘is 
not a complete solution to all problems, but it opens avenues and establishes 
commitments oriented towards resolving them’ (Monsanto, 1996: 7). The URNG 
statement on the signing of the accord emphasised that the accord was not a blueprint 
for society, but a step towards peace and ‘the participation of all in its construction’ 
(Monsanto, 1996: 8).
The accord was widely understood, particularly in intemational organisations, to
represent ‘an alternative to neoliberalism’ in its support for government involvement in
the economy (Jonas, 2000: 80-81). Thus,
for those with a more positive interpretation, especially the UN and other 
intemational officials, the glass was more than half full. From their 
perspective, the accord embodied a comprehensive approach that everyone 
could live with; it was acceptable not only to CACIF but also to the 
intemational financial institutions (IFIs) in Washington (Jonas, 2000: 80- 
81).
CACIF’s reaction was one of ‘enthusiasm’, although it would resist elements of the 
accord in their implementation (Jonas, 2000: 80).
In sum, many popular and leftists thus resigned themselves to the necessity of such an 
accord, and ultimately accepted its logic as the viable compromise position: a process 
of t rasformismo m ade 1 egitimate by the i ncorporation o f  the g uerrilla i nto t he p ost- 
conflict political order and the endorsement of civil society through the ASC, 
reflecting a ‘trade-off logic of further participation. The agents of this process of 
trasformismo involved not just local modernising elites, but the intemational 
organisations that supported the implicit neoliberal economic logic of the accords, the
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IFIs, and that supported the parameters that this logic constructed for ‘compromise’, 
i.e., the UN. As will be discussed further below, this ‘ compromise’ is in fact more 
‘neoliberal’ than is commonly acknowledged, in that it relies on the construction of 
neoliberal subjectivity in the post-conflict state.
Military reform and the reintegration of the URNG
Robinson argues that in authoritarian- ‘ democratic ’ transitions, controlled
demilitarisation occurs because corrupt militaries obstruct capitalist modernisation 
through their pursuit of economic privilege; they are necessary only to the extent that 
social control requires coercion (Robinson, 1996: 66). ‘Controlled’ demilitarisation 
involves the subordination of military authority to civilian elites, but not the 
elimination of coercive military potential (Robinson, 1996: 66). As social control can 
be effectively devolved through the promotion of democracy-cum-polyarchy and the 
reconstruction of civil society in an analogous vein, such demilitarization can occur, 
and is indeed advantageous to elites (Robinson, 1996: 66-69).
Within the peace process of a civil war, the notion of demilitarisation involves more 
parties than just the state. Thus, in the Guatemalan peace process, there would be 
accords both on the Role of the Armed Forces in Society and on the demilitarisation of 
the guerrilla. The former to a large extent followed the logic of controlled 
demilitarisation that Robinson outlines, yet by the time the latter is discussed, events 
that discredited the guerrilla would have opened the door for another the devolution of 
social control to an even more decentralised level: that of individual political 
subjectivity through impunity.
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The controlled nature of demilitarisation was in the first instance conducted through 
‘self-purges’ within the military before the negotiations proper, after which officers 
were not affected by the reductions called for in the accords (Schirmer, 1998: 270-2); 
(Molina Mejia, 1999: 65). As a result of this preparation by the military, the ASC 
could construct a text that to a certain extent created the framework for the ‘Agreement 
on the Strengthening of Civilian Power and the Role of the Armed Forces in a 
Democratic Society’.
The ASC, which had suffered significant organisational challenges by this point, put 
forward a rather reformist program m e.A s Torres-Rivas notes, the debate ‘took place 
as always with references to the unconstitutionality of different points ... Nothing is 
said [in the accord] about substantive themes such as a new concept of national 
security, the significance of sovereignty in a global society, the utility of the military 
. . .’ (Torres-Rivas, 1997: 30, translation mine). He describes the negotiation as ‘a battle 
of percentages’ in its narrow discussions around the precise levels of military 
reduction (Torres-Rivas, 1997: 30).
The Armed Forces Accord would be limited vis-à-vis the ASC proposal in a few 
important ways: while it redefined the role of the military as relating only to the 
external security of the country (narrowing its previous remit of both internal and
The ASC called for: the reorientation of the military to external defence, its 
subordination to civil power, a 50 percent reduction in military personnel, equipment 
and troops, constitutional changes including allowing the Minister of Defence to be a 
civilian, the security of citizens to be the function of civilian security forces divorced 
from the military, the dismantlement of all the counterinsurgency structure including 
military i ntelligence and the d issolution o f the FACs, and the d efinition o fm  ilitary 
service as voluntary with the possibility of conscientious objection. Asemblea de la 
Sociedad Civil, Propuesta de la Asamblea de la Sociedad Civil - El Ejercito en 
Democracia ([cited 10 June 2002]); available from 
http ://www.us.net/cip/dialogue/l 203.htm.
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external defence), it did so with the caveat that the President can call on the military 
for internal security in cases of emergency. The Accord did not reduce the army to the 
degree sought by the ASC or achieved in El Salvador (it was reduced by 33 percent 
rather than 50 p e rcen t);it also had very weak language and no verification measures 
for the demobilisation of FACs. Certain counterinsurgency groups and their training 
facilities were not decommissioned, nor were some intelligence organs (Jonas, 2000: 
85). Internal security would be handled by a new National Police force, which lacked 
details regarding membership criteria, another weakness vis-à-vis the Salvadoran 
example. Most of these elements of the Armed Forces accord would be contingent on 
constitutional reforms (as with the Indigenous Rights agreement). Although the 
reaction to the Armed Forces accord was muted, those organisations that did issue 
statements were cautiously optimistic (Torres-Rivas, 1997: 111).
The guerrilla made a significant tactical error during the 1996 negotiations: one faction 
of the URNG (ORPA) kidnapped an 86-year-old member of the oligarchy, Olga 
Novella, for ransom, and the government ultimately consented to exchange her for the 
perpetrator.*'^ Kidnappings for ransom are not uncommon in Guatemala, but the timing 
and nature of this -  apparently a fimdraising exercise for ORPA and the future 
presidential campaign of its head, Rodrigo Asturias -  seriously compromised the 
URNG’s negotiating position (Noriega, 2001). The head of the ORPA resigned from 
their negotiating team, and the intemational community stepped in to finalise the
The reduction in the budget involves a 33 percent reduction in spending as a 
proportion of GDP from 1995 to 1999. Thus the proposed reduction would be 
somewhat off-set by the then projected economic growth. Raul Molina Mejia, 'The 
Struggle Against Impunity in Guatemala', Social Justice 26, no. 4 (1999): 65.
For details, see: Central America Report, 'ORPA Kidnapping Revealed; Peace 
Talks on Hold', Central America Report, 31 October 1996; Central America Report, 
'Peace Negotiations Still in Limbo', Central America Report, 1 November 1996.
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logistical accords that remained. (It is interesting but not surprising that this 
miscalculation by one sector of the guerrilla would (allegedly) involve the electoral 
process: it exposes the implications that increased material requirements for 
campaigning have for the left.)
A series of final agreements were signed in December 1996, culminating in the 
‘Accord for a Firm and Lasting Peace’. These agreements were facilitated by the 
Friend Governments, which hosted a series of meetings in Europe involving both 
negotiators and civil society to  sign the final operational accords, a tour to achieve 
closure in the face of the setback of the Novella affair. These operational accords 
treated establishing a cease-fire, constitutional reforms, and the demobilisation of the 
URNG.
The Agreement on Constitutional Reform and the Electoral Regime called on the 
government to draft amendments to the constitution, as per the Indigenous Rights and 
Armed Forces agreements, and forward them to congress within 60 days of its entry 
into force {Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral Regime, 1996). 
Such amendments would require a two-thirds majority there and final approval in a 
national referendum. The accord also provided for the study of the reform of the 
electoral system, underscoring the authority of the Tribunal Supremo Electoral, 
established by the 1985 constitution.
The demobilisation accord was very contentious because it reopened the sticky issue 
of amnesty. The agreement called for the creation of a special commission to involve 
the government, URNG, and international donor representatives, as well as a national 
law -  a national reconciliation act -  to be passed by the Guatemalan congress (Jonas,
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2000: 89). The law that emerged was ultimately very weak: it naturally needed to 
provide amnesty for ‘political crimes’ to allow for the re-incorporation of the URNG, 
but it understood ‘political crimes’ to involve both directly taking up arms against the 
government as well as ‘related common crimes’, ‘which cannot be shown to be 
motivated by personal goals’ (text in (Jonas, 2000: 90). This provided wide scope to 
amnesty counterinsurgency forces. The FRO and CACIF supported the agreement, 
while human rights activists, religious authorities, members of the FDNG and a 
number of indigenous organisations objected to it (Torres-Rivas, 1997: 133).
The agreements on military force and guerrilla demobilisation reflect a controlled 
demilitarisation. Traditional military apparatuses were subject only to limited 
reductions in a context where prior purges ‘counted’ towards the peace process. In 
addition to these ‘objective’ elements of coercion, the subjective element persists 
through military amnesties. The significant use of the ASC text engendered cautious 
but genuine consent in the case of the Armed Forces accord, while the accord on the 
guerrilla’s demobilisation could be used for less acceptable amnesties, justified under 
the exigencies of the crisis of Novella affair.
Articulating the post-confiict state: the texts of the accords
The negotiation of the essential reflects a particular caesarist solution to the crisis of 
counterinsurgent disarticulation, one that was highly contingent upon'international 
involvement. In what follows, the specific nature of that ‘revolution-restoration’ is 
considered. Two areas in particular are important vis-à-vis the crisis of 
counterinsurgent disarticulation: the socio-economic and the military, and how they 
resolve questions of coercion and consent. The accords evidence a general trend
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towards the devolution of social control to the level of individual subjectivity: through 
the internalisation of market rationality in the case of the Socio-Economic Accord, and 
through an explicit emphasis on the individual as agent of modernisation in the case of 
the Armed Forces Accord; where coercion is maintained subjectively through the 
persistence of impunity as an unresolved element of the demilitarisation project.
The Socio-Economic Accord
As noted earlier, modernising elites were motivated to participate in the peace process 
for the purposes of stabilising the country to be able to engage in longer-term 
economic planning and to assure security for tourism and for capital (financial 
regulation and the rule of law). The guerrilla sought to address the social bases of 
conflict. The ‘success’ reading of the peace process understands the socio-economic 
agreement as a significant compromise that accommodates both the neoliberal 
orientation of CACIF and the IFIs in its use of market mechanisms, e.g., vis-à-vis the 
question of land, while addressing the guerrilla agenda by strengthening the capacity 
for government in areas such as taxation and supporting social spending (Jonas, 2000: 
27). A critical perspective, however, seeks to examine the terms on which such a 
compromise is reached, particularly given the operation of power during the 
negotiations. The argument below is that the ‘compromise’ perspective misses to a 
large extent how neoliberal considerations may b e embedded in the elements of the 
accord that reflect the URNG’s agenda. What the success story perspective obscures is 
the extent to which neoliberalism in the periphery, particularly in a post­
counterinsurgent disarticulated state, requires a particular juridical and institutional 
environment to function and seeks ‘human capital’ as an economic resource for the 
private sector and the nation-as-the-firm. An examination of the texts of the accords
shows a strong neoliberal emphasis, both vis-à-vis the question of land, where such an
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orientation is commonly recognised, but also vis-à-vis fiscal and budgetary policy and 
spending and investment, where it is less so.
Land
The question of land is primarily addressed in the third section of the accord. The
Agrarian Situation and Rural Development (see ‘Outline of the Socio-Economic
Accord’ below ).T he accord begins with the statement that:
The transformation of the structure of land use and ownership must have as 
its objective the incorporation of the rural population into economic, social 
and political development so that the land constitutes, for those who work 
it, the basis of their economic stability, the foundation of their progressive 
social well-being and the guarantee of their freedom and dignity 
{Agreement on the Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation, 
1996:127).
Yet in the next paragraph this is collapsed into the commitment to ‘promote more 
efficient and more equitable farming’ {Agreement on the Social and Economic Aspects 
and Agrarian Situation, 1996:128). By the fourth paragraph the logic has transformed 
into one of security property rights: ‘Solving the agrarian problem is a complex 
process covering many aspects of rural life, from modernisation of production and 
cultivation methods to environmental protection, as well as security of property, 
adequate use of the land and of the labour force .. .’ {Agreement on the Social and 
Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation, 1996:130).
The primary mechanism with which the accord promotes the expansion of land 
ownership is through a National Trust Fund for Land, whereby the government buys 
land to ‘promote the establishment of a transparent land market’ {Agreement on the
145 The text of the Socio-Economic Accord is included in Appendix 3.
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Social and Economie Aspects and Agrarian Situation, 1996: ^34(a)). The government 
undertakes to:
Promote, through all means possible, the development of a dynamic land 
market that would enable tenant farmers who either do not have land or 
have insufficient land to acquire land through long-term transactions at 
commercial or favourable interest rates with little or no down payment. In 
particular, promote the issuance of mortgage-backed securities guaranteed 
by the State whose yield is attractive to private investors, especially 
financial institutions {Agreement on the Social and Economic Aspects and 
Agrarian Situation, 1996: %34(e)).
Other measures to assist private land ownership include legal reforms to simplify
awarding title and registering ownership and ‘an efficient, multi-user land registry
system that is financially sustainable’ {Agreement on the Social and Economic Aspects
and Agrarian Situation, 1996: %37(a), %38). Land would be acquired through the
consolidation of uncultivated state land, the reappropriation of illegally settled lands,
government purchases, including those supported by grants firom foreign governments,
international NGOs, and loans fi*om IFIs {Agreement on the Social and Economic
Aspects and Agrarian Situation, 1996: %34(c)). There are also measures for the
resolution of land disputes, a significant issue for areas where there have been
displaced communities, and promises to promote legislation for a land tax fi*om which
small holdings would be exempt.
The accord functions to promote a national land market through the privatisation of 
state land and through international assistance rather than pursuing genuine land 
reform. As Palma Murga describes it, ‘resolution of the agrarian problem is understood 
as a process of reallocating resources within a marginally reformed institutional 
context based on private ownership and the market’ (Palma Murga, 1997: 78). 
Although the question of illegally occupied lands does reflect an issue of justice for 
many indigenous communities, it also reflects a way to discipline corrupt military
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officers who participated in such acquisitions, particularly in the 1970s: the areas noted 
in the accord -  the Franja Transversal del Norte and the Peten -  were those known as 
the ‘Land of the Generals’.
Outline of the Socio-Economic Accord
I. Démocratisation and participatory development
A. Participation and consensus-building
B. Participation of women in economic and social development
II. Social development
A. Education and training
B. Health
C. Social security
D. Housing
E. Work
III. Agrarian situation and rural development
A. Participation
B. Access to land and productive resources
C. Support structure
D. Organisation of the rural population for production
E. Legal framework and juridical security
F. Land register
G. Labour protection
H. Environmental protection
I. Resources
IV. Modernisation of government services and fiscal policy
A. Modernisation of government services
B. Fiscal policy
V. Final Provisions
Fiscal and budgetary policy
Fiscal and budgetary policy are designed to strengthen the competitiveness of the
country, which requires greater labour productivity and infrastructure. The accords call
for an improvement in tax collection, a long-standing issue in Guatemala which had
the lowest level of taxation in the Western Hemisphere for 1963-1983 (Dunkerley,
1990: 231). In the accords, fiscal policy is defended in terms of a Porter-like argument
that lack of government spending has led to low levels of education, health, and
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infrastructure, ‘which militate against increasing the productivity of labour and the 
competitiveness of the Guatemalan economy’ {Agreement on the Social and Economic 
Aspects and Agrarian Situation, 1996: %45). Taxation and spending are understood in 
terms of the ‘competitiveness of nations’. The accords aim to increase the tax burden 
as a ratio of GDP by 50 percent from 1995 levels by 2000/* Furthermore, the 
enforcement of more regressive taxation, i.e., value-added tax, comes before the 
enforcement of the obligations of large contributors {Agreement on the Social and 
Economic A spects a nd Agrarian S ituation, 1996: % 50(d, e , g)). T bus, t he p ursuit o f  
taxation is cautious, and does not emphasise its redistributive potential. Taxation 
remains one of the most contentious issues in post-peace agreement politics (discussed 
further in the Conclusion).
Growth and the post-conflict state
The Socio-Economic Accord fundamentally prioritises growth over everything else.
The discourse of growth prefaces nearly every section of the agreements and growth
precedes any mention of social development or justice every time either term appears
in the Accord. For example, the section ‘Social Development’ argues that:
In the quest for growth, economic policy should be aimed at preventing 
processes of socio-economic exclusion, such as unemployment and 
impoverishment, and maximizing the benefits of economic growth for all 
Guatemalans. In seeking to ensure the well-being of all Guatemalans, 
social p olicy s hould f  oster e conomic d evelopment through i ts i mpact o n 
production and efficiency {Agreement on the Social and Economic Aspects 
and Agrarian Situation ,1996:^14).
This was not successfully implemented, and led to a cycle of negotiations with 
international lenders in the form of consultative group meetings and a ‘Facto Fiscal’ 
(fiscal pact). The IMF and World Bank would ultimately champion any p rogress in 
taxation, even regressive increases in VAT rather than more democratic measures. The 
Facto Fiscal will be discussed further in the conclusions. For an overview, see: Nuria 
Gamboa M. and Barbara Trentavizi, La Guatemala Posible: La Senda del Pacto Fiscal 
(Guatemala: Asociacion Centroamericana Hombres de Maiz, 2001).
180
In this paragraph, the bottom line (literally) is that social policy should be designed to 
improve production and efficiency.
Regardless of whether growth in fact leads to development axiomatically, it will in the
new Guatemalan state, for in fact social programs are designed to be contingent on a
certain level of economic growth.
For its part, the Government undertakes to adopt economic policies 
designed to achieve steady growth in the gross domestic product of not less 
than 6 per cent per annum, which would enable it to implement a 
progressive social policy {Agreement on the Social and Economic Aspects 
and Agrarian Situation, 1996: %18).
Thus, the accords construct a situation where the country is invested in economic
growth as a requirement for the social services promised in the agreements. A failure
to produce the social services promised can thus be excused by pointing to slow
growth.
In this agreement, citizenship itself is defined as an economic good. The section 
‘Démocratisation and Participatory Development’ argues that fimctional, participatory 
democracy requires consensus building among ‘agents of socio-economic
There is much good evidence that growth does not lead automatically to 
development. For diverse but compelling arguments, see: Victor Bulmer-Thomas, The 
New Economic Model in Latin American and its Impact on Income Distribution and 
Poverty (London: Institute for Latin American Studies, 1996); Elmar Altvater, 'The 
Growth Obsession', in Socialist Register 2002: A World o f Contradictions, ed. Leo 
Panitch and Colin Leys (Black Point, Nova Scotia: Femwood, 2002); Sharachchandra 
Lélé, 'Sustainable Development: A Critical Review', World Development 19, no. 6 
(1991). Furthermore, as de Janvry argues, growth does not automatically lead to 
articulation, de Janvry, The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America, 49.
In fact, the annual percent increase in real GDP in Guatemala fi-om 1995-2000 was: 
4.9 (1995) 3.0 (1996) 4.4 (1997) 5.0 (1998) 3.6 (1999) 3.3 (2000). Quest Economics 
Database: Americas Review World of Information, Guatemala: Key Inidcators (Janet 
Matthews Information Services, 2001 [cited 1 July 2002]); available fi-om Lexis- 
Nexis; Alex Tanzi, IMF's Annual GDP Percent Change Forcasts (2001 [cited 1 July 
2002]); available fi’om Lexis-Nexis.
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development’ as well as citizen participation in ‘identifying, prioritising and meeting 
their needs’ {Agreement on the Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation, 
1996: ^1). The assumption is that such participation is ‘essential in order to promote 
productivity and economic growth’ {Agreement on the Social and Economic Aspects 
and Agrarian Situation, 1996: %2-3).
The state must play the role of brokering this consensus -  ‘essential in order to 
stimulate and stabilise economic and social growth’ -  ‘in order to be able to work 
effectively and efficiently to modernise the production sector, enhance 
competitiveness, promote economic growth and provide basic social services 
efficiently and universally’ {Agreement on the Social and Economic Aspects and 
Agrarian Situation, 1996:12-3). A clear question that emerges is who will participate 
in this consensus. Point 4 acknowledges the right of indigenous and resettled peoples 
to ‘exercise their rights effectively and participate fully in decision-making on the 
various matters affecting or involving them, with full awareness o f both their 
individual and collective obligations to society, which they will fulfil responsibly^ 
{Agreement on the Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation, 1996: 14, 
emphasis added). The right to participate is limited to ‘matters affecting or involving 
them’, while society is implied to be an entity which they are located outside of, and to 
which the obligations have already been determined. Not to acknowledge the 
individual and collective obligations is irresponsible and suggests a breach of the 
citizenship contract, presumably permitting the state to treat these groups and 
individuals differently.
There is an explicit sub-section for the status of women. This, too, is an economic 
affair, as it begins by ‘recognising women’s undervalued contributions in all spheres of
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economic and social activity.. .the Parties agree that there is a need to strengthen 
women’s participation in economic and social development on equal terms’ 
{Agreement on the Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation^ 1996:112). It 
is interesting to note where else women’s rights are articulated: primarily in the 
Indigenous Rights Accord. Women are not mentioned in the Agreement on 
Constitutional Reforms and the Electoral Regime, nor in the Comprehensive 
Agreement on Human Rights, and only once in the Agreement on Resettlement of the 
Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict. Women’s rights to protection are 
articulated in the indigenous agreement while their obligations as economic agents are 
articulated in the socio-economic agreements, yet they do not explicitly appear much 
elsewhere in the accords. This reflects the construction of neoliberalism’s need to 
manage the indigenous identity and socio-economic subjectivity, more than a 
comprehensive ‘gendering’ of the process.
Social spending and investment
The accords go further than ‘merely’ casting citizenship in terms of economic agency: 
they provide a blueprint for the construction of economic agents in their treatment of 
education and training, work, and the organisation of the rural population for 
production.
Education is a highly economic good, ‘vital for economic modernisation and 
international competitiveness’ {Agreement on the Social and Economic Aspects and 
Agrarian Situation, 1996: 121). Education and training should ‘contribute to the 
application of technical and scientific progress and, consequently, to the achievement
For a discussion of women’s rights as the ‘missing accord’, see Susanne Jonas, Of 
Centaurs andDo\es: Guatemala's Peace Process (Oxford: Westview Press, 2000), 86.
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of higher productivity, the creation of more jobs and increased income for the 
population and beneficial integration into the world economy’ {Agreement on the 
Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation, 1996: %21). The goal of 
education is thus to further the national economy and its globalised possibilities.
Work is defined in terms of the individual’s development: it is ‘essential for the 
integral development of the individual, the well-being of the family and the social and 
economic development of Guatemala’ {Agreement on the Social and Economic 
Aspects and Agrarian Situation, 1996: ^26). The role of labour is as ‘an essential 
element of social participation in socio-economic development and o f economic 
efficiency. In this respect, the state’s policy with regard to work is critical for a 
strategy o f growth with social justice’ {Agreement on the Social and Economic Aspects 
and Agrarian Situation, 1996: ^26, emphasis added). The state is cast unambiguously 
as the guarantor of economic growth, and represents the manager who will mediate 
between growth and social justice. Organised 1 abour’s role is 1 ikewise expressed in 
terms of promoting economic efficiency. The Accord’s discourse on work involves the 
commodification of labour celebrated as beneficial for both the individual and the 
state, the latter of which controls the social dimensions of labour for the market.
The labourer in the neoliberal economy must possess a particular economic rationality.
There is no mistaking that the accords aim to construct this rationality, as the
subsection ‘organisation of the rural population for production’ evidences:
Organising the rural population is a decisive factor in transforming the 
inhabitants of the countryside into genuine protagonists of their own 
development...there is a need to promote a more efficient form of 
organisation of small producers so that they can, in particular, take 
advantage of the support structure described in paragraph 35 {Agreement 
on the Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation, 1996:136).
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As with the discourse on work, participating in the reorganised, productive rural 
economy is good for the individual, indeed liberating (one becomes a ‘genuine 
protagonist’). However, such participation requires becoming a micro-entrepreneur. 
The support structures in paragraph 35 involve the provision of infrastructure for the 
marketing of agricultural produce. The paragraph continues.
To this end, the Government undertakes to:
(a) Support micro-, small and medium-scale agricultural and rural 
enterprises. ..
(b) Tackle the problem of smallholdings through:
(i) A firm and sustained policy of support for smallholders so that they can 
become small-scale agricultural businessmen through access to training, 
technology, credit and other inputs;
(ii) Promoting, if the smallholders so desire, amalgamation of holdings in 
those cases where conversion into small businesses is not possible owing 
to the dispersal and size of the properties {Agreement on the Social and 
Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation, 1996: %36).
Smallholdings are considered a problem that needs to be solved through conversion to
micro-enterprise via training and technology. Farmers are to become businessmen, and
if they are not able to due to the scale of their holdings, the government will assist
them to consolidate into economies of scale.
As with land, the subsection on housing emphasises privatisation. There is a need ‘to
give priority to the building of low-cost housing, through the appropriate financial
arrangements, in order to enable as many Guatemalan families as possible to own their
own homes’ {Agreement on the Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation,
1996: 125). The financing of new housing would occur with the proper incentives to
investors and companies:
Strengthen the securities market and make it more available as a source of 
funds to purchase housing, by ... facilitating the selling of securities issued 
for housing operations, such as common and preferred stocks in
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construction companies, mortgage bonds and debentures, real estate 
participation certificates, supplemental letters, promissory notes and other 
documents related to rental with an option to buy {Agreement on the Social 
and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation, 1996: |25(f)).
One of the striking things about this passage is the specificity of economic instruments
to be employed in financing new housing, no doubt the ‘appropriate financial
arrangements’. There is no ambiguity about how the goal for low-income housing will
be accomplished, the mechanisms involve strengthening the market, commodifying
real estate, and providing more financing for construction companies. Then the
government will provide subsidies to low-income families to purchase their houses
{Agreement on the Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation, 1996:
1125(g)). Thus, housing is constructed to be governed by the market and lucrative to
investors, despite the need for subsidies as well: it is a predominantly economic, rather
than social, good. (Considering the contingency of social programmes on the 6 percent
increase in GDP, this approach seems even more precarious in terms of its ability to
actually provide housing to the poor.)
Recalling CACIF’s identification of tourism as a ‘cluster’ of national competitiveness
for economic development, the Socio-Economic Accord’s treatment of culture in the
rural sector reflects Porter’s thesis as well. The preservation of culture is seen in
economic terms: as something for the state to take advantage of.
These changes [promoting more efficient farming, etc.] will enable 
Guatemala to take full advantage of the capacities of its inhabitants and, in 
particular, the richness of the traditions and cultures of its indigenous 
peoples. It should also take advantage of the high potential for agricultural, 
industrial, commercial and tourist development of those resources deriving 
from its wealth of natural resources {Agreement on the Social and 
Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation, 1996:129).
Clearly the implication is that the commercial and tourisitc development of natural
resources might also apply to the traditions of indigenous peoples. In the neoliberal
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project, traditions represent a resource for the state to utilise. The state is the guarantor 
that ‘its’ inhabitants are utilised as economic inputs. Indigenous peoples ‘in particular’ 
are a rich commodity to be developed.
The Socio-Economic Accord relies on conventional neoliberal mechanisms -  
privatisation and the market -  for access / distributional issues around land and 
housing. More subtly and profoundly, perhaps, it aims to reconstruct the social as an 
expression of the market. It does this at the level of individual subjectivity through the 
creation of structures that inculcate market rationality in the conduct of nearly all areas 
of daily life. The citizen-entrepreneur embodies this ideal and becomes the subject of 
policy-making. Growth and efficiency appear as omnipresent goals. Social goods are 
consistently constructed in economic terms. Indeed, the rural population is explicitly 
reorganised for production, and the solution to land reform is the market, which 
‘promises’ growth out of the historical injustices acknowledged in the accords. This 
order homogenises the diversity of economic relationships to the land into one 
governed by the rational actor and the market, with the sanctioned marginalisation of 
groups that ‘irresponsibly’ do not participate in full. Indeed, ‘the richness of the 
traditions and cultures’ of indigenous peoples become commodities.
The Socio-Economic Accord exploits the need to address the social bases of conflict as 
an opportunity to reconstruct the integral state as a reflection of the market. The raison 
d ’etat becomes the microeconomics of the firm, while citizenship is constructed 
around the rationality and subjectivity of homo economicus.
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Subjectivity and coercion
Modernisation and development figure as prominent motifs in the discourse of the 
Armed Forces and related agreements, reflecting to a certain extent an understanding 
that continues the aspirations of counterinsurgency if not its methods. The Armed 
Forces Accord is predicated on the ideas of the weakness of civil institutions, national 
development and ‘the security and full development of the individual’ {Agreement on 
the Strengthening o f Civilian Power and the Role o f the Armed Forces in a 
Democratic Society, 1996: preface). The discourse of the development of the 
individual provides justification for claims such as ‘it is of crucial importance to 
enhance, modernize and reinforce the State and its republican, democratic and 
representative system of government’ {Agreement on the Strengthening o f Civilian 
Power and the Role o f the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society, 1996: %l-2). The 
function of the new National Civil Police is ‘to protect and guarantee the exercise of 
the rights and freedoms of the individual; prevent, investigate and combat crimes, and 
maintain public order and internal security’ {Agreement on the Strengthening o f 
Civilian Power and the Role o f the Armed Forces in a Democratic Society, 1996: %2- 
3). And the military education system is to be reformed to be consistent ‘with a culture 
of peace and democratic coexistence’ as well as ‘with national values, the integral 
development of the individual, knowledge of our national history, respect for human 
rights and the identity and rights of indigenous peoples, and the primacy of the 
individual’ {Agreement on the Strengthening o f Civilian Power and the Role o f the 
Armed Forces in a Democratic Society, 1996: %40). Thus, demilitarisation is 
predicated on accepting the primacy of the individual; one of the values of 
counterinsurgency’s embedded modernisation.
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Impunity is mentioned as early as the 1994 Comprehensive Agreement on Human 
Rights, whose second section, ‘Commitment Against Impunity’, involves an 
agreement by the government not to sponsor legislation or other measures to prevent 
the prosecution of those responsible for human rights violations and to initiate 
legislation ‘so that enforced or involuntary disappearances and summary or extra­
judicial executions may be characterized as crimes of particular gravity and punished 
as s uch’ ( The Comprehensive A greement o n Human R ights, 1994: % 2). Paragraph 3 
stipulates that ‘No special law or exclusive jurisdiction may be invoked to uphold 
impunity in respect of human rights violations’. However, in the subsequent agreement 
on the Role of the Armed Forces impunity is mentioned only once, in the context of 
the reform of the justice system, which ‘should be geared to preventing the judiciary 
from producing or covering up a system of impunity and corruption’ {Agreement on 
the Strengthening o f Civilian Power and the Role o f the Armed Forces in a 
Democratic Society, 1996: ^9). The notion of impunity, as noted earlier, is primarily 
raised in the agreement on the reintegration of the URNG. This accord called for new 
legislation, a National Reconciliation Act to address both ‘the right to know the truth’ 
and ‘ the r ight o f  redress’ ; p aragraph 20 o f  the a ccord s tipulates s uch an act s hould 
promote national reconciliation ‘without neglecting the need to combat impunity’, 
although the following sections on political crimes and related common crimes clearly 
provide wide scope for amnesty. (The Law for National Reconciliation was passed in 
early 1997.)
Impunity generates certain political subjective effects which are of concern here 
primarily in terms of their capacity to dissuade political engagement. Impunity is 
associated with depoliticisation both because the psychodynamics associated with 
counterinsurgency’s techniques of involving the population in its technologies of
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control and because of the ‘unreality’ of making sense of the experienced world in a 
climate of denial.
The technologies of counterinsurgency involve actively incorporating the population in 
strategies of social control. This may be done in terms of forced resettlement and civil 
patrols, but it is also done through the exercise of spectacle. The use of spectacle 
occurs within the public-private obfuscation that characterises counterinsurgency, for 
while it is intended to influence those immediately present, it is also denied by official 
sources. However, by forcing some to witness the atrocities of counterinsurgency, the 
perpetrators psychologically involve them in the violence, leading to a sense of shared 
responsibility. Frank Graziano writes of such spectacles in Argentina, ‘The public’s 
collective body, united by and meaningful in relation to the body being brutalised, 
constituted the agency by which the macabre display was transformed into a 
ceremonial strengthening of the institutions in which they were now participating’ 
(Zur, 1995: 62). Counterinsurgency implicates the public in its own tyranny as the 
‘audience-guarantor’, forcing it to ‘[share] the State’s power and truth because it 
[shared] in the spectacle’ (Zur, 1995: 62, quoting Graziano). Thus counterinsurgency 
carries out other forms of social denial in addition to its official denial. Moreover, the 
continued public denial of counterinsurgency both in terms of truth and accountability 
reiterates a depoliticised subjectivity.
The public denial of the trauma of counterinsurgency through impunity can lead to a 
sense of unreality that makes politics next to impossible. The absence of an 
acknowledgement of trauma, ‘pervert the highest mental functions ... the process of 
learning and knowing, and even that of imagining’ such that ‘victims do not see truth 
and justice as feasible’ (Rojas, 1999: 20, 17). The symptoms of impunity are highly
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undemocratic: people report ‘impotence and fiustration, that they did not any longer 
feel like a whole person with rights’ (Rojas, 1999: 27). Dr. Paz Rojas writes of 
impunity in Chile: ‘The appearance of this new symptomatology, whose psycho­
dynamism differed from that of crime, led us to think that, with time, impunity induces 
mechanisms of intrapsychic perturbation with consequences equal to or worse than 
torture’ (Rojas, 1999: 25-26). From a Gramscian perspective, impunity could be seen 
as an expression of coercion that threatens to close the potential for the critical 
dialogue between independent subjectivity and socially constructed subjectivity 
required to transcend hegemonic understandings of society.
Raul Molina Mejia describes the political / psychological manifestation of impunity as 
the technique ‘by which political options in a polity are restricted and controlled 
through the state’s manipulation of fear’ (Molina Mejia, 1999: 58). He argues that not 
only does the continuation of coercion through silence preempt demands for social 
equality and justice generally, but in the case of Guatemala impunity affected the 
FDNG’s support in the 1995 elections. He claims that although voters knew that 
individual ballots were secret, ‘the political inclination of each municipality would be 
immediately unveiled’ (Molina Mejia, 1999: 64). The legacy of counterinsurgency 
extends beyond its immediate manifestations, where the memory of violent 
repercussions extends into spheres such as voting behaviour.
In sum, there are two significant features of the resolution of militarism and 
counterinsurgency from the perspective ofpolitical subjectivity. One reinscribes the 
individual as the site of development as a protection from the abuses of 
counterinsurgency, which does not break from counterinsurgency’s fimdamental 
concept of modernisation. Second, the continuation of the logic of counterinsurgency
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through impunity leads to a depoliticisation of the public. This occurs both at the more 
overt level of an awareness that individual rights may not secure the protection of the 
collectivity as well as the less visible psychological level, where the ‘unreality’ of 
lived and constructed worlds cannot be reconciled.
'Revolution-restoration’ in the texts of the accords
The ethos of this revolution-restoration is the neoliberal modernisation process. Thus
the social transformations reflected in the accords reflect a ‘revolutionary’ dimension 
to the extent that this modernisation process moves beyond the logic of 
counterinsurgent modernisation. Yet it reflects a ‘restorative’ dimension to the extent 
this project reconstructs society to serve better modernising elite interests constructed 
under counterinsurgency, without counterinsurgency’s contradictory, violent excesses.
The accords reflect an impulse to rework, if largely at the margins, the traditional- 
modern dichotomy of disarticulation through the ‘reorganisation of the rural 
population for production’. This impulse favours transforming agrarian capitalism 
outside of the boundaries of large flncas into what Lenin described as the ‘farmer’ 
model of agrarian capitalism, where the peasant becomes the ‘agent of agriculture’ and 
evolves into a capitalist farmer (de Janvry, 1981: 107). In principle, such a transition 
would involve the ‘revolutionary’ social transformation of a greater proletarianisation 
of the rural labour force, which would allow for less direct coercion in rural labour 
relations and the construction of an internal market.'^" In Guatemala, this logic is 
applied only at the margins of disarticulation, as it presumes the persistence of large
For these reasons, Lenin thought the farmer model of rural capitalism superior to 
the Junker model, de Janvry, The Agrarian Question and Reformism in Latin America, 
108.
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fîncas (which in Lenin’s model the farmer model would have displaced) and the 
modernization of the economy around export-oriented clusters rather than an emphasis 
on the domestic market. The objective conditions of disarticulation, then, are 
incompletely resolved in the accords, given the boundaries of the application its 
‘revolutionary’ logic. Indeed, the application of this logic at the margins reflects a 
greater emphasis on the subjective, rather than objective, dimensions of disarticulation.
The accords do overtly engage with the subjective practices of counterinsurgent 
disarticulation. The project is one of ‘revolution’ to the extent that it desecuritises the 
‘objects’ of counterinsurgency through the provision of rights to the ‘remainder’ of the 
disarticulated ensemble of social relations: the codification of human and indigenous 
rights and the reintegration of the guerrilla. However, it is one of ‘restoration’ in that 
this resolution of the crisis of counterinsurgency concludes the process of destroying 
the autonomous bases for indigenous society. The tension of these two dimensions are 
embodied in the transformation of the ‘objective’ bases for the traditional from the 
disarticulated production of agricultural commodities to the commodification of 
tradition itself. In this movement, traditional culture loses its autonomous subsistence- 
productive basis: its ‘objective’ conditions of existence are relocated to a direct 
relationship to the disarticulated market through the commodification o f  indigenous 
culture. The grounds for the preservation of indigenous culture are its attenuated 
subordination to market culture.
Conclusion
In its origins, the Guatemalan peace process reflected a need to resolve the 
contradictions of counterinsurgent modernisation, the resolution of which involves an
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emphasis on the subjective dimensions of counterinsurgency in its reformulation of the 
nature of disarticulation towards a neohberal model.
This outcome is the result of ongoing operations of power within the Guatemalan 
peace process that relied to large extent on international involvement and ultimately 
privileged a particular elite perspective. Such operations involved the ability to 
establish the dominant understandings of key elements in the terrain of the 
negotiations as a reflection of intellectual and moral leadership and, associated with 
that, the ability to cultivate some degree of consent through the construction and 
management of civil society and the use of electoral politics.
The social bases of conflict are resolved in the texts of the accords by reconstructing 
society as a reflection of the market. The texts of the accords involve the devolution of 
social control through the construction of neoliberal economic subjectivity and the 
preservation of the subjective coercion of counterinsurgency through impunity. In this 
reformulation, the ‘traditional remainder’ of counterinsurgency, indigenous culture, 
was ultimately subject to attenuation and subordination to the logic of market society 
as well. This was ‘revolutionary’ in envisaging a transformation of the subjective 
dimension of counterinsurgent disarticulation and to a much lesser extent the objective 
dimension as well, which had genuine appeal for subaltern groups. However, both in 
terms of the limitation it has vis-à-vis reworking objective conditions of 
counterinsurgent disarticulation and in terms of its fundamental project of continuing 
disarticulation through neoliberalism, the project is one of ‘restoration’.
The caesarist solution reflected in the accords would not be a stable one, as 
foreshadowed by the 1995 elections. The FRO in particular would represent an
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organised rejection of the agreements, campaigning to defeat the constitutional reforms 
associated with the Indigenous Rights and Armed Forces Accords. This has been read 
as right-wing racism (Jonas, 2000), what here could be understood in terms of the 
rejection of the idea of addressing the subjective dimensions of counterinsurgency, or 
the cultural persistence of the need for social control. However, the ‘elite-pacted’ 
nature of the negotiations, however, equally produced, in a sense, the FRG’s 
competing caesarist perspective: a distinct resolution of counterinsurgent
disarticulation that preserves military counterinsurgency while addressing 
disarticulation through economic populism.
The Guatemalan peace process, in its resolution of counterinsurgent disarticulation, 
provides i nsight i nto t he p ossibility o fp  eace p rocesses o perating as t echnologies o f  
neoliberalism. In the next chapter, this theme and its relationship to the 
implementation of the accords will be explored.
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Conclusion
The preceding chapters provided a Gramscian framework for analysis of the 
Guatemalan peace process, an overview of the ensemble of social relations in conflict 
and entering the peace process, and an analysis of the peace process itself, the origins 
and conduct of the negotiations and the resulting texts.
The caesarist solution that emerges from the Guatemalan peace process would not 
overcome its inevitable initial fragility to become hegemonic, much less to implement 
fully the accords. However, the nature of the accords’ implementation reflects a 
particular hierarchy of measures, that in association with the peace conditionality of 
the international financial institutions (IFIs), can be seen as a condition of disciplinary 
neoliberalism. Incomplete implementation nonetheless reconstructs the terrain of 
popular resistance around the implementation of the accords, thus enhancing the 
ethico-political purchase of neoliberalism.
In what follows, the argument developed in the preceding chapters is reviewed, the 
level and nature of the implementation of the accords is considered, and some 
reflections on the implications of peace processes in the neoliberal historical bloc have 
for understanding world order are offered.
Overview of the argument
The analysis offered here began with the observation that though the Guatemalan 
peace process has been considered a success by many, such claims have been 
predominantly problem-solving in nature -  located in a set of assumptions that
196
maintains the status quo and its associated power relationships -  rather than critical,
i.e., sensitive to ontological and normative assumptions, historical construction and 
social transformation. The problematic presented by the success claims, and by the 
notion of post-conflict reconstruction broadly understood, is that of addressing the 
social bases or root causes of conflict. This problematic is resolved, according to the 
success claim, above all through the achievement of a programme of social 
development, a regime of human and indigenous rights, and democratic participation 
in Guatemalan politics. In contrast, a critical perspective asks on what grounds such 
development, rights and participation are constructed.
A Gramscian perspective sees politics in such a critical theoretical vein, in terms of 
relationships of power and knowledge across the institutional boundaries observed in 
conventional analyses. Gramscian analysis implies a reformulation of the problematic 
of addressing the social bases of conflict in terms that recognise the relationship 
between political and civil society in the ‘ensemble of social relations’, which may not 
conform to the boundaries of the state conventionally understood. Such a perspective 
recognises the historically, materially and subjectively constituted nature of power and 
its relationship both to coercion and intellectual and moral leadership. This analysis is 
particularly useful for drawing attention to the operation of power during moments of 
potential social transformation.
Gramsci understood the institutionalisation of an ensemble of social relations through 
regimes of coercion and consent, shared ethico-political understandings that unite 
dominant social groups with subaltern, in terms of the historical bloc. A holistic, 
critical analysis of post-cold war peace processes recognises the dominance 
internationally of a neoliberal historical bloc.
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The ensemble of social relations in Guatemala entering the peace process was one of 
counterinsurgent disarticulation. Here disarticulation refers to the (re)construction of 
modem / traditional social divisions, and associated race and class hierarchies, to 
maintain conditions of semiproletariat labour (including below market wages) 
associated with export-oriented plantation agriculture. Thus disarticulation is 
associated both with ‘objective’ economic conditions and ‘subjective’ social 
conditions that justify such hierarchies. Guatemala can be described as disarticulated 
from the generalisation of coffee cultivation. The reform decade of 1944-54 addressed 
some features of disarticulation, but not capitalism per se. It precipitated US 
involvement based on perceived economic concerns as well as understandings of the 
racialised and militarised ensemble of social relations associated with disarticulation as 
desirable for modernisation. This involvement supported local agricultural and military 
elite interests, which together constmcted a counterinsurgent state.
Counterinsurgency is predicated on elite-oriented models of development, where the 
‘residual’ social elements of disarticulation -  the ‘traditional’ and associated social 
categories -  are understood to be a potential threat to modernisation. The 
counterinsurgent period in  Guatemala reflected significant international involvement 
both in terms of the ‘intellectual and moral leadership’ behind theories of 
counterinsurgency and in the (re)constmction of society in a particular modernisation 
ideal. The construction of the counterinsurgent state is accompanied by a restructuring 
of the economy towards activities more integrated with transnational capital: banking, 
non-traditional agricultural exports, maquila finishing and tourism.
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The Guatemalan peace process emerges from a crisis of the counterinsurgent state: the 
internal financial crisis of the cost to elites and the external crisis of international 
concerns about Guatemala’s human rights abuses. These crises led on the one hand to 
a return to civilian rule and on the other to participation in the Central American 
regional peace processes. The regional efforts would construct certain parameters for 
the Guatemala peace process, particularly the privileging of electoral democracy as 
the expression of democratic participation. Guatemala’s peace process used civil 
society to cultivate consent while engaging in a strategy of deferring ‘essential’ 
questions until after the 1995 elections. Such moves led to an attenuation of popular 
demands and the construction of rights as entirely political, to the exclusion of the 
economic. The appeal to electoral democracy, while constructed around polyarchic 
principles for preserving elite privilege, in fact resulted in exposing elite divisions. 
Thus the post-1995 election period, when ‘the essential’ -  the mihtary and the 
economic -  is resolved, reflects a caesarist resolution of the crisis of counterinsurgent 
disarticulation involving the international community, modernising economic elites 
represented by the PAN, and the URNG.
Caesarism-  thereassertionofelitepow erin a novel ‘revolution-restoration’ o fth e  
social order -  captures the way in which the social bases of conflict are indeed opened 
up for negotiation, though resolved through plans for a reorganisation of society that 
ultimately restores elite privilege. The blueprint for this reorganisation of society 
involves an appeal to participation in the post-conflict state, the provision of rights, 
social investment, and demilitarisation. However, these social ‘goods’ as understood in 
the texts of the accords reflect a neoliberal social order that divorces economic issues 
from political rights, uses social investment to construct a neoliberal economy and 
subjectivity, and relocates coercion from direct militarism to a system of police.
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The peace process in Guatemala aimed constructed a state suited to the post-CoId War 
neoliberal order. The state was reconstructed toprovide g reater security for capital, 
and as, as per Foucault’s observation in Chapter 2, an enterprise ‘to universalize 
competition and invent market-shaped systems of action for individuals, groups and 
institutions’ (Lemke, 2001: 197). The entirety of the ensemble of social relations 
becomes subordinate to market logic, through a project of reorganisation that involves 
the reconstruction of homo economicus under a particular self-entrepreneurial 
subjectivity and the commodification of indigenous culture.
Caesarism, implementation, and neoiiberaiism’s ethico- 
poiiticai purchase
The fragility of the caesarist solution to the peace process is reflected in the very 
limited and uneven implementation of the accords. Implementation reflects the 
common denominator of the two caesarist resolutions to the crisis of counterinsurgent 
disarticulation -  the initially successful PAN/URNG/intemational solution and the 
FRG’s populism -  the need to secure the guerrilla. Thus, the operational accords, 
dealing with a definitive ceasefire, the demobilisation of the guerrilla, and the return of 
refugees, were for the most part implemented very quickly (Salvesen, 2002: 9). In 
principle, all of the accords were to be implemented by December 2000, however this 
timetable was revised in December 1999 to extend until 2004; the rescheduled agenda 
included 119 outstanding commitments predominantly relating to the Socio-Economic 
Accord (66), the Armed Forces Accord (23) and the Indigenous Accord (18)
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(Salvesen, 2002: 9).*^ ’ One ofthe most conspicuous obstacles to implementation is the 
electoral defeat of constitutional reforms necessary for the full implementation of the 
Indigenous Rights and Armed Forces Accords; taxation has also remained a persistent 
question, generating a new set of civil society negotiations around a Pacto Fiscal 
(fiscal pact)/^^
Perhaps the most fundamental failure of implementation involves the defeat of the 
constitutional reforms required by the Agreement on Constitutional Reforms and the 
Electoral Regime, and associated with key elements of the Armed Forces and 
Indigenous Rights A ccords .T he  PAN embroiled the reforms in a complicated 
process that added numerous extraneous elements to the package and delayed their 
consideration, making them vulnerable to numerous challenges from a well-organised
The interim targets for these commitments for 2004 largely do not seem to be met. 
MINUGUA, 'Executive Summary: MINUGUA Report to the Consultative Group 
meeting for Guatemala', (Guatemala: MINUGUA, 2003).
To date, MINUGUA has written numerous reports on the implementation of the 
accords: 16 specifically on the accords, 14 on its human rights missions, and 
approximately 18 others on related issues. This section relies significantly on the more 
recent MINUGUA reports on indigenous rights (MINUGUA, 'The Indigenous Peoples 
of Guatemala: Overcoming Discrimination in the Framework of the Peace 
Agreements', (Guatemala: 2001)), on the armed forces agreement (MINUGUA, 'Status 
of the Commitments of the Peace Agreements Relating to the Armed Forces', 
(Guatemala: 2002)), and its reports for the Consultative Group meetings (discussed 
further below); MINUGUA, 'Report for the Consultative Group meeting for 
Guatemala', (Guatemala: MINUGUA, 2002); MINUGUA, 'Executive Summary: 
MINUGUA Report to the Consultative Group meeting for Guatemala',. Susanne Jonas 
provides the most extensive discussion of the defeat of the constitutional reforms and 
is therefore relied upon heavily in that discussion. Jonas, O f Centaurs and Doves: 
Guatemala's Peace Process . The URNG has also created its own reports on 
implementation: URNG, 'Balance del Processo de Paz 1997-1999', (Guatemala: 
URNG, 1999); URNG, 'Cumplimiento de los Acuerdos de Paz: Abril -Diciembre 
1997', (Guatemala: URNG, 1998).
Implementation has been at best partial from 1996 to the present, thus the impact of 
the 2000 elections that saw the defeat of the PAN by the FRG should not be 
overstated. Nonetheless, the defeat of the PAN does reflect the inability to consolidate 
the peace process agenda in the face of caesarist instability. The FRG won the 1999 
election by a margin of 68 to 32 percent James Buchanan, 'Guatemala Under the FRG: 
Peace at a Crossroads', (Ottawa: Canadian Foundation for the Americas, 2000), 4.
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and well-funded anti-reform campaign.The reforms were ultimately defeated, 56 
percent to 44 percent, in a poll marked by very low voter turn out: 18.5 percent of 
registered voters (MINUGUA, 2002: 2). The negative result has been described in 
terms of a ‘punishment vote’ against politicians for the lack of transparency in the 
development of the reforms in Congress and a reflection of distrust of the political elite 
(Jonas, 2000: 203, Salvesen, 2002: 22). In addition, confusion about the complexity of 
the reforms may have affected the outcome: for example, new proposals added 
questions of municipal authority to demilitarisation reforms such that the indigenous 
mayor of the second largest city in Guatemala opposed the measures, effecting the 
overall ‘No’ vote there (Jonas, 2000: 204).
By the time of the poll, both the PAN and the FRG officially supported the reforms, 
however, with dubious sincerity. The PAN, as noted, clearly had not taken an active 
leadership position on quickly achieving reforms, despite their Congressional majority 
(with the argument that it needed to establish the legitimacy of the reforms with the 
FRG to ensure that it would not sabotage them during the referendum), nor did it 
actively promote the reforms closer to the referendum (Jonas, 2000: 190, 95). The 
FRG decided to support the reforms in early April, ‘for opportunistic political reasons’ 
(Jonas, 2000: 195). Jonas suggests that ‘many believed, in fact, that both were
The Agreement required that the government propose draft constitutional 
amendments to Congress within 60 days of its entry into force (which occurred with 
the final Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace on 29 December 1996). The 
proposals were finally forwarded to Congress in May 1997, subject to negotiation in 
Congress until October 1998, and then put to a national referendum in May 1999, an 
election year. Initially the FRG, which would later ostensibly support the reforms, 
argued that the measures could not be dealt with in Congress but required a full 
National Constituent Assembly, a position that Susanne Jonas argues was taken in bad 
faith Jonas, O f Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala's Peace Process^ 190. Opponents of 
the reforms also took their case to the Constitutional Court, which ruled on procedural 
grounds in February 1998 that the reforms were unconstitutional, sending them back to 
Congress Jonas, Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala's Peace Process, 194.
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engaging in a kind of “double discourse” with their formal 'W  masking indifference 
and internal divisions (PAN) or opposition (FRG)’ (Jonas, 2000: 195). The left 
assumed that the reforms would pass and, preoccupied with the elections that year, did 
not mobilise for the cause (Jonas, 2000: 195). The ‘No’ campaign involved scare 
mongering around ideas of ‘social chaos’ and the ‘balkanisation’ of Guatemalan into 
two countries (Jonas, 2000: 196-8).
The defeat of the constitutional reforms included the defeat of an amendment to 
redefine the remit of the military to limit it exclusively to the external defence of the 
country. In June 2000, a decree further compromised this element of the peace process 
by formalising the military’s role in internal security (Salvesen, 2002: 10). 
Implementation of the creation of a new military doctrine had not been achieved by 
2002 (Salvesen, 2002: 10). There has been a failure to redeploy military detachments 
in areas of severe counterinsurgency activities, such as the Ixil triangle, and to 
reconstruct military education and training away from counterinsurgency doctrine and 
towards a meaningful appreciation of human rights (MINUGUA, 2002: 19-21). While 
the military budget seemed to meet its target in 1997 and 1998 its proportion of GDP 
has been creeping beyond the 0.66 percent ceiling in the peace accords since 1999. 
The figure was 0.83 percent by 2000 and 0.94 percent by 2001 as the result of 
supplementary transfers to the Defence Ministry, which increased the Congressionally 
approved allocation by 85 percent (MINUGUA, 2002: 19).
As with the redefinition of the role of the military, the redefinition of the Guatemalan 
nation as multi-ethnic, multicultural and multilingual was defeated with the failure of 
the constitutional reforms. Very few measures of the Indigenous Rights accord have 
been achieved beyond those calling for the creation of commissions for further study,
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leading MINUGUA to conclude in January 2002 that the Indigenous Rights accord has 
been the least implemented (Salvesen, 2002: 14-15); (MINUGUA, 2002: 6). All 
commitments pertaining to land in the Indigenous Rights accord (having to do with 
title and legal protections) were rescheduled for lack of compliance (MINUGUA, 
2001: 25-26). The biggest success in the implementation of this accord is understood 
to be the creation of Joint Commissions of government and indigenous representatives 
(MINUGUA, 2001: 30). Yet the Joint Commissions have not had substantive impact: 
their only accomplishments have been the drafting of further proposals, which has 
tarnished their credibility with indigenous organisations (Raymundo, 2001).
Regarding the Socio-Economic Accord, most attention has been focused on the 
challenge of implementing the measures associated with the area of modernisation and 
fiscal policy. The accords sought to increase taxation from 8 percent to 12 percent of 
GDP by 2000. By 1997 it was clear that the government was not going to meet the 
interim target of 10 percent by 1998, the commitment was rescheduled and (re)solved 
through a complex negotiation between civil society and the PAN government 
resulting in a new Pacto Fiscal (fiscal pact).‘^  ^ In anticipation of the October 1998 
meeting of the Consultative Group of international donors to the peace p rocess, the 
government sought to reschedule its taxation targets. This led to set of negotiations 
involving n umerous c ivil s ociety organisations, i ncluding C ACIF, around t he P acta 
Fiscal, which lasted until May 2000 and rescheduled the 12 percent target until 2002
The PAN government did attempt to create a more progressive property tax in late 
1997, however, such measures were subject to a confused campaign of resistance. 
There were widespread protests against the tax (Jmpuesto Unico Sabre Inmuebles, 
lUSI) in 1998, supported not only by the FRG but also by rural mayors who felt they 
would pay the political costs of higher taxes while the wealth would remain with the 
central government Gamboa M. and Trentavizi, La Guatemala Posible: La Senda del 
Pacto Fiscal, 20 Jonas, Of Centaurs and Doves: Guatemala's Peace Process, 171-2.
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(also not met) (Gamboa M. and Trentavizi, 2001: 149); (Salvesen, 2002: 17); 
(MINUGUA, 2002: 14). The primary tax measure that has been implemented involved 
raising the value added tax (VAT) from 10 to 12 percent. The successes of 
implementation in the area of fiscal policy involve the creation of ‘information 
systems’ for the surveillance of income and public spending. The tax administration 
(Superintendencia de Administracion Tributaria, SAT) established an information 
sharing system toeoordinate independent b anks and the central b ank in  monitoring 
income (Salvesen, 2002: 17). The SAT has also implemented the requirement for a 
Unified Tax Register to monitor compliance with tax obligations and a system of 
evaluation and control of public spending, the Integral System for Financial 
Administration (SIAF) has been established (Salvesen, 2002: 17).
At the end of the Guatemalan peace process a Consultative Group (CG) was created 
among key funders of the implementation of the accords, including the World Bank, 
the Inter-American Development Bank, other international organisations, and bilateral 
donors. The CG met in January 1997, just after the signing of the final accords, and 
pledged US$1.9 billion in aid for the process. Indeed, the actual contribution for the 
period 1996-99 reached US$2.4 billion (Salvesen, 2002: 29). By December 2001, the 
total value of external assistance amounted to US$3.2 billion, of which 78 percent 
came from multilateral agencies (Inter-American Development Bank, 2002: 1). The 
IFIs and the EU provided 81 percent of the multilateral funding, that is 63 percent of 
the external resources for financing the peace agreements (Inter-American 
Development Bank, 2002: 2). The US also represents a significant player, providing 45 
percent of bilateral aid and about 10 percent of the overall amount. (For specific 
contributions, see the chart below.) Jonas suggests that the IFIs were inspired to give 
particular attention to Guatemala because of the perception that Guatemala had in
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recent years prudently managed its macroeconomic affairs so that the implementation 
of the peace accords could be an opportunity for poverty reduction without 
macroeconomic instability (Jonas, 2000: 170).
Agency or Country Total Signed (Thousands of US$)
Bilateral 735,340.1
Germany 140,700.0
Spain 16,442.4
Canada 28,379.2
Denmark 7,076.2
Finland 8,438.9
Italy 12,918.4
Netherlands 14,224.4
Japan 73,954.5
Norway 37,622.0
United Kingdom 19,960.1
Sweden 29,771.3
Switzerland 13,331.6
United States 332,521.2
Multilateral 2,479,590.2
Central American Bank for 
Economic Integration 543,254.0
European Union 145,675.4
World Bank 329,295.3
Inter-American Development 
Bank 990,516.0
Organisation of American 
States 11,257.0
UN Development Programme 328,860.0
Other UN agencies 130,732.50
TOTAL 3,214,930.3
The CG is seen as a strong example of ‘peace conditionality’ -  ‘the use of formal
performance criteria and informal policy dialogue to encourage the implementation of
peace accords and the consolidation o f peace’ (Boyce, 2002: 1 025-6) -  particularly
vis-à-vis taxation. Donors formally and explicitly stated the conditions of their
assistance at the outset of the post-conflict reconstruction period, based primarily on
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the increase in fiscal revenues from 8 to 12 percent by 2000 (Salvesen, 2002: 29). The 
conventional reading of this conditionality is that the aid pledged at the January 1997 
CG meeting was to be a temporary measure to assist the peace process, which in 
principle would ultimately become domestically sustained through greater taxes and 
spending on social programmes (Jonas, 2000: 170). However, peace conditionality vis- 
à-vis Guatemala has not been contingent on a progressive understanding of taxes and, 
as noted above, one of the most tangible areas of increases taxes is in the regressive 
VAT.
The PAN did not successfully move beyond the fragility of caesarism to build a 
hegemonic project around the construction of neoliberalism as implied by the accords. 
The pattern of implementation nonetheless reflects a hierarchy of neoliberal interests. 
In addition to securing the guerrilla, implementation has emphasised taxation and the 
surveillance of banking and public finance. These concerns reflect the logic of 
disciplinary neoliberalism as Stephen Gill describes it: the use of surveillance to affect 
conformity in fiscal policy under the IFIs and other elements of the G7 nexus and the 
(re)construction of taxation to extend it more broadly and regressively, privileging 
capital and increasing the burden on the lower classes (Gill, 1995). The former 
expresses the need for elites to reproduce the neoliberal transnational bloc while the 
latter institutionalises unequal economic hierarchies under the guise of an ‘activist tax 
state’ that nevertheless relies upon increasingly regressive taxes (Gill, 2003: 135-7). 
The importance placed on fiscal restructuring is reflected in peace conditionality. 
While the conceptual redefinition of the state vis-à-vis militarism and multiculturalism 
in the constitutional reforms is left to the uncertain fate of the electoral process, the 
fiscal reconstruction of the state vis-à-vis taxation and the creation of surveillance for
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the protection of international capital becomes an area of international pressure and 
peace conditionality.
The ethico-political rationale for taxation appeals to the necessity of funding for the 
implementation of social services agreed to in the accords and indeed the sense that 
such an approach could in the process redistribute wealth and power in Guatemala 
(Jonas, 2000: 169-70). However, as taxation is discussed in the Pacto Fiscal and as the 
basis for peace conditionality on one hand, the Integral System for Financial 
Administration for the ‘evaluation and control of public spending’ is established on the 
other, ensuring state spending within the boundaries of the values implied by 
neoliberal restructuring, i.e., the insulation of economic oversight from democratic 
decision-making (Gill, 2003: 132). The emergence of a problematic around the need to 
increase taxation to create sustainability in the domestic funding of the peace accords 
obscures the strategic nature of the selective implementation of taxation and financial 
surveillance mechanisms.
Furthermore, partial implementation has reconfigured popular movements towards 
pressing for implementation above critical analysis of the nature of the accords 
themselves, reiterating the ‘end of the revolutionary option’. The accords have become 
seen by many as the best option demilitarisation and multiculturalism, establishing 
neoliberalism as the horizon of ‘common sense’ progressive politics. Thus to the 
extent that the implementation of the accords now defines the parameters of social 
struggle, neoliberalism’s ethico-political project gains credibility. For example, in an 
analysis of the December 2003 run-off elections in Guatemala, left commentator 
Simon Helweg-Larson argues in terms of the ‘progressive development’ of 
implementing the peace accords (Helweg-Larson, 2003).
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Implications of a Gramsclan analysis of the international 
politics of post-confllct reconstruction In Guatemala
Gramscian analysis is particularly suited to analyse critically peace processes because 
of its emphasis on the operation of power within ‘consensual’ arrangements, which are 
above all the premise of such negotiations. Related to that, the Gramscian emphasis on 
the technologies of power for co-opting openings for social change is particularly 
suited to analysing the apparent populist assertion of right-wing politics in such 
circumstances: in his own analysis, the rise of fascism in Italy, and in the case of 
Guatemala, the failure of the peace process to maintain popular support through 
implementation. In the case of peace processes, as Guatemala illustrates, the failure of 
such caesarist solutions to establish hegemony in the short term may not threaten the 
elite project it implies, and indeed my endow such solutions with greater ethico- 
political purchase, improving the longer term prospects for such programmes. Of 
course this outcome relies on the ethico-political purchase of the notion of peace itself, 
which is established in the post-Cold War era through the ‘end of the revolutionary 
option’.
The case of Guatemala underscores that understanding peace processes through a 
Gramscian lens that implies an understanding of world order, for which the analysis 
must examine not just neoliberalism, but post-Cold War neoliberalism. This reflects 
the particularities of the position of developing countries in world order, a condition 
that Robinson is right to suggest remains undertheorised by Gramscian IPE. For 
although the global transition to neoliberalism equally influences the ensemble of 
social relations in Guatemala in the ascent of non-traditional sectors of the economy 
and the rise o f  modemising elites associated with C ACIF v is-à-vis more traditional
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economic elites, this does not lead immediately towards a neoliberal peace process. 
Cold War politics associated with Ronald Reagan -  with Margaret Thatcher the most 
vivid architect of radical neoliberal deregulation -  amplified the logic of 
counterinsurgency before it became subject to such resolution. The logic of the ‘end to 
the revolutionary option’ could only occur after the end of the Cold War. However, it 
is also true that though there is a universalising impulse to neoliberal intellectual and 
moral leadership as established through multilateral organisations, as a world order it 
does not require that all states operate with the same guarantees for capital, it merely 
disciplines through access to finance those that do not. The move from 
counterinsurgency reflects the drive by Guatemalan elites to compete within the 
neoliberal world economy as much as the imposition of a peace process by the 
international community.
Peace processes can be effective technologies for neoliberalism in several ways. As 
noted above, negotiations engage in the practice of cultivating consent, but as 
discussed in Chapter 3, under third party mediation may extract ‘consent’ from 
different parties to keep the momentum of the discussions going with the promise of 
future participation. Furthermore, peace processes that address the social bases of 
conflict represent the opportunity to restructure the state: this may be a desirable goal 
depending on the nature of the ensemble of social relations, but the appeal to such a 
necessity gives powerful interests greater scope to (re)construct the social structures of 
the ensemble of relations. Finally, the ethical purchase of peace and the existential 
threat of a return to violence together operate to justify certain kinds of changes 
towards a neoliberal order: for example, it encourages the devolution of social control 
from the military to the police. Similarly, it supports the ‘pragmatic’ adjustment of the 
national economy to the global economy to facilitate the urgent need for post-conflict
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reconstruction, subordinating national policies to the logic of international 
organisations through p eace conditionality. These policies are underwritten with the 
appeal to peace as a normative good in the era where the revolutionary option is 
understood to be obsolete.
Nonetheless, the implications a critical Gramscian analysis of peace processes have for 
the study of world order involve, among other things, appreciating the ethico-political 
purchase neoliberalism has in certain settings. This moves beyond an appreciation of 
the political subjective dimension of neoliberalism, which is so often missed, but 
appreciating that the impulse to devolve social control to the individual and the 
universalise competition in settings of very unequal privilege appear as genuinely 
progressive options, much as the move to capitalism was embraced in the reform era in 
Guatemala. Though aware of the novel features of the ethico-political rationales 
animating this world order, Gramscian analysis remains critical about nature of such 
discipline, in particular the ‘totalising’ effects it could imply for such a politics.
To that end, a Gramscian analysis of post-Cold War peace processes can illuminate the 
‘common sense’ understandings within the ‘international community’ of industrialised 
states and multilateral institutions about post-conflict reconstruction plans. The case of 
Guatemala, now taken to be an archetypal case in such efforts, likewise underscores to 
Gramscian IPE the necessity of an analysis that better incorporates raisons d ’etat in 
the periphery, and the fmitfulness of more rigorous engagement between IPE and 
related fields that have also engaged in Gramscian analyses.
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Appendix 1 : Political Chronology of Guatemala^
1821 Guatemala declares independence from Spain.
1822 Central America annexes itself to Mexican Empire.
1823 Central America declares independence from Mexico and forms United
Provinces of Central America.
1824 Central American states ratify republican constitutions.
1826 Central American governments sign Treaty of Friendship and Commerce
with United States.
1826-29 Bloody civil war in Guatemala between Liberals and Conservatives.
1829 Liberals emerge victorious in Guatemala.
1831-38 Liberal Mariano Galvez launches bold liberal and anticlerical policies.
1837-40 Cholera epidemic in Central America.
1839 Conservative Rafael Carrera comes to power in War of the Montana.
1839-42 Liberal program dismantled.
1847 Guatemala declared a Republic.
1848 Carrera resigns in face of popular uprising.
1849 Carrera returns to power as armed forces chief. Mariano Paredes is 
officially President until 1851.
1854-65 Carrera serves as Perpetual President of Guatemala.
1865 Carrera Dies.
1871 Conservative leader General Vicente Cema overthrown by Liberal revolt.
1873 Liberal Justo Rufino Barrios becomes dictator of Guatemala.
1885 Barrios killed in El Salvador.
1898 President José M. Reyna assassinated.
1898-1920 Manuel Estrada Carbrera seizes power and establishes dictatorship.
1899 United Fruit Company formed.
1921 Guatemalan “Unionist” government overthrown by military.
1931 -44 Dictatorship of Jorge Ubico.
1944 Ubico resigns in face of protests.
1945 New Constitution ratified.
1945-50 Juan José Arévalo leads reformist administration.
1949 Francisco J. Arana assassinated, and revolt of Guardia de Honor follows.
1950-54 Jacobo Arbenz elected President of Guatemala.
1952 Agrarian reform law goes into effect. Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT)
formed.
1954 Carlos Castillo Armas overthrows Arbenz with aid of US.
1957 Castillo Armas assassinated.
1958 Common market plan developed and treaty signed.
1958-63 Conservative Migeul Ydlgoras Fuentes elected President.
1960 Leftist revolt suppressed. Survivors form MR-13 guerilla movement.
1963 Military, led by Minister of Defense Enrique Peralta Azudia, ousts
Ydlgoras and pursues hard-line against leftists.
1975 Guerilla Army of the Poor (EGP) launches guerilla activity in northern
Quiché Department.
* Sources: Ralph Lee Woodward Jr., Central America: A Nation Divided, 3rd ed. (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1999). Jeremy Armon, Rachel Sieder, and Richard 
Wilson, eds.. Negotiating Rights: The Guatemalan Peace Process, 2 ed. (London: 
Conciliation Resources, 1997).
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1977 Guatemala rejects US military aid when Jimmy Carter links it to greater 
human rights observance.
1978 General Fernando Romeo Lucas Garcia becomes President in fraudulent 
election. Escalates repressive policies. Rejuvenated Rebel Armed Forces 
(FAR) renew guerilla activities.
1981 US resumes arms sales to Guatemala.
1982 Guatemalan Military coup in March ousts General Lucas and installs a 
junta headed by General Bfrain Rios Montt. Rios Montt assumes 
Presidency on June 9. Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) 
formed as umbrella group for rebel groups.
1983 Military coup in August ousts Rios Montt and installs Defense Minister 
Oscar Humberto Mejias Victores.
1985 Military agrees to elections.
1986 Civilian rule re-established with inauguration of Vinicio Cerezo. Oscar
Arias elected President of Costa Rica.
1987 Esquipulas II Peace Agreement signed.
1988 URNG meets with National Reconciliation Commission established by
Esquipulas II.
1990 Msgr. Rodolfo Quezada Toruno becomes official ‘conciliator’ of emerging 
Guatemala peace process, UN Secretary General invited to observe. URNG 
meets with other sectors of society.
1991 Jorge Serrano Elias elected President. Mexico Accord signed.
1993 Serrano attempts ^auto-golpe \ Instancia Nacional de Consenso (National 
Consensus Body, INC) resolves crisis, installs Human Rights Ombudsman 
Ramiro de Leon Carpio as President.
1994 Civil Society Assembly (ASC) formed. Five peace accords signed.
1995 Indigenous Rights Accord signed. Alvaro Arzii of the PAN party wins 
December elections by a two percent margin.
1996 Eight peace agreements signed, including the final peace accord, ‘The 
Agreement on a Firm and Lasting Peace’, on 29 December.
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Appendix 2; Maps of Guatemala'
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Appendix 3: Text of the Socio-Economic Accord
Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation
THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA: PROCEDURES FOR THE 
ESTABLISHMENT OF A FIRM AND LASTING PEACE AND PROGRESS IN 
FASHIONING A REGION OF PEACE, FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY AND 
DEVELOPMENT
Letter dated 24 May 1996 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of 
the General Assembly
I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the Agreement on Social and 
Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation, concluded on 6 May 1996 between the 
Presidential Peace Commission of the Government of Guatemala and the General 
Command of the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG) (see annex). 
The signing ceremony took place at the Mexican Foreign Ministry in the presence of 
Mr. Angel Gurria, Foreign Minister, and, amongst others, senior officials of the 
countries that are members of the Group of Friends of the Guatemalan Peace Process 
(Colombia, Mexico, Norway, Spain, the United States of America and Venezuela), 
representatives of the Assembly of Civil Society and other Guatemalan personalities.
This Agreement, which is the finit of intensive negotiations initiated a year ago, 
contains a comprehensive package of commitments on several issues critical to the 
building of a lasting peace and sustainable development in Guatemala. Based on a 
shared perception that conflict resolution is inseparable from significant change in 
social and economic policy, the parties have agreed on a broad array of measures to 
permit wider participation in decision-making at all levels; to increase and redirect 
government spending towards social development; to promote a more efficient and 
equitable agrarian structure; to modernize public administration; and to produce a 
sustained increase in public revenue. At the heart of the strategies outlined in the 
agreement is the concept, consistent with the thinking of the United Nations, that 
enhanced social participation in all aspects of development is key to both improved 
social justice and sustainable economic growth. The Agreement reflects an agenda of 
social and economic change widely supported in Guatemala. On 22 May 1996, the text 
of the Agreement was submitted to the Assembly of Civil Society for its endorsement.
With the signing of the Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian 
Situation, the peace process in Guatemala is gathering new momentum. The cessation 
of offensive military action declared by both parties in March has held. The suspension 
by the URNG of its practice of levying "war tax", with effect from 6 May, will 
broaden support.for the peace process within Guatemala. Advances in the negotiations 
will, in turn, facilitate the difficult struggle against impunity to which the Government 
of President Arzu is committed. Better prospects for an early peace will also enhance 
the impact and effectiveness of the verifying and institution-building activities of the 
United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and of Compliance with 
the Commitments of the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala 
(MINUGUA). In a public statement dated 6 May 1996,1 congratulated the parties on 
their achievements and encouraged them to build upon those positive developments as 
they considered the next item on the negotiating agenda, namely, "Strengthening
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civilian p ower and the role o f  the army in a democratic society". This process will 
begin on 7 and 8 June 1996 in Mexico City.
The Agreement will enter into force with the signing of the Agreement on a Firm and 
Lasting Peace, which is to be the culmination of negotiations held under United 
Nations auspices since January 1994. At the request of the parties, and subject to 
authorization by the appropriate United Nations organ, MINUGUA will then expand 
its activities to cover verification of all agreements reached. While the latter's 
comprehensiveness will make verification a particularly complex task, experience has 
shown that the presence of the Verification Mission is a key factor in the broad process 
ofbuildingpeace and consolidating democracy in G uatemala. In duetime I intend, 
therefore, to recommend that the mandate of MINUGUA be extended, as requested by 
the parties, and that the Mission be provided with the sound financial basis it needs to 
continue to make its critical contribution to the peace process.
Support by the United Nations system for implementation of the peace accords will be 
another key contribution to the consolidation of peace and democracy in Guatemala. 
The comprehensiveness of the accords, combined with the limited availability of 
external assistance and the expectations of Guatemalan people that peace will soon 
produce tangible benefits, will call for the redoubling of our efforts, in close 
collaboration with the Government of Guatemala, to coordinate the United Nations 
system's response to the demand for verification, good offices and technical assistance 
to help implement the accords. To ensure an integrated approach, I have called a 
meeting of relevant United Nations specialized agencies, bodies and programmes, 
under the chairmanship of the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, to discuss 
how the United Nations system can best work together in this endeavour.
I would be grateful if you would bring the contents of the present letter to the attention 
of the members of the General Assembly.
(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI
ANNEX
Agreement on Social and Economic Aspects and Agrarian Situation 
concluded on 6 May 1996 between the Presidential Peace Commission 
of the Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria 
Nacional Guatemalteca 
Whereas:
A firm and lasting peace must be consolidated on the basis of social and economic 
development directed towards the common good, meeting the needs of the whole 
population.
This is necessary in order to overcome the poverty, extreme poverty, discrimination 
and social and political marginalization which have impeded and distorted the 
country's social, economic, cultural and political development and have represented a 
source of conflict and instability.
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Socio-economic development requires social justice, as one of the building blocks of 
unity and national solidarity, together with sustainable economic growth as a condition 
for meeting the people's social needs.
Rural areas require an integral strategy that facilitates access by small farmers to land 
and other production resources, offers juridical security and promotes conflict 
resolution.
It is essential, both for the realization of the production potential of Guatemalan 
society and for the achievement of greater social justice, that all sectors of society 
participate effectively in finding a way to meet their needs, particularly in setting 
public policies that concern them.
The State should pursue democratization in order to expand those possibilities for 
participation and strengthen its role as a leader of national development, as a legislator, 
as a source of public investment and a provider of services and as a promoter of 
consensus-building and conflict resolution.
This Agreement seeks to create or strengthen mechanisms and conditions to guarantee 
the effective participation of the people and contains the priority objectives for 
Government action to lay the foundations of this participatory development.
The implementation of this Agreement should enable all the country's social and 
political forces to face together, in a cooperative and responsible way, the immediate 
tasks of combating poverty, discrimination and privilege, thus building a united, 
prosperous and just Guatemala that will afford a dignified way of life to its people as a 
whole.
The Government of Guatemala and the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca 
(hereinafter referred to as "the Parties") have agreed as follows:
I. DEMOCRATIZATION AND PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT
A. Participation and consensus-building
1. In order to pursue a true, fimctional and participatory democracy, the process of 
social and economic development should be democratic and participatory and include:
(a) consensus-building and dialogue among agents of socio-economic development;
(b) consensus-building between these agents and State bodies in the formulation and 
implementation of development strategies; and (c) effective citizen participation in 
identifying, prioritizing and meeting their needs.
2. Expanded social participation is a bulwark against corruption, privilege, distortions 
of development and the abuse of economic and political power to the detriment of 
society. Therefore, it is an instrument for the eradication of economic, social and 
political polarization in society.
3. In addition to representing a factor in democratization, citizen participation in 
economic and social development is essential in order to promote productivity and 
economic growth, achieve a more equitable distribution of wealth and train human 
resources. It ensures transparency in public policies and their orientation towards the
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common good rather than special interests, the effective protection of the interests of 
the most vulnerable groups, efficiency in providing services and, consequently, the 
integral development of the individual.
4. In this spirit, and in line with the agreements already concluded on the resettlement 
of the population groups uprooted by the armed conflict and on identity and rights of 
indigenous peoples, the Parties agree on the importance of establishing or 
strengthening mechanisms allowing the citizens and different social groups to exercise 
their rights effectively and participate fully in decision-making on the various matters 
affecting or involving them, with full awareness of both their individual and collective 
obligations to society, which they will fulfil responsibly.
5. Strengthening social participation means that greater opportunities in social and 
economic decision-making should be offered to organized groups. This assumes that 
all kinds of grass-roots organizations representing different interests will be recognized 
and encouraged. It requires, in particular, the guarantee of full and effective rights for 
rural and urban workers and small farmers to participate, as organized entities, in the 
process of building consensus with the business sector or at the national level. For this 
purpose, flexible laws and administrative regulations must be passed to grant legal 
personality or other forms of legal recognition to those organizations requesting it.
6. This also assumes a major effort to promote a culture of consensus and capacity- 
building in business, labour and other types of organizations in order to increase their 
ability to plan and negotiate and effectively to assume the rights and duties inherent in 
democratic participation.
Consensus-building
7. Building consensus at the national, departmental and communal levels and among 
rural and urban units of production is essential in order to stimulate and stabilize 
economic and social growth. State structures must be adapted to fulfil this role of 
building consensus and reconciling interests, in order to be able to work effectively 
and efficiently to modernize the production sector, enhance competitiveness, promote 
economic growth and provide basic social services efficiently and universally.
Participation at the local level
8. Bearing in mind that the people who live in a department or municipality, whether 
business owners, workers, members of cooperatives or community representatives, are 
the ones who can best define the measures that benefit or affect them, a package of 
instruments must be adopted for institutionalizing the decentralization of social and 
economic decision-making, involving a real transfer of government funds and of the 
authority to discuss and decide locally on the allocation of resources, how projects will 
be executed and the priorities and characteristics of government programmes or 
activities. In this way, government bodies will be able to base their actions on 
proposals arising fi-om the reconciliation of interests among the various segments of 
society.
9. Through this Agreement, the Government commits itself to take a series of steps 
designed to increase the people's participation in the various aspects of public life, 
including social and rural development policies. This series o f reforms must enable
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structures that generate social conflict to be replaced by new relationships that ensure 
the consolidation of peace, as an expression of harmonious life together, and the 
strengthening of democracy, as a dynamic and perfectible process from which 
advances can be achieved through the participation of various segments of society in 
shaping the country's political, social and economic choices.
10. In order to reinforce the people's ability to participate and, at the same time, the 
State's management capacity, the Government agrees to:
Communities
(a) Promote a reform of the Municipal Code so that deputy mayors are appointed by 
the municipal mayor, taking into account the recommendations of local residents in an 
open town council meeting;
Municipalities
(b) Foster social participation in the context of municipal autonomy, pursuing the 
process of decentralization to give more authority to municipal governments, and 
consequently, strengthening their technical, administrative and financial resources;
(c) Establish and implement as soon as possible, in cooperation with the National 
Association of Municipalities, a municipal training programme that will serve as a 
framework for national efforts and international cooperation in this field. The 
programme will stress the training of municipal staff who will specialize in executing 
the new duties that will be the responsibility of the municipality as a result of 
decentralization, with an emphasis on land use planning, a land register, urban 
planning, financial management, project management and training of local 
organizations so that they can participate effectively in meeting their own needs;
Departments
(d) Promote in the Congress a reform of the Act concerning the governance of the 
departments of the Republic, to the effect that the governor of the department would be 
appointed by the President of the Republic, taking into consideration the candidates 
nominated by the non-governmental representatives of the departmental development 
councils;
Regions
(e) Regionalize health care, education and cultural services for indigenous people and 
ensure the full participation of indigenous organizations in the design and 
implementation of this process;
System of urban and rural development councils
(f) Take the following steps, bearing in mind the fundamental role of urban and rural 
development councils in ensuring, promoting and guaranteeing the people's 
participation in the identification of local priorities, the definition of public projects 
and programmes and the integration of national pohcy into urban and rural 
development:
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(i) Re-establish local development councils;
(ii) Promote a reform of the Urban and Rural Development Councils Act to broaden 
the range of sectors participating in departmental and regional development councils;
(iii) Provide adequate funding for the council system.
B. Participation of women in economic and social development
11. The active participation of women is essential for Guatemala's economic and social 
development, and the State has a duty to promote the elimination of all forms of 
discrimination against women.
12. Recognizing women's undervalued contributions in all spheres o f  economic and 
social activity, and particularly their efforts towards community improvement, the 
Parties agree that there is a need to strengthen women's participation in economic and 
social development on equal terms.
13. To this end, the Government undertakes to take the specific economic and social 
situation of women into account in its development strategies, plans and programmes, 
and to train civil servants in analysis and planning based on this approach. This 
undertaking includes the following:
(a) Recognizing the equal rights of women and men in the home, in the workplace, in 
the production sector and in social and political life, and ensuring that women have the 
same opportunities as men, particularly with regard to access to credit, land ownership 
and other productive and technological resources;
Education and training
(b) Ensuring that women have equal opportunities for education and training in the 
same conditions as men, and that any form of discrimination against women that may 
be found in school curricula is eliminated;
Housing
(c) Ensuring that women have equal access to housing of their own by eliminating the 
obstacles and impediments that affect women in relation to rental property, credit and 
construction;
Health
(d) Implementing nationwide comprehensive health programmes for women, which 
involves giving women access to appropriate information, prevention and health care 
services;
Labour
(e) Guaranteeing women's right to work, which requires:
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(i) Using various means to encourage vocational training for women;
(ii) Revising labour legislation to guarantee equality of rights and opportunities 
between men and women;
(iii) In rural areas, recognizing women as agricultural workers to ensure that their work 
is valued and remunerated;
(iv) Enacting laws to protect the rights of women who work as household employees, 
especially in relation to fair wages, working hours, social security and respect for their 
dignity;
Organization and participation
(f) Guaranteeing women's right to organize and their participation, on the same terms 
as men, at the senior decision-making levels of local, regional and national institutions;
(g) Promoting women's participation in public administration, especially in the 
formulation, execution and supervision of government plans and policies;
Legislation
(h) Revising national legislation and regulations to eliminate all forms of 
discrimination against women in terms of economic, social, cultural and political 
participation, and to give effect to the government commitments deriving from the 
ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women.
II. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT
14. The State is responsible for promoting, guiding and regulating the country's socio­
economic development so as to ensure economic efficiency, increased social services 
and social justice in an integrated manner and through the efforts of society as a whole. 
In the quest for growth, economic policy should be aimed at preventing processes of 
socio-economic exclusion, such as unemployment and impoverishment, and 
maximizing the benefits of economic growth for all Guatemalans. In seeking to ensure 
the well-being of all Guatemalans, social policy should foster economic development 
through its impact on production and efficiency.
15. Guatemala requires speedy economic growth in order to create jobs and enhance 
social development. The country's social development, in turn, is essential for its 
economic growth and for better integration into the world economy. In this regard, 
better living standards, health, education and training are the pillars of sustainable 
development in Guatemala.
State responsibilities
16. The State has inescapable obligations in the task of correcting social inequities and 
deficiencies, both by steering the course of development and by making public 
investments and providing universal social services. Likewise, the State has the 
specific obligations, imposed by constitutional mandate, of ensuring the effective
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enjoyment, without discrimination of any kind, of the right to work, health, education 
and housing, as well as other social rights. The historical social imbalances 
experienced in Guatemala must be corrected, and peace must be consolidated, through 
decisive policies which are implemented by both the State and society as a whole.
Productive investments
17. The country's socio-economic development cannot depend exclusively on public 
finances or on international cooperation. Rather, it requires an increase in productive 
investments that create adequately paid jobs. The Parties urge national and foreign 
entrepreneurs to invest in the country, considering that the signing and implementation 
of an agreement on a firm and lasting peace are essential components of the stability 
and transparency required for investment and economic expansion.
Gross domestic product
18. For its part, the Government undertakes to adopt economic policies designed to 
achieve steady growth in the gross domestic product of not less than 6 per cent per 
annum, which would enable it to implement a progressive social policy. At the same 
time, it undertakes to implement a social policy aimed at ensuring the well-being of all 
Guatemalans, with emphasis on health, nutrition, education and training, housing, 
environmental sanitation and access to productive employment and to decent pay.
The State's leadership role
19. To meet this objective and to enable the State to play its leadership role in social 
policy, the Government undertakes to:
(a) Apply and develop the regulatory firamework to guarantee the exercise of social 
rights and provide social services through public entities and, where necessary, through 
semi-public or private entities, and supervise the adequate provision of such services;
(b) Promote and ensure the participation, in accordance with the regulatory fi*amework, 
of all social and economic sectors that can cooperate in social development, 
particularly in providing full access to basic services;
(c) Ensure that the public sector provides services efficiently, considering that the State 
has a duty to give the population access to quality services.
20. In response to the population's urgent demands, the Government undertakes to:
(a) Increase social investment significantly, especially in the areas of health, education 
and employment;
(b) Restructure the budget so as to increase social expenditure;
(c) Give priority to the neediest sectors of society and the most disadvantaged areas of 
the country, without short-changing other sectors of society;
(d) Improve the administration of government resources and investments by 
decentralizing them and making them 1 ess concentrated and bureaucratic, reforming
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budget performance mechanisms by giving them autonomy in decision-making and 
financial management to guarantee their efficiency and transparency, and 
strengthening supervisory and auditing mechanisms.
A. Education and training
21. Education and training have a fimdamental role in the country’s economic, cultural, 
social and political development. They are central to the strategy of equity and national 
unity, and vital for economic modernization and international competitiveness. Reform 
of the educational system and of its administration is therefore necessary, as is the 
implementation of coherent and forceful State policies in the field of education, in 
order to achieve the following objectives:
(a) To affirm and disseminate the moral and cultural values and the concepts and 
behaviour patterns which are the foundations of democratic coexistence, including 
respect for human rights, for the cultural diversity of Guatemala, for the productive 
work of its people and the protection of the environment and for the values and 
mechanisms of power-sharing and social and political consensus-building which 
constitute the basis of a culture of peace;
(b) To avoid the perpetuation of poverty and of social, ethnic, sexual and geographical 
forms of discrimination, particularly those which arise from the divide between urban 
and rural society;
(c) To contribute to the application of technical and scientific progress and, 
consequently, to the achievement of higher productivity, the creation of more jobs and 
increased income for the population, and beneficial integration into the world 
economy.
22. In response to the country's needs in the field of education, the Government 
undertakes to:
Spending on education
(a) Implement significant increases in the resources allocated to education. By the year 
2000, the Government proposes to step up public spending on education as a 
proportion of gross domestic product by at least 50 per cent over its 1995 level. These 
targets will be revised upwards in the light of future developments in State finances;
Adjustment of educational curricula
(b) Adjust educational curricula in accordance with the objectives set out in paragraph
21. These adjustments will take into account the conclusions of the Education Reform 
Commission established by the Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples;
Coverage
(c) Expand, as a matter of urgency, the coverage of education services at all levels, and 
in particular the provision of bilingual education in rural communities, by means of:
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(i) The integration of children of school age into the educational system, ensuring that 
they complete the pre-primary and primary levels and the first level of secondary 
school; in particular, by the year 2000, the Government undertakes to provide access, 
for all those between ages 7 and 12, to at least three years of schooling;
(ii) Literacy programmes in as many languages as is technically feasible, with the 
participation of suitably qualified indigenous organizations; the Government 
undertakes to raise the literacy rate to 70 per cent by the year 2000; and
(iii) Education, training and technical courses for adults;
Occupational training
(d) Develop, with appropriate and efficient methodology, training programmes in 
communities and enterprises for the retraining and technical updating of workers, with 
emphasis on the inhabitants of isolated areas and rural communities, with support from 
those sectors which are able to collaborate in this undertaking;
Training for participation
(e) Provide training to enable social organizations at the municipal, regional and 
national levels to take part in socio-economic development, including the fields of 
public administration, fiscal responsibility and consensus-building;
Civic education programme
(f) Design and implement a national civic education programme for democracy and 
peace, promoting the protection of human rights, the renewal of political culture and 
the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The mass media will be invited to participate in 
this programme;
Community-school interaction and community participation
(g) In order to encourage the enrolment of children in the educational system and to 
lower the school drop-out rate, the Government undertakes to encourage effective 
community and parental participation in the various aspects of the education and 
training services (curricula, appointment of teachers, school calendar, etc.);
Financial support
(h) Develop scholarship and student grant programmes, economic support and other 
incentives, to enable needy students to continue their education;
Training of school administrators
(i) Develop continuing education programmes for teachers and school administrators; 
Advisory commission
(j) For the purpose of designing and implementing the educational reform to be carried 
out by the Ministry of Education, an advisory commission attached to the Ministry will
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be set up, consisting of participants in the educational process, including 
representatives of the Education Reform Commission set up pursuant to the Agreement 
on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples;
Higher education and research
(k) State-run higher education, the management, organization and development of 
which is the sole responsibility of the Guatemalan University of San Carlos, is a key 
factor in achieving economic growth, social equity, the dissemination of culture and a 
greater pool of technological know-how. The Government of the Republic undertakes 
to provide to the University of San Carlos, in a timely manner, the hmding which is its 
prerogative under a constitutional mandate. With all due respect to the autonomy of the 
University, the parties urge the authorities of that distinguished institution to give 
favourable consideration to all initiatives which increase its contribution to the 
country's development and help to consolidate peace. The Government undertakes to 
heed such contributions and initiatives and to respond appropriately. Particular 
importance is attached to the development of the University's regional centres and of 
its internship programmes, especially in the poorest sectors. The Parties also urge the 
business sector to devote increased efforts to applied technological research and to 
human resources development, forging c loser exchange links with the University of 
San Carlos;
Educational outreach workers
(1) Pursuant to the Agreement on Resettlement of the Population Groups Uprooted by 
the Armed Conflict and the Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 
community educational outreach workers shall be incorporated into the national 
education system, and due regard shall be given to suitable curricula for indigenous 
communities and uprooted population groups.
B. Health
23. The Parties agree on the need to promote a reform of the national health sector. 
This reform should be aimed at ensuring effective exercise of the fundamental right to 
health, without any discrimination whatsoever, and the effective performance by the 
State, which wouldbeprovided withthenecessary resources, o f  its obligation with 
regard to health and social welfare. Some of the main points of this reform are as 
follows:
Concept
(a) It would be based on an integrated concept of health (including prevention, 
promotion, recovery and rehabilitation) and on humanitarian and community-based 
practice emphasizing the spirit of service, and it would be applied at all levels of the 
country's public health sector;
National coordinated health system
(b) One of the responsibilities of the Ministry of Health is to formulate policies to 
provide the entire Guatemalan population with integrated health services. Under the 
coordination of the Ministry of Health, the health system would combine the work of
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public agencies (including the Guatemalan Social Security Institute) and private and 
non-governmental organizations involved in this sector to implement actions designed 
to enable the whole Guatemalan population to have access to integrated health 
services;
Low-income population
(c) The system would create the conditions for ensuring that the low-income 
population has effective access to quality health services. The Government undertakes 
to increase the resources it allocates to health. By the year 2000, the Government 
proposes to step up public spending on health as a proportion of gross domestic 
product by at least 50 per cent over its 1995 level. This target will be revised upwards 
in the light of future developments in State finances;
Priority care
(d) The system would give priority to efforts to fight malnutrition and to promote 
environmental sanitation, preventive health care and primary health care, especially 
maternal and child care. The Government undertakes to allocate at least 50 per cent of 
public health expenditure to preventive care and undertakes to cut the 1995 infant and 
maternal mortality rate in half by the year 2000. In addition, the Government 
undertakes to maintain the certification of eradication of poliomyelitis, and to eradicate 
measles by the year 2000;
Medicine, equipment and inputs
(e) The Ministry of Public Health and Social Welfare will revise current rules and 
practices with regard to the manufacture and marketing of drugs, equipment and inputs 
and vrill promote measures to ensure that these are in sufficient supply and that they 
are affordable and of high quality. In the case of popular basic or generic drugs, ways 
of purchasing them will be studied and applied in order to ensure transparency in their 
marketing, quality and pricing to ensure that services are provided efficiently;
Indigenous and traditional medicine
(f) The system would enhance the importance of indigenous and traditional medicine, 
promoting its study and renewing its concepts, methods and practices;
Social participation
(g) The system would encourage active participation of municipalities, communities 
and social organizations (including groups of women, indigenous people, trade unions 
and civic and humanitarian associations) in the planning, execution and monitoring of 
the administration of health services and programmes, through local health systems 
and urban and rural development councils;
Administrative decentralization and enhancement of local autonomy
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(h) The decentralized organization of the various levels of health care should ensure 
that health programmes and services are offered at the community, regional and 
national levels, which are the basis of the national coordinated health system.
C. Social security
24. Social security is a mechanism for expressing human solidarity and promoting the 
common good, laying the foundations for stability, economic development, national 
unity and peace. Under the Political Constitution of the Republic, the Guatemalan 
Social Security Institute, an autonomous body, administers the social security system. 
The Parties consider that appropriate measures should be taken to expand its coverage 
and increase its benefits and the quality and efficiency of its services. To that end, the 
following should be taken into account:
(a) The administration of the Guatemalan Social Security Institute should be 
completely autonomous, in accordance with the constitutional principle of 
coordination with health agencies under the national coordinated health system;
(b) Under the International Labour Organization convention ratified by Guatemala, 
social security should include programmes for medical care and benefits in the areas of 
sickness, maternity, disability, old age, survival, job-related accidents and illnesses, 
employment and family welfare;
(c) The application of the principles of efficiency, universality, unity and 
compulsoriness to the operation of the Guatemalan Social Security Institute should be 
reinforced and guaranteed;
(d) The financial soundness of the Institute should be strengthened through a system of 
tripartite control of contributions;
(e) New ways of managing the Institute with the participation of its constituent sectors 
should be promoted;
(f) The Institute should be effectively incorporated into the coordinated health system;
(g) Conditions should be created that will facilitate the universal coverage of all 
workers by the social security system.
D. Housing
25. It has been recognized that there is a need to institute a policy, in accordance with 
the constitutional mandate, to give priority to the building of low-cost housing, through 
appropriate financial arrangements, in order to enable as many Guatemalan families as 
possible to own their own homes. To this end, the Government undertakes to:
Planning
(a) Closely monitor land management policies, especially urban planning and 
environmental protection policies, to enable the poor to have access to housing and 
related services in hygienic and environmentally sustainable conditions;
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Standards
(b) U pdate h ealth and sa fety r egulations applicable t o t he c  onstruction i ndustry and 
monitor compliance with them; coordinate with municipalities to ensure that 
construction and supervision standards are homogeneous, clear and simple, in an effort 
to provide high-quality, safe housing;
Housing stock
(c)Promote a policy to increasethestockofhousingin Guatemala, i n a n  effortto 
enable more people from low-income sectors to rent or own their own homes;
(d) Increase the supply of housing-related services, housing options and high-quality, 
low-cost building materials; in this context, apply anti-trust regulations to the 
production and marketing of building materials and housing-related services in 
accordance with article 130 of the Constitution;
Finance and credit
(e) Implement monetary policies designed to reduce the cost of credit significantly;
(f) Strengthen the securities market and make it more available as a source of fimds to 
purchase housing, by offering first and second mortgages and facilitating the selling of 
securities issued for housing operations, such as common and preferred stocks in 
construction companies, mortgage bonds and debentures, real estate participation 
certificates, supplemental letters, promissory notes and other documents related to 
rental with an option to buy;
(g) Design a direct subsidy mechanism and apply it to the demand for low-cost 
housing, to benefit the most needy sectors. To this end, strengthen the Guatemalan 
Housing Fund to improve its capacity to grant fimds to assist those living in poverty 
and extreme poverty;
Participation
(h) Stimulate the establishment and strengthening of participatory arrangements, such 
as cooperatives and self-managed and family businesses, to ensure that the 
beneficiaries are able to participate in the planning and construction of housing and 
related services;
Regularization of the land situation
(i) Promote the legalization, access to and registry of land, not only in the vicinity of 
Guatemala City but also for urban development in the province capitals and 
municipalities, together with the implementation of building projects in villages and on 
farms, especially rural housing;
National commitment
(j) In view of the size and urgency of the housing problem, national efforts should be 
mobilized to solve it. The Government undertakes to allocate to the housing promotion
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policy no less than 1.5 per cent of the tax revenue budget, beginning in 1997, giving 
priority to the subsidy for low-cost housing options.
E. Work
26. Work is essential for the integral development of the individual, the well-being of 
the family and the social and economic development of Guatemala. Labour relations 
are an essential element of social participation in socio-economic development and of 
economic efficiency. In this respect, the State's policy with regard to work is critical 
for a strategy of growth with social justice. In order to carry out this policy, the 
Government undertakes to:
Economic policy
(a) Through an economic policy designed to increase the use of the labour force, create 
conditions for the attainment of rising and sustained levels of employment, while 
sharply reducing structural underemployment and making possible a progressive 
increase in real wages;
(b) Encourage measures in coordination with the various social sectors to increase 
investment and productivity within the fi-amework of an overall strategy of growth 
with social stability and equity;
Protective labour legislation
(c) Promote, in the course of 1996, legal and regulatory changes to enforce the labour 
laws and severely penalize violations, including violations in respect of the minimum 
wage, non-payment, withholding and delays in wages, occupational hygiene and safety 
and the work environment;
(d) Decentralize and expand labour inspection services, strengthening the capacity to 
monitor compliance with the labour norms of domestic law and those derived fi'om the 
international labour agreements ratified by Guatemala, paying particular attention to 
monitoring compliance with the labour rights of women, migrant and temporary 
agricultural workers,householdworkers,minors, theeIderly, thedisabledandother 
workers who are in a more vulnerable and unprotected situation;
Occupational training
(e) Establish a permanent, modem vocational instruction and training programme to 
ensure training at all levels and a corresponding increase in productivity through a 
draft law regulating vocational training at liie national level;
(f) Promote coverage by the national vocational instruction and training programmes 
of at least 200,000 workers by the year 2000, with an emphasis on those who are 
joining the workforce and those who need special training to adapt to new conditions 
in the labour market;
Ministry of Labour
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(g) Strengthen and modernize the Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare, ensuring its 
leading role in Government policies related to the labour sector and its effective 
deployment in the promotion of employment and in labour cooperation. To that end, it 
undertakes to:
Participation, coordination and negotiations
(i) Promote the restructuring of labour relations in enterprises by encouraging labour 
management cooperation and coordination with a view to the development of the 
enterprise for the common good, including possible profit-sharing arrangements;
(ii) Facilitate the procedures for the recognition of the legal personality of labour 
organizations;
(iii) In the case of agricultural workers who are still hired through contractors, propose 
reforms for the speedy and flexible legal recognition of forms of association for the 
negotiation of such hiring; and
(iv) Promote a culture of negotiation and, in particular, train persons to settle disputes 
and coordinate action for the benefit of the parties involved.
m. AGRARIAN SITUATION AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT
27. It is essential and unavoidable to solve the problems of agrarian reform and rural 
development in order to address the situation of the majority population, which live in 
rural areas and is most affected by poverty, extreme poverty, injustice and the 
weakness of State institutions. The transformation of the structure of land use and 
ownership must have as its objective the incorporation of the rural population into 
economic, social and political development so that the land constitutes, for those who 
work it, the basis of their economic stability, the foundation of their progressive social 
well-being and the guarantee of their freedom and dignity.
28. Land is central to the problems of rural development. From the conquest to the 
present, historic events, often tragic, have left deep traces in ethnic, social and 
economic relations concerning property and land use. These have led to a situation of 
concentration of resources which contrasts with the poverty of the majority and hinders 
the development of Guatemala as a whole. It is essential to redress and overcome this 
legacy and promote more efficient and more equitable farming, strengthening the 
potential o f  a 111 hose i nvolved, not only in t erms o fp  roductive c apacity but also in  
enhancing the cultures and value systems which coexist and intermingle in the rural 
areas of Guatemala.
29. These changes will enable Guatemala to take full advantage of the capacities of its 
inhabitants and, in particular, the richness of the traditions and cultures of its 
indigenous peoples. It should also take advantage of the high potential for agricultural, 
industrial, commercial and tourist development of those resources deriving from its 
wealth of natural resources.
30. Solving the agrarian problem is a complex process covering many aspects of rural 
life, from modernization of production and cultivation methods to environmental 
protection, as well as security of property, adequate use of the land and of the labour
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force, labour protection and a more equitable distribution of resources and the benefits 
of development. This is also a social process whose success depends not only on the 
State, but also on a combination of efforts on the part of the organized sectors of 
society, in the awareness that the common good requires breaking with the patterns 
and prejudices of the past and seeking new and democratic forms of coexistence.
31. The State has a fundamental and vital role in this process. As the guide for national 
development, as a legislator, as a source of public investment and provider of services 
and as a promoter of social cooperation and conflict resolution, it is essential for the 
State to increase and refocus its efforts and its resources towards the rural areas, and to 
promote agrarian modernization, in a sustained manner, in the direction of greater 
justice and greater efficiency.
32. The agreements already signed on human rights, on the resettlement of populations 
uprooted by armed confrontation and on the identity and rights of indigenous peoples 
contain commitments which constitute essential elements of a global strategy for rural 
development. It is in line with these provisions that the Government undertakes, 
through this Agreement, to promote an integral strategy covering the multiple elements 
which make up agrarian structure, including land ownership and the use of natural 
resources; credit systems and mechanisms; manufacturing and marketing; agrarian 
legislation and legal security; labour relations; technical assistance and training; the 
sustainability of natural resources and the organization of the rural population. This 
strategy includes the aspects described below.
A. Participation
33. The capacity of all actors involved in the agricultural sector must be mobilized to 
make proposals and to take action, including indigenous peoples' organizations, 
producers' associations, business associations, rural workers' trade unions, rural and 
women's organizations or universities and research centres in Guatemala. To that end, 
in addition to the provisions of other chapters of this Agreement, the Government 
undertakes to:
(a) Strengthen the capacity of rural organizations such as associative rural enterprises, 
cooperatives, small farmers' associations, mixed enterprises and self-managed and 
family businesses to participate fully in decisions on all matters concerning them and 
to establish or strengthen State institutions, especially those of the State agricultural 
sector, involved in rural development so that they can promote such participation, 
particularly the full participation of women in the decision-making process. That will 
strengthen the effectiveness of State action and ensure that it responds to the needs of 
rural areas. In particular, participation in development councils will be promoted as a 
fi-amework for the joint formulation of development and land use plans;
(b) Strengthen and expand the participation of tenant farmers' organizations, rural 
women, indigenous organizations, cooperatives, producers' trade unions and non­
governmental organizations in the National Agricultural Development Council as the 
main mechanism for consultation, coordination and social participation in the decision­
making process for rural development, and in particular for the implementation of this 
chapter.
B. Access to land and productive resources
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34. Promote the access of tenant farmers to land ownership and the sustainable use of 
land resources. To that end, the Government will take the following actions:
Access to land ownership: land trust fund
(a) Establish a land trust fund within a broad-based banking institution to provide 
credit and to promote savings, preferably among micro-, small and medium-sized 
enterprises. The land trust fund will have prime responsibility for the acquisition of 
land through Government funding, will promote the establishment of a transparent 
land market and will facilitate the updating of land development plans. The fund will 
give priority to the allocation of land to rural men and women who are organized for 
that purpose, taking into account economic and environmental sustainability 
requirements;
(b) In order to ensure that the neediest sectors benefit from its services, the fund will 
set up a special advisory and management unit to serve rural communities and 
organizations;
(c) Initially, the fund will limit its activities to the following types of land:
(i) Uncultivated State land and State-owned farms;
(ii) Illegally settled public land, especially in Petén and the Franja Transversal del 
Norte, which the Government has pledged to recover through legal action;
(iii) Land acquired with the resources allocated by the Government to the National 
Land Fund and the National Peace Fund for that purpose;
(iv) Land purchased with grants from friendly Governments and international non­
governmental organizations;
(v) Land purchased with loans secured from international financing agencies;
(vi) Undeveloped land expropriated under article 40 of the Constitution;
(vii) Land acquired from the proceeds of the sale of excess land, as determined by 
comparing the actual dimensions of private property with the dimensions recorded at 
the land register department, which has become the property of the State;
(viii) Land which the State may purchase pursuant to Decree No. 1551, article 40, on 
agricultural development areas;
(ix) Land which the State may purchase for any purpose; and
(x) Miscellaneous grants;
(d) The Government will promote and enact legislation to regulate all the activities of 
the land trust fund. Such legislation will establish, inter alia, the fund's aims, functions 
and financing and acquisition mechanisms, and the allocation, origin and destination of
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land. In 1999, the extent to which the allocation targets have been met will be assessed 
and, if need be, the functioning of the land allocation programme will be adjusted;
Access to land ownership: funding mechanisms
(e) Promote, through all means possible, the development of a dynamic land market 
that would enable tenant farmers who either do not have land or have insufficient land 
to acquire land through long-term transactions at commercial or favourable interest 
rates with little or no down payment. In particular, promote the issuance of mortgage- 
backed securities guaranteed by the State whose yield is attractive to private investors, 
especially financial institutions;
Access to the use of natural resources
(f) By 1999, allocate to small and medium-sized farmers' groups legally incorporated 
as natural resources management ventures, 100,000 hectares within multi-use areas for 
sustainable forest management, the management of protected areas, eco-tourism, 
conservation of water sources and other activities compatible with the sustainable 
potential use of the natural resources of such areas;
(g) Promote and support the participation of the private sector and grass-roots 
community organizations in projects for the management and conservation of 
renewable natural resources through incentives, targeted direct subsidies or funding 
mechanisms on soft terms, in view of the non-monetary benefits that the national 
community derives from such projects. Given the benefit that the international 
community receives from the sustainable management and conservation of the 
country's forest and biogenetic resources, the Government will actively promote 
international cooperation in this venture;
Access to other productive projects
(h) Develop sustainable productive projects especially geared towards boosting 
productivity and the processing of agricultural, forestry and fishery products in the 
poorest areas of the country. In particular, for the period 1997-2000, guarantee the 
implementation, in the poorest areas, of a Government agricultural sector investment 
programme in the amount of 200 million quetzales in the agriculture, forestry and 
fisheries sectors;
(i) Promote a renewable natural resources management programme which fosters 
sustainable forestry and agro-forestry production, as well as handicrafts and small- and 
medium-scale industry projects that give added value to forest products;
(j) Promote productive ventures related, inter alia, to agro-processing industries, 
marketing, services, handicrafts and tourism with a view to creating jobs and securing 
fair incomes for all;
(k) Promote an eco-tourism programme with the broad participation of communities 
which have received appropriate training.
C. Support structure
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35. Prerequisites for a more efficient and just agricultural structure include not only 
more equitable access to productive resources but also a support structure that will 
enhance farmers' access to information, technology, training, credit and marketing 
facilities. Over and above its commitment to social investment as set forth in the 
chapter on social development, including in particular investment in health, education, 
housing and employment, the Government also undertakes to:
Basic infrastructure
(a)Engageinjudicious publicinvestmentandfostera climateconducivetoprivate 
investment with a view to upgrading the infrastructure available for sustainable 
production and marketing, especially in areas of poverty and extreme poverty;
(b) Develop a rural development investment programme with emphasis on basic 
infrastructure (highways, rural roads, electricity, telecommunications, water and 
environmental sanitation) and productive projects, for a total amount of 300 million 
quetzales annually during the period 1997-1999;
Credit and financial services
(c) Activate the land fund not later than 1997, while simultaneously promoting 
conditions that will enable small and medium-scale farmers to have access to credit, 
individually or in groups, on a financially sustainable basis. In particular, with the 
support of the private sector and non-govemmental development organizations, the 
Government proposes to strengthen local savings and credit agencies, including 
associations, cooperatives and the like, with a view to enhancing their function as 
sources of credit providing small and medium-scale farmers with financial services 
efficiently and in accordance with local needs and conditions;
Training and technical assistance
(d) Strengthen, decentralize and broaden the coverage of training programmes, 
especially programmes designed to enhance rural people's managerial skills at various 
levels. The private sector and non-govemmental organizations will be enlisted in the 
implementation of this action;
(e) Develop technical assistance and job training programmes that will upgrade the 
skills, versatility and productivity of the labour force in mral areas;
Information
(f) Develop an information collection, compilation and distribution system for the 
agriculture, forestry, food processing and fisheries sectors, one that will provide small 
producers with reliable information on which to base their decisions relating to seeds, 
inputs, crops, costs and marketing;
Marketing
(g) Develop a system of storage centres and duty-free zones with a view to facilitating 
the processing and marketing of agricultural products and fostering mral employment.
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D. Organization of the rural population for production
36. Organizing the rural population is a decisive factor in transforming the inhabitants 
of the countryside into genuine protagonists of their own development. In view of the 
vital role of small and medium-scale enterprises in combating poverty, creating rural 
jobs and promoting more efficient land use, there is a need to promote a more efficient 
form of organization of small producers so that they can, in particular, take advantage 
of the support structure described in paragraph 35. To this end, the Government 
undertakes to:
(a) Support micro-, small and medium-scale agricultural and rural enterprises by 
strengthening the various ways of organizing them, such as associative rural 
enterprises, cooperatives, small farmers' associations, mixed enterprises and self­
managed and family businesses;
(b) Tackle the problem of smallholdings through:
(i) A firm and sustained policy of support for smallholders so that they can become 
small-scale agricultural businessmen through access to training, technology, credit and 
other inputs;
(ii) Promoting, if the smallholders so desire, amalgamation of holdings in those cases 
where conversion into small businesses is not possible owing to the dispersal and size 
of the properties.
E. Legal framework and juridical security
37. Guatemala is in need of reform of the juridical framework of agriculture and 
institutional development in the rural sector so that an end can be put to the lack of 
protection and dispossession from which small farmers, and in particular indigenous 
peoples, have suffered, so as to permit full integration of the rural population into the 
national economy and regulate land use in an efficient and environmentally sustainable 
manner in accordance with development needs. To this end, and taking into account in 
all cases the provisions of the Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, the Government undertakes to:
Legal reform
(a) Promote a legal reform which will establish a juridical framework governing land 
ownership that is secure, simple and accessible to the entire population. This reform 
will need to simplify the procedures for awarding title and registering ownership and 
other real estate rights, as well as to simplify administrative and judicial formalities 
and procedures;
(b) Promote the establishment of an agrarian and environmental jurisdiction within the 
judiciary through the enactment of the relevant legislation by the Congress;
(c) Promote the revision and adjustment of the legislation on undeveloped land so that 
it conforms to the provisions of the Constitution, and regulate, inter alia through 
incentives and penalties, the underutilization of land and its use in ways incompatible 
with sustainable natural resource utilization and preservation of the environment;
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(d) Protect common and municipal land, in particular by limiting to the strict minimum 
the cases in which it can be transferred or handed over in whatever form to private 
individuals;
(e) With respect to community-owned land, to regulate participation by communities 
in order to ensure that it is they who take the decisions relating to their land;
Prompt settlement of land conflicts
(f) To establish and apply flexible judicial or non-judicial procedures for the settlement 
of disputes relating to land and other natural resources (in particular, direct settlement 
and conciliation), taking into account the provisions of the Agreement on Resettlement 
of the Population Groups Uprooted by the Armed Conflict and the Agreement on 
Identity and Rights of Indigenous People. In addition, to establish procedures that will 
make it possible:
(i) To define formulas for compensation in the case of land disputes and claims in 
which farmers, small farmers and communities in a situation of extreme poverty have 
been or may be dispossessed for reasons not attributable to them;
(ii) To reinstate or compensate, as appropriate, the State, municipalities, communities 
or individuals when their land has been usurped or has been allocated in an irregular or 
unjustified manner involving abuse of authority;
(g) Regulate the award of title to the lands of indigenous communities and 
beneficiaries of the Guatemalan Institute for Agrarian Reform who are in lawful 
possession of the land assigned to them;
Institutional mechanisms
(h) By 1997, to have started the operations of a Presidential office for legal assistance 
and conflict resolution in relation to land, with nationwide coverage and the task of 
providing advice and legal assistance to small farmers and agricultural workers with a 
view to the full exercise of their rights, and in particular of:
(i) Advising and providing legal assistance to small farmers and agricultural workers 
and/or their organizations upon request;
(ii) Intervening in land disputes at the request of a party with a view to arriving at a 
just and expeditious solution;
(iii) In the case of judicial disputes, providing advice and legal assistance free of 
charge to small farmers and/or their organizations when they so request;
(iv) Receiving complaints of abuses committed against communities, rural 
organizations and individual small farmers and bringing them to the attention of the 
Office of the Counsel for Human Rights and/or of any other national or international 
verification mechanism.
G. Land register
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38. On the basis of the provisions of paragraph 37, the Government undertakes to 
promote legislative changes that would make it possible to establish an efficient 
decentralized multi-user land registry system that is financially sustainable, subject to 
compulsory updating and easy to update. Likewise, the Government undertakes to 
initiate, by January 1997 at the latest, the process of land surveying and systematizing 
the land register information, starting with priority zones, in particular with a view to 
the implementation of paragraph 34 on access to land and other production resources.
H. Labour protection
39. The Government undertakes to promote better participation of rural workers in the 
benefits of agriculture and a reorientation of labour relations in rural areas. It will place 
particular emphasis on applying to rural workers the labour policy outlined in the 
relevant section of the present agreement. An energetic labour protection policy, 
combined with a vocational training policy, is in line with the requirements of social 
justice. It is also needed in order to attack rural poverty and promote an agrarian 
reform aimed at more efficient use of natural and human resources. Accordingly, the 
Government undertakes to:
(a) Ensure that the labour legislation is effectively applied in rural areas;
(b) Pay urgent attention to the abuses to which rural migrant workers, young tenant 
farmers and day labourers are subjected in the context of hiring through middlemen, 
sharecropping, payment in kind and the use of weights and measures. The Government 
undertakes to adopt administrative and/or penal sanctions against offenders;
(c) Promote reform of the procedures for recognition of the legal personality of small 
farmers' organizations with a view to simplifying such recognition and making it more 
flexible through the application of the 1975 International Labour Organization 
Convention 141 on organization of rural workers.
I. Environmental protection
40. Guatemala's natural wealth is a valuable asset of the country and mankind, in 
addition to being an essential part of the cultural and spiritual heritage of the 
indigenous peoples. The irrational exploitation of Guatemala's biogenetic and forest 
resource diversity endangers a human environment that facilitates sustainable 
development. Sustainable development is understood as being a process of change in 
the life of the human being through economic growth with social equity, involving 
production methods and consumption patterns that maintain the ecological balance. 
This process implies respecting ethnic and cultural diversity and guaranteeing the 
quality of life of future generations.
41. In this sense, and in line with the principles of the Central American Alliance for 
Sustainable Development, the Government reiterates the following commitments:
(a) To adjust educational curricula and training and technical assistance programmes to 
the requirements of environmental sustainability;
(b) To give priority to environmental sanitation in its health policy;
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(c) To link physical planning policies, particularly urban planning, with environmental 
protection;
(d) To promote sustainable natural resource management programmes that will create 
jobs.
J. Resources
42. In order to finance the measures mentioned above, and in view of the priority 
assigned to modernizing the agriculture sector and rural development, the Government 
undertakes to increase the State resources allocated to this area by, inter alia:
Land tax
(a) Promoting, by 1997, the legislation and mechanisms for the application, in 
consultation with municipalities, of a land tax in the rural areas from which it is easy 
for the municipalities to collect revenues. The tax, from which small properties will be 
exempt, will help to discourage ownership of undeveloped land and underutilization of 
land. Taken as a whole, these mechanisms ought not to encourage deforestation of land 
use for forestry;
Tax on undeveloped land
(b) Establishing a new tax schedule for the annual tax on undeveloped land which 
imposes significantly higher taxes on privately owned unutilized and/or underutilized 
land.
IV. MODERNIZATION OF GOVERNMENT SERVICES AND FISCAL POLICY
A. Modernization of government services
43. Government services should become an efficient tool of development policies. To 
this end, the Government undertakes to:
Decentralization and redistribution
(a) Deepen the decentralization and redistribution of the powers, responsibilities and 
resources concentrated in the central Government in order to modernize, render 
effective and streamline government services. Decentralization should ensure the 
transfer o f  decision-making power and sufficient resources to the appropriate 1 evels 
(local, municipal, departmental and regional) so as to meet the needs of socio­
economic development in an efficient way and promote close cooperation between 
government bodies and the population. This implies:
(i) Promoting an amendment to the Executive Authority Act and the Departmental 
Control and Administration Act and, in particular, to Decree No. 586 of 1956, which 
will make it possible to simplify, decentralize and redistribute government services;
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(ii) Promoting the decentralization of support systems, including the purchasing and 
procurement system, the human resources system, the information-gathering and 
statistical system and the financial management system.
National auditing
(b) Reform, strengthen and modernize the Comptroller's Office.
Professionalization and advancement of public servants
44. The State should have a skilled labour force which can ensure the honest and 
efficient management of public fimds. To this end, it is necessary to:
(a) Establish a career civil service;
(b) Adopt legal and administrative measures to ensure real compliance with the 
Integrity and Accountability Act;
(c) Promote criminal sanctions for acts of corruption and misappropriation of public 
fimds.
B. Fiscal pohcy
45. Fiscal policy (revenue and expenditure) is the key tool enabling the State to comply 
with its constitutional commitments, particularly those relating to social development, 
which is essential to the quest for the common good. Fiscal policy is also essential to 
Guatemalan sustainable development, which has been impaired by low levels of 
education, health c are and p ublic s ecurity, a 1 ack o f  i nfrastructure and other factors 
which militate against increasing the productivity of labour and the competitiveness of 
the Guatemalan economy.
Budgetary policy
46. Budgetary policy should respond to the need for socio-economic development in a 
stable context, which requires a public spending policy consistent with the following 
basic principles:
(a) Giving priority to social spending, the provision of public services and the basic 
infrastructure needed to support production and marketing;
(b) Giving priority to social investment in health care, education and housing; rural 
development; job creation; and compliance with the commitments entered into under 
the peace agreements. The budget should include sufficient resources for strengthening 
the organizations and institutions responsible for ensuring the rule of law and respect 
for human rights;
(c) Efficient budget performance, with an emphasis on decentralization, redistribution 
and auditing of budgetary resources.
Tax policy
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47. Tax policy should be designed to enable the collection of the resources needed for 
the performance of the State's functions, including the funds required for the 
consolidation of peace, within the framework of a tax system consistent with the 
following basic principles:
(a) The system is fair, equitable and, on the whole, progressive, in keeping with the 
constitutional principle of ability to pay;
(b) The system is universal and compulsory;
(c) The system stimulates saving and investment.
48. The State should also ensure efficiency and transparency in tax collection and 
fiscal management so as to promote taxpayer confidence in government policy and 
eliminate tax evasion and fraud.
Tax collection target
49. Bearing in mind the need to increase State revenues in order to cope with the 
urgent tasks of economic growth, social development and building peace, the 
Government undertakes to ensure that by the year 2000, the tax burden, measured as a 
ratio of gross domestic product, increases by at least 50 per cent as compared with the 
1995 tax burden.
Fiscal commitment
50. As a step towards a fair and equitable tax system, the Government undertakes to 
address the most serious issue relating to tax injustice and inequity, namely, evasion 
and fraud, especially on the part of those who should be the largest contributors. In 
order to eradicate privileges and abuses, eliminate tax evasion and fraud and 
implement a tax system which is, on the whole, progressive, the Government 
undertakes to:
Legislation
(a) Promote an amendment to the Tax Code establishing harsher penalties for tax 
evasion, avoidance and fraud, both for taxpayers and for tax administration officials;
(b) Promote an amendment to the tax laws designed to eliminate loopholes;
(c) Evaluate and regulate tax exemptions strictly so as to eliminate abuses; 
Strengthening of tax administration
(d) Strengthen the existing auditing and collection mechanisms, such as cross­
checking, tax identification numbers and tax credits for withholding of income tax and 
value-added tax;
(e) Simplify and automate tax administration procedures;
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(f) Ensure the correct and prompt application or reimbursement of tax credit and 
punish severely those who do not return withheld value-added tax to the tax 
authorities;
(g) Create a special programme for large contributors in order to ensure that they 
comply fully with their tax obligations;
(h) Implement administrative structures specifically g eared to the revenue collection 
and auditing programmes and to the application of the relevant tax laws;
(i) Strengthen the capacity of municipalities to exercise their authority to collect taxes; 
Participation
(j) Ensure that the urban and rural development councils contribute to the definition 
and monitoring of tax policy within the framework of their mandate to formulate 
development policies;
Civic education
(k) Within academic curricula, continue to promote knowledge of, respect for and 
compliance with tax obligations as part of coexistence in a democratic society.
Enforcement of tax policy
51. The failure to fulfil tax obligations deprives the country of the resources needed in 
order to address the backlog of social needs affecting Guatemalan society. The 
Government undertakes to impose exemplary penalties on those who engage in various 
types of tax fraud, to modernize and strengthen tax administration and to give priority 
to spending on social needs.
V. FINAL PROVISIONS
1. This Agreement shall form part of the agreement on a firm and lasting peace and 
shall enter into force at the time of the signing of the latter agreement.
2. In order to ensure that this Agreement serves the interests of Guatemalans, the 
Government shall initiate immediately the programming and planning activities which 
will enable it to comply with the investment commitments contained herein.
3. In accordance with the Framework Agreement, the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations is requested to verify compliance with this Agreement.
4. This Agreement shall be disseminated as widely as possible; to this end, the 
cooperation of the mass media and of teaching and educational institutions is 
requested.
Mexico City, 6 May 1996
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For the Government of the Republic of Guatemala 
Gustavo PORRAS CASTEJÔN 
Raquel ZELAYA ROSALES 
Brigadier General Otto PÉREZ MOLINA 
Richard AITKENHEAD CASTILLO
For the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca
General Command
Commander Pablo MONSANTO
Commander Rolando MORAN
Commander Caspar ILOM
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For the United Nations 
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